M. MEHBOOB AHMAD, J.-This writ petition is directed against an order dated 6-4-1977 passed by the Deputy Secretary (Colonies), Board of Revenue Punjab, Lahore, whereby the land held by the petitioner under a lose was directed to be resumed and possession thereof given to Small Indus-- tries Corporation, Faisalabad respondent No. 3, for establishment of Small Industries Estate at Lyallpur.
2. The facts necessary for the purpose of this writ petition, briefly stated, are that land, measuring 33 acres 4 kanals and 13 marlas, situate in Chak No. 8/J B, Tehsil and District Faisalabad, was taken on lease by the petitioner for a period of 10 years under a temporary scheme as per terms and conditions contained in Notification No. 3369/67/198-CL-I dated 7-2-1968. The lease was to commence from Kharif 1969 and continue till Kharif 1978. The possession of the land was obtained by- the petitioner on 19-3-1969.
It has been alleged that the petitioner cultured the land leased out to him by spending a huge sum and also installed a tube-well there.
It has been further asserted that the lease stood automatically extended for another five years as notified by the Board of Revenue, Punjab, through Circular Memorandum No. 10993-77/195-CLI dated 7-2-1978.
It has been also alleged that the lease has been cancelled by the impugned order dated 6-4-1977 without notice to the petitioner and possession on paper taken on 6-5-1977 although the petitioner remains in actual physical possession.
It may be pertinent to mention here that the petitioner instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Faisalabad for declaration and injunction pertaining to the land in dispute in this writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Additional Administrative Civil Judge, Faisalabad by his judgment and decree dated 29-11-1978 and the appeal preferred to the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad against the judgment and decree of the Civil Court aforementioned also failed, vide judgment dated 18-1-1979 passed by the lower Appellate Court. It was after the dismissal of this appeal that the petitioner filed the present writ petition in the High Court impugning the same action of the respondent which he had impugned in the civil suit and had failed therein.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended ; firstly, that the order impugned in this writ petition whereby the lease of the petitioner has been cancelled had been passed without notice to the petitioner and as such offends the principles of natural justice. Reliance in support of the above contention was placed on Jan Muhammad v.
Government of West Pakistan etc. PLD 1979 Lah. 152 and Mian Ghulam Muhammad v. The Collector, Montgomery and 2 others PLD 1973 Lah. 528; secondly, that the land having been cultivated by the petitioner was not available land and as such could not be resumed under the impugned order; thirdly, that the lease of the petitioner stood extended for another five years i.e. up to 1983 under circular memorandum of the Board of Revenue, Punjab, dated 7-2-1978; fourthly, that the petitioner has now become entitled to purchase the land in view of Notification No. 3215-79/3973-C-II dated 3-9-1979; and lastly, that no compensation has been paid to the petitioner as provided by section 25 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912.
4. The learned Assistant Advocate-General appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 argued that the writ petition suffers from laches having been filed two years after the passing of the impugned order; that it is liable to be dismissed as other adequate remedies available to the petitioner as provided by section 7 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 read with sections 161, 162, 163 and 164 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 have not been availed of by the petitioner; and that the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked by the petitioner he having failed in impugning the action of the respondents in the civil Court and not having assailed the judgment of the Additional District Judge further.
It was further argued by the learned A. A. G. That there was no requirement of serving the petitioner with a notice in the instant case as the land was not being resumed for breach of terms and conditions of the lease and under section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, but in pursuance of a specific condition in the terms and conditions of lease viz. Condition No. 13 which empowered the Collector to pass an order resuming the land without payment of any compensation in case the land was required for a public purpose. He submitted that establish-- ment of an industrial estate was a public purpose and as such the land was being resumed under the terms and conditions of the lease itself.
He also argued that the circular memorandum dated 7-2-1978 relied upon by the petitioner was superseded by circular memorandum No.10993-77/939-CL-I dated 11-4-1978 which specifically provided that if during the currency of the lease period the land is required by the Govern--ment for any purpose the lessee shall surrender its possession peaceably without payment of compensation for improvement, if any made by him thereon. Similarly notification dated 3-9 19 was inapplicable to the case in hand and the petitioner was not entitle .Purchase the land, the lease having expired in 1978 and the land having been resumed in 1977.
It was also contended by the learned A. A: G. That the land in dispute is specifically excluded by para. 2 of the notification as the land falls in the category provided for in sub-clause (a) of sub- para. (iv) of para. 2 of the said notification.
