' CH. MUHAMMAD YOUNIS, J.--- Briefly stated the facts relevant for the disposal of this constitutional petition are that the respondent No,2 filed an application under section 11-A of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, seeking permission of the Court to terminate more than 50% of the workmen without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the settlement due to stagnation in overall economy of the country, squeezing fiscal space and framework, convention of Tobacco Control Implementation, increase of excise tax on cigarette since 2007 and continuous decline in profit of the company since 2009. The petitioner-union was arrayed as respondent in the said petition.
Under section 14(x) of the Constitution of the petitioner-union the General Secretary of the Union was competent to conduct the cases of every nature with the consultation of the Chief Organizer.
The Chief Organizer was only authorized fully to file the cases on behalf of the Union but he as well as the President and the Chairman of the union were not authorized to defend the cases on behalf of the union independently without any specific resolution of the union. The Union was being represented by one Babu Muhammad ldrees the Chief Organizer and the President of the Union who on the very first date of hearing and without notice attended the court without permission of the Executive Body. The General Secretary having come to know of the collusion of the President, the_Chairman and Chief Organizer with the respondent-company filed an application after getting approval from the General Body to allow him to defend the application filed by the respondent-company. The said application was dismissed vide impugned order dated 11-8-2011 by the learned Labour Court.
2. The said order of the learned Labour Court was assailed in revision petition but the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the revision petition vide impugned judgment dated 10-11-2011.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order of the learned Labour Court and the judgment passed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal are against law and facts. The General Secretary was authorized to whereas the Chief Organizer or the President and Chairman of the union was not competent to defend the petition of the respondent on behalf of the union. The petitioner-union is a body corporate and was competent to sue and to be sued by its name. The Executive Body was competent to take decision to represent the union in any case.
The General Secretary was the person who was authorized to conduct the cases of every nature with the consultation of the Chief Organizer. The President and Chairman of the union were not authorized to defend the cases of union independently without any specific resolution of the union.
The learned Labour Court had thus no lawful justification to dismiss the application of the General Secretary to allow him to file written reply to the petition and defend the same. Both the forums have allegedly deprived the petitioner-union to defend the petition through General Secretary. In the absence of any efficacious alternate remedy the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by the petitioner union by filing this writ petition.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent-Company has vehemently opposed the petition and argued that under compelling circumstances the petition under section 11-A had been filed before.
The learned Labour Court and the petitioner Union delayedthe matter on one pretext or the other.
The ,Chief Organizer had himself appeared before the learned Labour Court to represent the petitioner-Union on the very first date when the petition was entertained by the learned Labour Court. There was nothing to prevent the General Secretary of the union to file the reply to the petition but the matter was delayed and thereafter the President and the Chairman filed the reply.
The learned *counsel goes on to submit that labour proceedings are summary in nature. The principal office bearer of the union was competent to sign, initiate and defend the proceedings as held in PLD 1978 Karachi 417. Moreover, the concurrent findings of both the forums below warrant no interference by this Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The sole purpose of the petitioner-union was, to delay the matter for an indefinite period, whereas the company was continuously suffering huge loss. During the period of 9 months ending on Sept. 30, 2011 the company had suffered loss of about Rs,30 crore. The petitioner-union has filed this petition with mala fide intention in order to delay the matter further. The petitioner-union even refused to cross- examine the witness of the respondent. Due to the conduct of the petitioner-union the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was constrained to transfer the Appellate Tribunal was constrained to transfer the case as is evident from the order dated 12-9-2011. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for, the respondent has referred. To PLD 2010 SC 691, 1987 SCMR 1887, PLD 1978 Karachi 417 and 1988 PLC 894. The learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to some other case-law which is not relevant for the decision of the instant writ petition.
5. I have considered the arguments advanced from both the sides and have gone through the impugned orders.
6. According to the constitution of the petitioner-union, only the General Secretary was competent to defend the petition in consultation with the Chief Organizer. The order sheet dated 21-5-2011 shows that on the very first date when the petition was presented by the respondent, Babu Muhammad I drees Chief Organizer was given copies and he was asked to submit the written statement so the notice was never issued to the petitioner :Union so as to enable the General Secretary to file the written .Statement. As informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the President and Chairman had connived with the respondent-company so they were issued show- cause notices for submitting the written reply on behalf of the union without any authority. The inquiry was conducted and the inquiry committee finding them guilty had suspended them. The Executive Committee proceeded against them. As regards Babu Muhammad Idrees, the Chief Organizer, he was not competent to appear on behalf of the petitioner-union or accept the service and defend the petition before the learned Labour Court as it was against the constitution of the petitioner-Union which provides that all the correspondence and litigation and proceedings in the litigation shall be conducted by the General Secretary with the consultation of the Chief Organizer.
So, the Chief Organizer himself was not competent to appear and defend before the learned Labour Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly pointed out that in another Petition No,174 of 2010 the respondent-company itself submitted that under the registered constitution of "Jeeway Pakistan Workers. Union" it was the General Secretary alone who could file and initiate the proceedings in the learned Labour Court. Under the Pakistan Industrial Relation Ordinance, 2010, and Pakistan Industrial Relation Rules, 1973, it was the General Secretary alone who could invoke the jurisdiction of learned Labour Court or initiate proceedings for and on behalf of the CBA union. It was further contended by the respondent-company itself that the application filed by the union through its Chief Organizer Babu Muhammad Idrees was illegal and not maintainable as he was not employee of the company nor was a workman employed in establishment and he has no authority to invoke the jurisdiction of learned Labour Court. The respondent-company cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. On one hand, the learned counsel contended that being principal officer the said Chief Organizer was competent to defend the petition but at the same time it was contention of the respondent-company itself that only the General Secretary was competent to file and initiate proceedings in the learned Labour Court. So, in the light of the above discussion, it is held that the application of the General Secretary was illegally dismissed by the learned Labour Court. If he had been allowed to file the written statement in July 2011, the matter could have been concluded much before.
7. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the impugned orders passed by the learned Labour Court as well as the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal are not sustainable in the eye of law. Dismissal of application of the petitioner-Union to file written statement merely on the basis of observation that it was aimed at delaying the proceedings was without any lawful justification
8. In these circumstances, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. The learned Labour Court is directed to allow the General Secretary of the petitioner-union to file the written statement and then proceed further with the matter in accordance with law. Since the matter has already been delayed, the learned Labour Court is directed to conclude the proceedings' within two months from the next date of hearing.