' This Regular Second Appeal relates to certain land sold by respondent No, 4, Ghulam Muhammad, in favour of the appellant, Muhammad Ashraf. The other three respondents, Ghulam Nabi and others, filed a usual suit for declaration, under custom, challenging the said sale on the ground that it was without consideration and legal necessity. The petitioner, Mst. Karim Bibi, made an application for being impleaded as a party to the suit. It was alleged by her that the sale in favour of the appellant was a benami transaction and that, in fact, the disputed land had been purchased by her. The Civil Judge, who was seized of the suit, however, did not allow her to join the suit as a party and observed that she may file a separate suit for vindication of her rights. Accordingly, she instituted a separate suit against the appellant claiming title to the disputed land.
2. The suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 was decreed on 29th September 1966. The appellant, who was one of the defendants in that suit, challenged the judgment and decree passed against, him by means of an appeal, before an Additional District Judge, but without success. He has, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court.
3. As for the suit brought by the petitioner, Mst. Karim Bibi, it was also decreed on 25th September 1974. The judgment and decree passed in that suit were not assailed by the appellant who was the only defendant in her suit, and thus the same has attained finality qua him. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3, however, instituted a separate suit with a view to avoiding the judgment and decree passed in the suit brought by the petitioners, but the same was dismissed. They then filed an appeal against the dismissal of their suit which was accepted and the suit was remanded to the trial Court for fresh decision. Feeling aggrieved by the remand order, Mst. Karim Bibi has filed an appeal (F. A. O. 356 of 1979) which is pending decision in this Court.
4. Mst. Karim Bibi has also made a petition (C. M. No, 469/C of 1981) for being added as an appellant to the second appeal in hand. Her said petition is going to be disposed of by this order.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended since the decree passed in favour of the petitioner, Mst. Karim Bibi, in the suit brought by her has attained finality qua the appellant, Muhammad Ashraf, the real dispute, in the present circumstances, in regard to the validity of the sale in question is between her and respondents Nos. 1 to 3 who had challenged the sale, under custom, as reversioners of respondent No, 4, Ghulam Muhammad. As stated earlier, it was the said Ghulam Muhammad who had sold the land involved in this case. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to implead her as a party to the instant appeal. He relied on sub- rule (2) of rule 10 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure to support his contention.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in consequence of the decree granted to the petitioner, the appellant had been substituted by the petitioner as vendee in respect of the sale in dispute and, therefore, he did not oppose the petitioner's request for being added as an appellant to the present appeal.
7. The petition was, however, strongly resisted by learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. It was urged by him that since Mst. Karim Bibi was not allowed to become a party to the suit giving rise to the instant appeal and had not challenged the order of the trial Court in that behalf she could not be impleaded as a party to this second appeal, especially when she had not made an attempt to become a party to the first appeal filed by the appellant. It was, therefore, prayed by learned counsel for the sad respondents that the petition made by her be dismissed.
8. In reply to the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3, it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that since the order of the learned trial Court rejecting the petitioner's request I for being impleaded as a party to the suit brought by the said respondents was not appealable and a revision could not be claimed as a matter of right the petitioner did not bother about that order any further. It was also pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that by the time of the dismissal of the first appeal of the appellant, the petitioner's suit had not been decreed and, therefore, she did not make an effort to become a party to that appeal. This statement of learned counsel for the petitioner was not refuted by the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3.
9. As for the petitioner's failure to challenge the order of the trial Court refusing her permission to become a party to the suit giving rise to this appeal, I agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that the said order of the learned trial Court was not open to appeal and the petitioner could not seek its revision as a matter of right. She filed a separate suit as suggested in the aforesaid order and the same had met with success. The relief claimed by her in the instant petition cannot, therefore, be refused to her on the ground that she had not voiced any grievance against the order of the learned trial Court whereby she was not allowed to become a party to the suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3.
10. It is not denied that the petitioner had not made an application to the learned Additional District Judge to become a party to the first appeal filed by the appellant but it was explained on her behalf that by the time of the decision of the first appeal her suit had not been decreed and, therefore, she did not make an attempt to join the said appeal. This, to my mind, is a cogent explanation. The petitioner's omission to make an application for joining proceedings before the first appellate Court is, therefore, of no consequence.
11. According to sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person can be allowed to join a suit if his participation the suit is necessary for effectual and complete adjudication of the real controversy involved therein. It was not disputed that the said provisions of law are equally applicable to the appeals. In view of the phraseology of sub-rule (2) a person can be impleaded as a party even if he has not made a request for the purpose. In other words, the Court can suo motu implead a person as a party to a suit or an appeal. What is to be ensured by the Court before so doing is that the involvement of such person is necessary for the effectual and complete adjudication of the real controversy to be resolve by it. In view of the facts stated above, now the dispute involved in the present appeal concerns the petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 to 3 because by not challenging the verdict given in the suit brought by the petitioner, namely, that the sale in question was, in fact, made in favour of the petitioner and not the appellant, the appellant has completely surrendered his rights, if any, in favour of the petitioner. Now, therefore, if the appeal before me fails, the real loser would be the petitioner and not the appellant. In this view of the matter, it is necessary to implead the petitioner as a party to the instant appeal. I, therefore, .
12. The office shall add the name of the petitioner as an appellant both in the record of the case as well as in the relevant registers.
13. The appeal shall now be listed for arguments along with F. A.
0. No, 356 of 1979.