' SYED SAJJAD HASSAN SHAH, J.---The petitioner-plaintiff filed the suit for possession through pre- emption against the sale transaction effected through registered Sale-deed No,3098 attested on 25-9-2007. Thereafter, the registered deed was incorporated in Revenue Record vide Mutation No,6987 dated 9-10-2008 in the name of respondent-vendee. The respondent has purchased the land measuring 10-Marla out of Khasra No,324 for an ostensible price of Rs,1,30,000 whereas actual sale consideration was fixed and paid as Rs,20,000. He further alleged that vendor has sold the same secretly and no notice was given under section 32 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. The petitioner-plaintiff claimed that he has acquired the knowledge of sale transaction on 20-10-2008 and has failed the suit on 27-10-2008. He possessed superior right of pre-emption being co-sharer, contiguous owner and participator in immunities.
2. The respondent-defendant filed an application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. On the ground that the suit is barred by limitation having been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The application was rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 24-4- 2009 which order was set aside by the learned District Judge, D.I. Khan and the suit was dismissed being hopelessly time-barred.
3.- The impugned judgment of the appellate Court assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that sale-deed is registered but Registrar concerned did not give public notice in respect of such registration as envisaged by section 32 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 which is not redundant, as such, the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of knowledge got by petitioner-plaintiff and not from the date of registration of sale-deed as provided by section 31 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. He further argued that the sale transaction was kept secret and the petitioner-plaintiff got the knowledge on 20-10-2008 and filed the suit on 25-10-2008 after completing the requisite formalities of Talbs, thus, the suit has been filed within the period of 120 days of the knowledge of the petitioner plaintiff which is well within time.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent strenuously rebutted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the absence of penal clause, the provisions of section 32 of the Act ibid are directory and not mandatory as it is specifically mentioned in Clause (a) of section 31 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 that the period Of limitation would run from the date of the registration of the sale-deed. It is further submitted that the plaint was rightly rejected by the learned appellate Court, as the suit was hopelessly time-barred.
5. We have considered the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and carefully perused the record.
6. A perusal of record reveals that the suit has been filed by the petitioner-plaintiff after seven months of the expiry of period of limitation. As per provisions contained in section 31 of the N.-W.F.P.
Pre-emption Act, 1987, the period of limitation has been prescribed as 120 days. Section 31 reads as under:-- "30. Limitation. ---The period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption under this Act shall be four months from the date--
(a) of the registration of the sale-deed;
(b) of the attestation of the mutation; if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale-deed;
(c) on which the vendee takes physical possession of the property if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale-deed or a mutation; or
(d) of knowledge by the pre-emptor, if the sale is not covered under paragraph(a) or paragraph(b) or paragraph(c)."
7. From perusal of the above cited provisions, it appears that no extension in period of limitation for filing the suit has been provided. The period would be computed from the date of attestation of registered sale-deed or if sale is made through mutation, the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of its attestation. The pre-emptor is required to file the suit for pre- emption within a period of 120 days as provided under the afore-stated provisions of law, meaning thereby that if the pre-emptor has failed to file the suit within the specified period, his suit would not be maintainable, as there is no provision available in the Act ibid that the suit can be filed within 120 days from the date of knowledge of the pre-emptor in case of registration of registered deed as well as the sale mutation.
8. The respondent has asserted in his plaint that the sale was concealed by the petitioner and at the same time, Sub-Registrar did not issue the public notice within the meanings of section 31 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, thus, claimed to have the limitation for filing of his suit computed from the date of his knowledge of sale i,e, five days earlier to the institution of suit.
9. Likewise, the provision contained in section 32 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 is reproduced as under:- "Notice---(I) The Registrar registering the sale-deed or the Revenue Officer attesting the mutation of a sale shall, within two weeks of the registration or attestation, as thee case- may be, give public notice in respect -of such registration or attestation.
(2) The notice under subsection (1) .Shall be deemed sufficiently given if it be stuck up on the main entrance of a mosque and on any other public place of the village, city or place where the property is situated: ' Provided that if the property is situated in a city, the notice shall also be given through a newspaper having large circulation in such city.
(3) The charges for the notice under subsection 2 shall be recovered from the vendee by the Registrar or the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, at the time of registration or attestation of mutation."
