' IJAZ AHMAD, J.--- Phullan, the predecessor of the parties died. Mutation No,399 was sanctioned on 6-6-1936 in favour of all the sons and daughters. Fazil, Qadir Bakhsh and Wahid Bakhsh sons of Phullan died issueless, one after the other. Mutations No,190 dated 20-4-1977, No,334 dated 8-12- 1983 and No,335 dated 8-12-1983 were sanctioned respectively in favour of Ghulam Muhammad etc., the sons of Piara, the brother of the above three deceased. Mst. Bachi, Jiwal and Mst. Bhirawan were deprived of the bequest of their deceased brothers. The respondents/legal heirs of the said three sisters of the deceased instituted a suit for declaration. Consenting written statement was submitted by Fateh Muhammad, one of the transferees of the land. Ghulam Muhammad and Jan Muhammad, the remaining defendants contested the suit. Issues were framed and plaintiffs produced evidence. The defendants'/petitioners' evidence was closed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. The respondents' suit was dismissed vide decree dated 12-6-1991 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jampur. The' respondents preferred appeal. During its pendency, the petitioners made an application under Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. For production of certain mutations to prove that Mst.
Bachi, Jiwan and Bhirawan had died prior to the death of their issueless brothers, thus they were not entitled to inherit the property of their brothers. The application was dismissed vide order dated 18-3-1992 on a statement made by the learned counsel for the present petitioner that he did not want to press the application, therefore, the same be dismissed. The second application on the subject was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. The respondents' appeal against the decree was accepted on 21-5-1992.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is evidence available on the record that Mst. Bachi, Mst. Jiwan and Mst. Bhirawan, the predecessors of the plaintiffs were not alive when their issueless brothers, the predecessor of petitioners, died and the succession opened, thus the respondents were not entitled to a decree as prayed; that the petitioners made an application for production of additional evidence. The additional evidence sought to be produced were the copies of the mutations which are 'the part of public record whose genuineness is beyond shadow of doubt and were essential to prove that the pre-deceased predecessors of the present respondents were not entitled to inherit the property and to enable the court to pronounce its judgment, therefore, their production should have been allowed. Places reliance on "Mst. Fowl Jan v.
Roshan Din and ,2 others (PLD 1992 SC 811) "Iqbal Ahmad and others v. Khurshid Ahmad and others"
(1997 SCMR 744) "Mohabbat v. Asadullah Khan and others" (PLD 1989 SC 112 and "Ahmad Ashraf v.
University of the Punjab" (1988 SCM R 1782). He argues that the courts by invoking their inherent jurisdiction could allow the production of additional evidence at revisional stage. Relies on "Mohabbot v. Asadullah Khan and others PLD 1989 SC 112. In support of his argument.
3. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that Order XIII, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Requires that all the documentary evidence in the possession and power of a party has to be produced on the first date of hearing and the documentary evidence not produced as required under Rule 1, C.P.C. Shall not be received at any subsequent stage unless good cause is shown. No such good cause was shown by the petitioners in their application made before learned District Judge. Places reliance on "Shtamand and others v. Zahir Shah and others" (2005 SCM R 348), "Noor Muhammad and 8 others v. Mst. Sheran Bibi and another" (1998 SCM R 789), "Abdul Hameed and 14 others v. Abdul qayyum and 16 others" (1998 SCM R 671) and "Abdul Rehman and another v. Mst. Saleem Bibi" (2007 YLR 1643 LHR). He further argues that the instant civil revision has been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 90 days. The appeal was accepted on 21- 5-1992 and the instant revision petition was filed on 23-8-1992 after 95 days i,e, five days beyond the period of limitation. He argues that sections 5 and 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 do not apply to a revision petition and thus render no help to the petitioner in bringing his petition within period of limitation. Relies on "Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another" (PLD 2010 SC 705) and "City District Government, Lahore through District Coordination Officer, Lahore v. Mian Muhammad Saeed Amin" (2006 SCM R 676). He further argues that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 in their examination-in-chief stated that Mst. Bachi, Mst. Jiwan and Mst. Bhirawan died after the death of Fazil, Qadir Bakhsh and Wahid Bakhsh, their brothers. These witnesses were not, specifically cross- examined on this point, therefore, their statements to this extent go unrebutted and the facts mentioned would be deemed to have been admitted by the petitioneridefendant. Refers Articles 132 and 133 of the 'Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and the judgment "Central Bank of India v. Sved Muhammad Abdul Jalail Shah and others" (1999 CLC 671) in support of his arguments.
