Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of IA Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has called in question the validity of the last paragraph of order dated 17-3-2010, whereby, the learned trial Court has ordered for confiscation of Rs.2,00,000 ( two lacs) in favour of the State while accepting an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C, in case F.I.R. No.233 of 2009 dated 3-10-2009 under section 365-A, P.P.C., Police Station, Pipplan, District Mianwali, registered at the complaint of Dost Muhammad, against Habib Ullah (petitioner), Naveed Ali alias Raju, Waris Khan and Asghar Khan with the allegation that they forcibly abducted his son namely Mureed Abbas at 12-00 noon on 29-9-2009 and subsequently demanded ransom amount, Rs.2,00,000 (two lacs) and according to the prosecution case it had been paid by the complainant to the accused which was allegedly recovered during the course of investigation at the instance of the petitioner and his co-accused. The complainant, however, received this amount on Superdari pending trial.
2. After usual investigation, the challan under section 173, Cr.P.C. Was submitted before the concerned court for trial of the accused, copies were delivered under section 265-C, Cr.P.C, followed by framing of charge against the accused to which they did not plead guilty and claimed a trial. The prosecution thus, was directed by the learned trial Court to produce its witnesses for bringing home the guilt of the accused. The prosecution produced Dost Muhammad complainant as P.W.1, Elam Din as P.W.2 and Amanullah as P.W.3, whereafter, the accused including the petitioner moved an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Seeking acquittal of the charge which was accepted by the learned trial Court on 17-3-2010, with the aforementioned observation about the ransom amount, referred to above, hence, the instant petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned trial Court has not believed the version of the complainant qua payment of ransom amount Rs.2,00,000 and has refused to deem it as the case property; the impugned order entails a direction that the said amount be confiscated in favour of the State which had been received by the complainant on Superdari during the proceedings of the trial; Dost Muhammad complainant has not claimed the amount in question as his own, in his statement as P.W.1 and has categorically denied to have paid any ransom amount to the accused persons, with further deposition that the said amount belonged to the police and not to him; Elam Din, P.W.2 and Amanullah P.,W.3 have also not stated even a single word qua the aforesaid ransom amount, to belong to Dost Muhammad complainant; the said amount was taken into possession by the police at the instance of the petitioner so in absence of any counter claimant, he is entitled to the custody of the same; the observation of the learned trial Court about the alleged ransom amount, not to be the case property, clearly establishes and justifies the claim of the petitioner to receive the said amount being its lawful owner; lastly contends that the impugned order in respect of ransom amount has resulted in miscarriage of justice.
4. The learned Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab controverts the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and contends that the ransom amount Rs.2,00,000 has been rightly disposed of in the impugned order by the learned trial Court as the complainant had given up his claim about it; the petitioner had never claimed in investigation or during trial that the said amount belonged to him or it had been handed over to the police by him; Dost Muhammad P.W.1 did not claim the ownership of the said amount in his testimony and the petitioner did not opt to conduct cross-examination on him which could have been the decisive factor if he had availed the said opportunity for cross-examination; the instant petition is devoid of any force which may be dismissed.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents attached with the petition. We find that during the course of investigation the Investigating Officer had shown the recovery of the ransom amount Rs.2,00,000 at the instance of the accused, which had allegedly been paid to them by Dost Muhammad complainant P.W.1 for release of his child Mureed Abbas. Some outside the court settlement appears to have been arrived at between the parties, hence, the complainant and his co-witnesses decided not to make incriminating statements against the petitioner and his co-accused. In the wake of this situation they all disowned the prosecution case, resultantly they were declared hostile by the learned trial Court and the learned counsel for both the sides were directed to cross-examine the P.Ws. The learned Public Prosecutor availed the opportunity of cross-examination, though without success, but the learned defence counsel outrightly refused to test the veracity of the testimonies of the complainant and the co-witnesses by not going for their grilling. There does not exist any circumstance, which could justify the claim of the petitioner and that of his co-accused in respect of alleged ransom amount. The U-turn taken by the complainant during the course of the trial is also indicative of another fact that he must have been compensated by the accused for showing readiness to make exonerating statement in favour of the petitioner and his co-accused, otherwise, he must not have volunteered to make such a favouring statement which could nosedive the prosecution case. A chance lost, cannot be revived through the instant Constitutional petition as the petitioner seems to be trying his luck rather than following a lawful pursuit.
6. The impugned order has been passed in accordance with settled principles of dispensation of criminal justice. It does not suffer from non-reading or misreading of evidence nor can it be termed as a shoddy order. The learned trial Court has advanced sound reasons and rational arguments while passing the impugned order, hence, it does not call for interference by this court.
7. The nutshell of the above discussion is that the instant petition being misconceived is dismissed.