10. We have also examined the above-cited provisions or section 321 of the Act ibid. Though the word "shall" has been used therein but it is directory in nature, as it does not provide the penal consequences in case of non-compliance of the same. Both the sections of law are quite independent in nature and spirit, without D there being any nexus in both of them, therefore, section 32 in no way abridges the scope and nature of section 31, thus, having no overriding effect which is mandatory in nature. In such eventuality, if any suit to have filed, to be considered beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
11. While determining the question that whether a provision of law is mandatory or directory depends upon the intention of legislature envisaged by the plain reading of its language in which the provision is couched. In order to substantiate the point under consideration we would like to dilate upon that while interpreting certain provision of law, the Court cannot modify the clear intention of law makers. It has to interpret the law as it is and not as it ought to be. The Court is not to make law or interpret in a manner which may be resulted as making the law. In this regard, the yardstick is available with the Court to know the intention of the law maker. In support of our reasoning, the reference of - Maxwell in his, "Interpretation of Statute," seventh Edition, defined while relying on case-law reproduced as under:-- "If the words of the statute in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words in themselves in such case best declaring the intension of legislature."
' Again, placing reliance on case-law, Maxwell says at page-7 that:- "The rule of construction is to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. It matters not, in such a case what the consequences may be. Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced, even though it be absurd or mischievous. The underlying principle is that the meaning of intention of a statute must be collected from the plaint and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the Courts as to what is just or expedient"
' Elaborating the point at page 5 it is stated again that:-- "However unjust, arbitrary or inconvenient the meaning conveyed may be it must receive its full effect, when once the meaning is plain, it is not the province of a Court to scan its wisdom or its policy.
' Craies on Statute Law Seventh Edition Chapter 5th at page 65 says:- "Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature"
' It is further stated at page 66:- "Some fifty years before in Salomon v. A Salomon and Co.
' Ltd. Lord Waston had said: `Intention of the Legislature' is a common but vary slippery phrase, which popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant "although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of law or equity what the Legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be ascertained from what it has chosen to enact" either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication" After expounding the enactment it only remains to enforce it" notwithstanding that it may be very generally received opinion that it "does not produce the effect which the legislature intended" or "might with 'advantage be modified."
' The point is further clarified at page 67 whereat it is stated:- "Even though a Court is satisfied that the Legislature did not contemplate the consequences of an enactment, a Court is bound to give effect to its clear language."
' The question of creeping of an error in a statute is dealt with at page 68, it is stated thereat:-- "In Lee v. Bude etc. Ry. Where it was argued that certain Acts of Parliament had been obtained by inserting in them false recitals, I would observe, said Willes, J. "that these Acts of Parliament are the law of the land and we do not sit here as a Court of appeal from Parliament If an Act of the Parliament has been obtained improperly, it is for the Legislature to correct it by repealing it, but so long as it exists as law the Courts are bound to obey it."
' Where the statutory provision even contains certain ambiguity or reasonableness or unreasonableness the Court has to give effect to the provision of law as it stands. Reliance placed upon the case of Abdul Muhammad v. Malik and others (2001 YLR 2117 Peshawar) wherein it has been held that:- "In interpretation of Statutes by N.S. Bindra. Fourth Edition at page 333, it is held that where words of the statute are clear then it is not within the province of a - Court simply with a view to avoid apparent anomalies to put such an interpretation on the words as they are incapable of hearing.
' It is always for the Legislature to take steps and to remove the anomaly, if any, and where it is considered fit to do so. Nothing can be added to the statute nor can be subtracted from it. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the law as it stands and Court should not depart from the plaint, meaning of the section even though serious anomalies may result where the provisions of ' the law are unambiguous, the Court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such statutory provisions.
' The Court of law is bound to construe an interpretation of the Act to the plain meaning of the language unless in the section itself or in any other part of the Act anything is found to modify, qualify or hold the statutory language even if absurd to be the result of such interpretation. What we hold is that even the principle of inconvenience i,e, "ab inconvenient" is only admissible on construing the provisions of law or statute where the meanings are obscure but where language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature/law-maker and not for the Court to consider.
Where a person/citizen feels like suffering such enactment he must appeal for relief to the law- maker. It is not for the Court to extend the scope of an Act on the ground of convenience."