4. The petitioner has made C.M. No,1-C of 1992 seeking the production of the additional evidence of the same documents which were refused by the learned District Judge. He has also made C.M.
No,932-C of 2000 seeking amendment in the written statement.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. First of all I would like to decide the point of limitation. The instant revision petition has been submitted after 95 days of the passing of the judgment and decree. Ostensibly it has been preferred five days after the expiry the period of limitation, The petitioners applied for issuance of copies on 26-5-1992, the same were ready for delivery and were received by the petitioners on 30-5-1992. The day when the judgment was passed and the five days spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment and decree if excluded, this civil revision was filed after 89 days of the pronouncing of judgment and drawing of the decree. It would be deemed to have been filed within period of limitation if section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is applicable in case of revision petition. The judgments "Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another" (PLD 2010 SC 705) and "City District Government, Lahore through District Coordination Officer, Lahore vs. Mian Muhammad Saeed Amin" (2006 SCM R 676) do not support the case of respondents. In both the judgments, it is held that section 5 providing the condonation of delay does not apply in case of a revision petition. In the second referred judgment, however the Court excluded the day when the judgment was passed and the days spent in obtaining the copies. Thus section 12 ibid was made applicable to proceedings under section 115, C.P.C. The scheme and purpose of condonation of delay under section 5 and deduction of the days under section 12 are altogether different from each other. The first is the discretion of the court which is variable according to the circumstances of the case. The second is not a variable dependent on the discretion of the court. It is the right of a party founded on the provision of law. In my view the deduction allowed under section 12 ibid is applicable in case of a revision petition as well. I rely on 2006 SCMR 767 titled City District Government Lahore through District Coordination Officer, Lahore v. Mian Muhammad Saeed Amin.
6. Now I would like to take up the case of additional evidence and decide C.M. No,1-C of 1992, the application seeking the production of the documents already refused by the learned District Judge, With all deference for the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner I dare opine that the petitioner has a stigma on his right, if he has any, to produce the additional evidence. His first application before the learned District Judge was dismissed as not pressed coupled with the specific prayer that the same be dismissed. This also led to the dismissal of the second application.
The same stigma would be carried to the application made before this court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied yet another judgment Irshad Ali v. Islamic Re ublic o Pakistan and 2 others" (1981 CLC 111) to argue that withdrawal of a constitutional petition at Katcha Peshi would not debar the submission of another petition. The facts of the application in hand are different from those in the relied judgments. In this case the petitioner had withdrawn his 1st application made before the learned District Judge with a specific prayer to dismiss the same. The petitioner has yet another hurdle to cross. The term production of additional evidence has to be understood as an action complementing the evidence already produced by a party. The petitioner's right to produce the additional evidence was closed by the trial court under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. That hump still in the way, the petitioner cannot ask at this stage to be allowed to produce the' additional evidence which is complementary in nature to the original evidence. The C.M. No,1-C of 1992 is dismissed. The production of the additional evidence is disallowed which was rightly disallowed by the learned District Judge as well.
7. The petitioner in C.M. No,932-C of 2000 has sought the following amendment:-{{URDU TEXT}} Perusal of the written statement submitted by defendants Nos.2 to 4 reveals that this objection has already been raised in paragraph No,6. Similar objection has also been raised in first paragraph of the preliminary objections raised by defendants Nos.6 and 7 in their written statement. In this view of the matter, the amendment sought through this application becomes meaningless. The suit having been instituted in the year 1985, this application has been made at a belated stage and has been designed to frustrate the decree passed in favour of the respondents.
8. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Mst. Bachi etc, had died prior to the opening of the succession on the eve of the death of their brothers has lost its force in view of petitioners' omission to cross-examine P.W.-1 and P.W.-2. Their statements that Mst. Bachi etc. Died after the death of their brothers whose bequest is in question, have gone unrebutted, therefore, the facts narrated therein would be deemed to have been admitted. I seek guidance from 1999 CLC 671 (Lahore) titled Central Bank of India v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Jalil Shah and others. Since the relationship of the parties is already admitted, the fact that Mst. Bachi etc. Outlived their brothers entitles them to inherit the property left by their brothers, the predecessorin-interest of the petitioners. The learned counsel has been unable to point out any illegality or irregularity that might have occasioned in the judgment passed or the decree drawn by the learned appellate court. This petition has no force. It is hereby dismissed.