1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This appeal, by the leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated the 25th of June, 1979, passed by the learned Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, by which an order of ejectment made against the appellant by the learned Rent Controller on the ground of default in the payment of rent as well as bona fide personal need of the landlady, was upheld. The first appeal filed by the appellant had been earlier dismissed by the Additional District Judge by his order dated the 3rd of October, 1978.
2. In the High Court, the main controversy centered around the question of default in the payment of rent. The landlady had alleged in the ejectment application that the monthly rent of Rs. 200, was payable in advance by the appellant on the first of each month for a portion of Bungalow No. 63-C Model Town, Lahore; and that the appellant had defaulted in the payment thereof since January, 1976, with tap result that arrears to the extent of Rs. 2,600, had accumulated. While the (carved Rent Controller found that the monthly rent was, indeed, fixed at Rs. 2.00, per mensem, the Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the monthly rent was Rs. 170, including the electricity charges, and that the appellant had committed default in the payment of rent only in respect of the months of July, and August, 1976. He held that the rent for these two months was deposited in the treasury by the appellant on the 30th of September, 1976, and since then the appellant had continued to deposit rent regularly, and the ejectment petition was instituted against him on the 21st of July, 1977.
3. It was contended in the High: Court that, irrespective of any agreement between the parties regarding the payment of monthly rent in advance, the matter was really governed by the statutory provisions contained in clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, which clearly stipulates payment of rent within 60 days from the period for which the rent is payable and that being so, the appellant could not be held to be in default, as he had made the payment within this period of 60 days for both the months in question.
4. This argument was not accepted by the High Court, on the ground that the tenant had clearly admitted that there was an agreement between the parties that the monthly rent shall be paid in advance, on the 1st of each month, and that being so he was under an obligation to pay rent within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy, as stipulated in the first part of the clause relied upon by the tenant, which meant that the rent for the month of July, had to be paid by the 15th of July, and that for the month of August by the 15th of August, 1976. On this view of the matter, the learned Chief Justice upheld the finding recorded by the District Court on the question of default.
5. He also re-affirmed the concurrent finding of the Courts below on the question of the bona fide personal need of the landlady for herself and her children. He accordingly, dismissed the second appeal.
6. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on the 19th of November, 1979, to consider the following contentions:
(a) That in the face of the statutory provisions contained in section 13 of the Ordinance permitting the payment of rent within sixty days of the period for which the rent is payable, the appellant could not be held to be in default on the basis of an agreement between the parties for the payment of rent in advance; and
(b) that the finding as regards the bona fide personal need of the land--lady was recorded by the High Court without hearing the appellant on the ground that it was a concurrent finding of fact.
7. Mr. A. K. Dogar, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that in terms of clause (f) of subsection
(2) of section 13 of the Ordinance, a tenant becomes liable to be evicted only if he has not paid or tendered rent due by him, and the rent becomes due only after the expiry of the period for which it is payable, and not before irrespective of any agreement to pay the same in advance. 1n support of this proposition, he has placed reliance on Altaf Hussain v. Talib Hussain (PLD 1977 Lah. 110), which is a judgment by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. It was concluded by the learned Judge that the tenancy being a monthly one the law allows fifteen days time to the tenant to pay the rent by the 15th of the subsequent month; as the rent would fall due only after the whole month had expired, and no default would be committed if the tenant merely acted against the condition regarding the advance payment of rent.
8. Precisely this very question had recently come up for examination before a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 162-R of 1975, namely, Alif Din v. Khadim Hussain (1980 SCMR 767), decided on the 2nd of April, 1980, and it was observed that the learned Single Judge, who decided the case of Altaf Hussain, had unfortunately overlooded a previous Division Bench judgment of his own Court, Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Sharif and 3 others (PLD 1971 Lah. 610), in which a contrary view had been taken to the effect that: "if there is an agreement of tenancy between the parties, then the matter falls in the first category mentioned in clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance, which stipulates that the rent is payable within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord" In Alif Din's case, this Court has approved the view taken by the Court in the case of Muhammad Ashraf in preference to the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the case of Altaf Hussain.
9. After hearing Mr. A. K. Dogar at some length and examining the provisions of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, we have no hesitation in reiterating that clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance comprises of two parts, dealing with two different and distinct situations.
10. In the first part it stipulates a situation where a time is fixed in the agreement of tenancy for the payment of rent, and in such a case the phrase "rent due by him" means the rent which has become due according to the terms of the tenancy: and if it is not paid within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement, then the tenant becomes liable to ejectment. In other words, the intention of the law clearly is to preserve the sanctity of the mutual contract as to the time agreed upon for the payment of rent, which becomes due on the date stipulated in the agreement. If the agreement stipulates the payment of advance rent by a certain date, then rent becomes due on that day, and the law allows a period of fifteen days for it payment after the expiry of the specified date, which is in the nature of a grace period for the benefit of tenants.
11. The second part of the clause deals with a situation where there is no agreement between the parties as to the date or time by which the rent is to be paid; and in such a case the law allows the tenant a period o sixty days from the period for which the rent is payable. We are unable to accept the contention that the second part of the clause also governs the first part, as such a proposition would amount to negating the first part of the clause, which is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.
12. As a result, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court that in terms of the agreement between the parties the rent for the month of July had become due on the first of July, and for the month of August on the first of August, 1976, and had to be paid by the 15th of the month concerned. As the tenant had clearly failed to pay the rent due from him within the time allowed by law, he was rightly found to be in default, and liable to be ejected on that ground.
13. As we are upholding the order of ejectment made against the appellant on the ground of default in the payment of rent, it is not necessary for us to examine the other ground found against the appellant, namely, the bona fide personal need of the landlady for herself and her children.
14. The appeal, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed. We would, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
15. The appellant is allowed two months time to vacate the premises.