12. By now it is well-settled principle of law that as a general rule statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but it is mandatory when those directions are followed by an express provision that in default to follow them the acts shall be null and void. The provisions of section 32 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 being directory, cannot in any manner override or dilute the provisions of section 31 of the Act ibid which are mandatory by all standards. Reliance placed on the case of Maulana Nur ul Haq v. Ibrahim Khalil (2000 SCM R 1305) wherein it has been held that:- "There is yet another aspect of the matter to which it is necessary to refer to section 32 of the Act appears to be mandatory, in view of the expression 'shall' used therein, but in fact is directory for want of a penal clause. No doubt there exists no faultless acid test or a universal rule for determining whether a provision of law is mandatory or directory and such determination by and large depends upon the intention of Legislature and the language in which the provision is couched but it is by now firmly settled that where the consequence of failure to comply with the provision is not mentioned the provision is directory and where the consequence is expressly mentioned the provision is mandatory. It was held in Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqeeb (PLD 1974 SC 134) that as a general rule a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matters merely of direction, but it is mandatory when those directions are followed by an express provision that in default of following them the facts shall be null and void. In Major Shujat All v. Mst.
Surrya Begum (PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 118) it was. Held that in the absence of a penalty for failure to follow the prescribed procedure the provisions are to be taken to be directory and not mandatory.
The provisions of section 32 of the Act being directory cannot in any manner override or dilute the provisions of section 31 of the Act which are mandatory till standards."
' Similar view has been expressed in the case of Mian Asif Islam v. Mian Muhammad Asif (PLD 2001 SC 499) wherein it has been held that:-- "The word "shall" used in section 30 of the said Act is mandatory in nature, therefore, the period of four months from the date of registration by section 30 cannot be extended because of section 31 of the said Act as official act is presumed to have been duly and regularly performed."
' Similar view has been expressed in the case of Malik Mirza v. Matloob Ahmad and 3 others (2008 CLC 1556) that:-- "The contention that if the Registrar fails to issue public notice envisaged by the mandatory provision of section 32 of the Act, the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of knowledge by the pre-emptor is misconceived. Such a provision is neither contained in section 31 of the Act nor can read into it in view of settled law that Courts cannot supply casus omissus. A comparative study of sections 31 and 32 of the Act would make it manifest that the provision with regard to public notice by the Registrar contained in section 32 for filing a pre-emption suit in respect of a sale transaction effected through a registered sale-deed and is meant to provide an extra source of knowledge for making Talb-e-Muwathibut and an alternative timeframe for making Talb-e-Ishhad in accordance with subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act."
13. The provision of section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides that any suit etc. Filed after the period of limitation prescribed by the first schedule shall be not permitting such interpretation of the law. Moreso, the legislature never intended J to create such a situation dismissed even if limitation has not been set up as ground of defence. Therefore, the suit filed beyond the period of limitation, the Court has ample power to dismiss the same at its very inception. In the case of Maulana Nur ul Haq v. Ibrahim Khalil (supra) the following dictum has been laid down:-- "As regards the third contention it will be enough to say that the plaint was rightly rejected as the suit having been brought beyond one hundred and twenty days of registration of the sale-deed was time-barred and the allegation that the transaction was effected in a clandestine manner overlooks this legal position that registration of a sale-deed is a notice to the publicat-large. For these reasons, leave is declined and the petition is dismissed."
14. If we give effect to those provisions contained in section 31 and section 32 of the Act in the manner as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it amounts to nullify and to declare as redundant the mandatory provisions of above-noted section 31 of the Act which shall amount to extend wide discretion and latitude, to the pre-emptor to file a suit for possession through preemption at any time according to his convenience, simply asserting in the plaint that the Registrar while attesting the registered deed and Revenue Officer while attesting the sale mutation did not observe the provisions contained in section 32 of the Act. The above discussion with reference to the law and its interpretation, would create a complex situation which would be faced by allowing the interpretation as urged on behalf of the petitioner, can be avoided by In this case, the sale transaction was effected through attestation of registered sale-deed. It is the basic principle of law that a registered deed constitutes presumptive notice to the public at large. It is also evident from the record that the petitioner resides in the same village where the suit-land is situated.
15. For the reasons mentioned above, we are firm in our view that the impugned order of the learned appellate Court is quite in accordance with law and requires no interference in constitutional jurisdiction by this Court. Resultantly, the instant writ petition being without substance is hereby dismissed.