IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ. - This is a second application under Section 426, Cr.P.C, seeking suspension of sentence awarded to the petitioners/convicts by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gojra, vide judgment dated 21.07.2010, in case F.I.R. No. 144, registered at Police Station Nawan Lahore, Gojra, for offences under Sections 302, 324, 337-F(i), 148 & 149, P.P.C., whereby they were convicted and sentenced as under:-
(i) Under Section 324/34. P.P.C.
10 years' R.I. And fine of Rs. 20,000/- in default of payment whereof further R.I. For 2 years.
(ii) Under Section 337-F/(in P.P.C.
One year's R.I. With payment of Daman Rs. 10,000/-.
(iii) Under Section 324/34. P.P.C.
Two years' R.I. And payment of Daman Rs. 10,000/-.
2. In support of this petition, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been given benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C, by the learned Trial Court, hence, their conviction would start w.e.f. 13.09.2009 i.e. From the date of their arrest and thus, they are entitled to be released on bail, on account of recent amendment in Section 426, Cr.P.C.
3. On the other hand, learned Additional Prosecutor General as well as learned counsel for the complainant have vehemently opposed this petition by submitting that judgment in the instant case was delivered on 21.07.2010, therefore, statutory ground has not yet accrued to the petitioners, hence, the instant petition being misconceived is liable to be dismissed.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the impugned judgment, I have noted that through the impugned judgment the petitioners/convicts were awarded imprisonment for ten years alongwith other sentences in various offences detail of which has been given above and according to the amendment brought in Section 426(1-A)(c), Cr.P.C., an Appellate Court shell, except where it is of the opinion that'* the delay in the decision of appeal has been occasioned by an at or omission of the appellant or any other person acting on his behalf, order a convicted person to be released on bail who has been sentenced to imprisonment for life or imprisonment exceeding seven years and whose appeal has not been decided within a period of two years of his conviction. The petitioners have preferred their appeal before this Court on 14.09.2010, so the period required for releasing them on bail has not elapsed so far. The submission of the learned counsel that the statutory period of two years would start from the arrest of the appellant is not tenable as the benefit of period before conviction is not mentioned in the amendment. Resultantly this application being misconceived is hereby dismissed.