Through this appeal under Section 417, Cr,P,C, the appellant has called in question the Judgment dated 19.12,2008 passed by learned Magistrate lot Class, Dora Ghazi Khan through which Respondent No, 2 was acquitted of the charge in case FIR No, 378/07, dated 18,08,2007 registered at Police Station Kot Chhutta, District Vehari in respect of an offence under Section 489-F, PPC,
2. The case has been called many a time since morning but none has entered appearance on behalf of the appellant to pursue this matter. Even same was the position on the last date of hearing, i,e, 18,03.2009, This matter is hanging fire since 2009, therefore, I have deemed it appropriate to decide the same even in absence of the appellant.
3. I have gone through the impugned judgment passed by the learned Magistrate 1st Class, Dera Ghazi Khan and found that to prove its case the prosecution has examined three witnesses and after scanning the available evidence the learned trial Court reached to the conclusions that there are glaring discrepancies in their statements with regard to place of occurrence, registration of FIR in question, delivery of disputed cheque and business transaction between the parties. The learned trial Court had recorded sound reasons for extending the benefit of doubt in favour of Respondent No, 2 and acquitting him of the charge. The reasons advanced by the learned trial Court for acquitting Respondent No, 2 are such that every reasonable Court could have arrived at the same after appraising the evidence available in this case. The learned trial Court has passed a perfect order keeping in view all the necessary aspects of the matter.
4. Apart from what has been discussed above the superior Courts of the country has already fixed benchmarks before reaching any conclusions while deciding appeal against acquittal which are as under:-- Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal would be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as :
(i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses;
(ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial;
(iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and
(iv) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a. findings of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this however is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized in the administration of justice.
Reliance is placed on the case of Billu alias Inayatullah u. The State (PLD 1979 Supreme Court 956).
Even in the case of Munawar Shah u. Liaquat Hussain and others (2002 SCM R 713) it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that:-- S. 417.--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)--Petition or appeal against acquittal--Scope-- Ordinary scope of petition or appeal against acquittal of accused is considerably narrow and limited--On the examination of the order of acquittal as a whole credence should be accorded to the findings of the subordinate Court whereby the accused had been exonerated from the charge of commission of the crime. S. 417--Appeal against acquittal--Principle--Obvious approach for dealing with the appeal against the conviction would be different and should be distinguished from the appeal against acquittal because presumption of double innocence of the accused attached to the order of acquittal, The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Muhammad Feroz Khan u.
Muhamamd Riaz and 2 others (2003 YLR 1731) held as under:-- Accused could not be vexed twice for the same offence.--In case of acquittal there was always a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused--First presumption in favour of the accused would be that he could not be termed as a criminal unless guilt was proved against him and second presumption would be that if a person was acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, he had a double presumption of innocence in his favour.
5. Beside the above referred law it has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when a Court of competent jurisdiction acquits an accused of the charge after a regular trial, then double presumption of innocence will always attached with the order of acquittal and very strong and exceptional grounds are required to set aside order of acquittal. Reference can be made to the case of Iftikhar Hussain and others v. The State (2004 SCM R 1185) wherein' the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Court has held as under: "It is well-settled principle of criminal administration of justice that when an accused is acquitted of the charge, he enjoys double presumption of innocence in his favour and Courts seized with acquittal appeal under Section 417, Cr.P.C. are obliged to be very careful in dislodging such presumption. Undoubtedly, two views are always possible while appreciating the evidence available on record, therefore, for such reason and in order to avoid the multiplicity of litigation, it is always insisted that the Court should follow the recognized principles for interference in the acquittal judgment as held in the case of Ghulam Sikandar and another versus Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11 that the Appellate Court seized with the acquittal appeal under Section 417, Cr.P.C. is competent to interfere in the order challenged before it provided it has been established that the trial Court has disregarded material evidence or misread such evidence or received such evidence . . . . . ."
In the recent famous case of Jehangir v. Aminullah and others (2010 SCM R 491) at page 494, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as under:-- "It is well-settled by now that "there are certain limitations on the power of the Appellate Court to convert acquittal into a conviction. It is well-settled that "Appellate Court would not interfere with acquittal merely because on reappraisal of the evidence it comes to the conclusion different from that of the Court acquitting the accused, provided both the conclusions are reasonably possible. If, however, the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusive and irresistible conclusion; and 'that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualized in these cases, in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with, after scrutiny under the forgoing searching light, should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous". The view taken by this Court in Ghulam Sikandar v, Mamaraz Khan PLD 1985 SC 11 is well- known that "in an appeal against acquittal this Court would not, on principle, ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of Court acquitting the accused. This approach is slightly different from that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the re-appraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused, This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well-accepted presumptions: on initial, that, till found guilty, the accused is innocent; and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence. The will not carry the second presumption and will also thus lose the first one if on points having conclusive effect on the end result the Court below: (a) disregarded material evidence;(b) misread such evidence: (c) received such evidence illegally". This principle was also followed in Muhammad Iqbal v. Sanaullah PLD 1997 SC 569, State v. Farman Hussain PLD 1995 SC 1, Ghulam Sikandar v. Mamaraz Khan PLD 1985 SC 11, AHMAD V. Crown PLD 1951 FC 107, Abdul Majid v. Superintendent of Legal Affairs, Government of Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 426, State v. Bashir PLD 1997 SC 408, Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Javed PLD 1976 SC 452, Shahzado v. State PLD 1977 SC 413; Farmanullah v. Qadeem Khan 2001 SCM R 1474 and Khadim Hussain u. Manzoor Hussain Shah 2002 SCM R 261,"
For what has been discussed above I have not seen any reason to interfere into the conclusions of acquittal arrived at by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment dated 19.12.2008 and this appeal is, thus, dismissed in limine.