SARDAR FAKHRE ALAM, J.-By this single judgment we propose to dispose of Civil Revisions Nos. 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, and 180 of 1981 (8 in number), as these arise out of a consolidated order of the Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance XIX of 1979) hereinafter referred to as Ordinance and also for the reason that the contesting parties are the same and the question raised challenging the impugned order is common to all.
2. The circumstances in which these revision petitions have been filed in short compass are that Allied Bank of Pakistan instituted eight suits for the recovery of different sums of loan from the defendants.
3. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Special Court under the Ordinance, Muhammad Ayub 'Butt defendant, the guarantor prayed for dismissal of the suits on the grounds that-there has been illegal conversion of the pledged goods on the part of the plaintiff-Bank as these were sold without the permission of the Court, notice to the defendants and that the plaintiff having opted to retain the goods as collateral security could not have proceeded to sell these. By an elaborate order dated 15-3-1981; the learned Special Judge, Banking N.-W. F. P. Dismissed all the eight applica--tions. The 'present eight revision petitions under section 115 of the C. P. C. Are directed against the said order.
4. Before, Mr. Hidayatullah Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner could touch the merits of the case, he was confronted with the preposition regarding the competency of the revision petitions under section 115, C. P. C. To meet the point he mainly relied on section 3 of the Ordinance, which reads:- "The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in addition to and, save as hereinafter expressly provided, not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force."
Elaborating further, he contended that the other laws including the C. P. C. Would be applicable to the matters dealt with under the Ordinance.
5. We, however, after thoroughly vetting all the provisions of the Ordinance do not share the view of the learned counsel. The Ordinance, which is a Special Statute promulgated for the recovery of specified loans advanced by the Banking Companies has prescribed its own procedure and the establishment of Special Courts. Section 2 (f) defines a Special Court to be one established under section 5 of the Ordinance and subsection (2) of section 5 of the Ordinance, lays down that a Special Court shall consist of a person, who is a District Judge. Under section 6, a Special Court shall in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction have all the powers vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 7 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Special Court which is the summary procedure provided for in Order XXXVII, in the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 11 deals with the finality of orders of the Special Court and it is in the following terms:- "Subject to the provisions for appeal in section 12, no Court or other authority shall call or permit to be called in question any order, judgment or sentence of a Special Court or the legality or propriety of anything done or intended to be done by the Special Court under this Ordinance."
Next comes section 12 which deals with the appeals and it being also very pertinent to resolve the controversy, the same is reproduced: "(1) Any person aggrieved by any order, judgment, decree or sentence of a Special Court may, within thirty days of such order, judgment, decree or sentence, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the order, judgment decree or sentence is passed: Provided that no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case before 'the Special Court.
(2) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be on any one of the following grounds, namely:-
(a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or
(b) the decision having failed to determine a material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or
(c) a substantial error apparent in the procedure provided by or under this Ordinance, which may possibly have produced error in the decision on merits.
(3) An appeal may be preferred under this section from a decision made ex Parte.
(4) An appeal under this section shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges.
(5) No appeal shall be admitted for hearing unless the appellant deposits in cash with the High Court an amount equivalent to the judgment debt or, at the discretion of the High Court, furnishes security equal in value to such amount."
Though the exclusion of jurisdiction shall not be easily inferred but the proviso to subsection (1) of section 12 clearly mentions that no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order, which does not dispose of the entire case before the Special Court. The High Court has only been invested with the limited powers of entertaining an appeal against a final judgment and decree of the Special Court and that too when the appellant deposits in cash with the High Court an amount equivalent to the judgment debt or if the High Court orders that instead the appellant should furnish security equal to the decretal amount. The whole scheme and purpose of the Ordinance as is evident is that the suits of the nature covered by it are to be disposed of expeditiously though with a right of appeal to the High Court but against the final decision and not from interlocutory orders.
6. The contention of the learned counsel that other laws including the C. P. C. Would be applicable under section 3 of the Ordinance is not a correct interpretation of the section. All other laws referred to in the section would be applicable subject to the express provisions of the Ordinance. The right of revision always is a creation of statute and the Ordinance does not provide for the same. There is provision for appeal incorporated in section 12 of the Ordinance, but therein again it is specifically laid down that no such appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order. The Code of Civil Procedure has not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Ordinance, though a Special Court is to exercise the powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and while exercising the powers it shall follow the summary procedure provided for in Order XXXVII in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, section 11 of the Ordinance in an unequivocal manner creates specific bar to the entertainment of the matters dealt with by the Special Court within its jurisdiction, by any Court or authority except the appeal provided for in section 12 against the final decision. There can be no manner of doubt that amongst other the revision under section 115 of the C. P. C. Is also barred.
On the view of the matter that we take, finding the revision petitions to be incompetent, we dismiss these in limine.