The last contention raised by the learned A. A.G. Was th4t the lease in any case stood expired in Kharif 1978 and the case of the petitioner being hit by the circular memorandum of 11-4-1978 it cannot be said that the lease stood extended automatically.
5. The learned counsel for respondent No. 3 only submitted that circular memorandum dated 7-2- 1978 having not been notified as provided by section 29 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act confers no title on the petitioner as it has no legal value and that respondent No. 3 having already paid a sum of Rs. 1,42,75,387 as the price of the land to the Government is entitled to the proprietary rights of the land in dispute and that the establishment of the industrial estate is being held in abeyance because of this litigation.
6. As regards the contention 'firstly', it is, of course, correct that any person against whom some action is being taken should be afforded adequate opportunity to explain his case, but then the failure to give a notice is not always fatal to the action taken. It has to be shown by the person complaining that the failure has resulted in prejudice to him. The petitioner has not been able to show what prejudice has been caused to him on account of the failure to give him a notice. The cancellation of the lease had not been made on account of failure of the petitioner to fulfil the terms and conditions which would have warranted application of section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The cancellation ofthe lease of the petitioner and the order of resumption had been passed as the land was required for a public purpose i.e. The establishment of an industrial estate. Clause 13 of the terms and conditions of the lease as contained in notification No. 3369/67-198-CL-I dated 7-2-1968 had been invoked for this purpose which specifically lays an obligation on the lessee, petitioner in the case in hand, to hand over the possession of the land without any compensation in case the land is required for a public purpose.
There is thus no prejudice shown to have been caused to the petitioner by the impugned action of which he could make a grievance in a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, especially when the, petitioner had not availed of the- remedies available to him under the relevant statute and the prejudice if any had been established by him by failure of the service of notice could be taken care of in those proceedings.
7. The above position apart, the petitioner having filed a suit an having failed therein could no longer raise the grievance of lack of service of notice. If the petitioner had the grievance that the invocation of this clause 13 was not correctly made the remedy for him, was to have filed suit for damages for breach of contract . The authorities cited by the learned counsel in support of his contention are not applicable to the facts of the present case in that PLD 1979 Lah. 152 cited by him relates to a case of purchase of land by the petitioner therein in open auction which was re- confirmed without affording the purchaser proper, opportunity--- Similarly PLD 1973 Lah. 528 was a case of renewal of tenancy whereas in the case under discussion the lease had been cancelled under the terms and condi--tions on which it was granted and during the continuation of the lease. The contention 'firstly' therefore fails.
8. Taking into consideration now the contentions 'secondly' and 'lastly', suffice it to say that clause 13 of the terms and conditions of the lease referred to above squarely answers these contentions.
The petitioner could lay no claim for compensation in case of resumption of land for a public purpose. The impugned order shows that the land was required for a public purpose ix.
Establishment of an industrial estate.
9. Adverting now to the contentions 'thirdly' and 'fourthly', it may be observed that the question of extension of lease of the petitioner up to 1983 ,by virtue of the Board of Revenue, Punjab's circular memorandum dated 7-2-1978 never arose as the order of cancellation of lease and resumption of the land had been passed earlier i.e. On 6-4-1977. It may be additionally pointed out that the circular memorandum dated 7-2-1978 was modified by circular memorandum dated 11-4-1978 which specifically laid down that even if the lease had been extended under the circular memo-- randum dated 7-2-1978 the lessee had to execute a bond undertaking that if during the currency of the lease period land is required by the Govern--ment for any purpose he shall surrender its possession peaceably without payment of compensation for improvement if any made by him thereon. It is significant to note that by this memorandum dated 1 I-4-1978 the lessee's obligation to surrender the land was laid as requirement by Govern--ment for any purpose contra distinctively from the condition of lease contained in clause 13 whereby the land could be resumed without payment of compensation only in cases of requirement for a public purpose. The circular memorandum dated 7-2-1978 therefore conferred no better rights on the petitioner even if it be assumed that it was applicable to the case in hand.
10. In so far as the notification dated 3-9-1979 whereby the land could be purchased by certain lessees is concerned, suffice it to say that the same having been enforced after the land had been resumed from the petitioner could not be pressed into service by the petitioner for urging that he was entitled to purchase of the land in dispute and in any case it being the admitted position that the land falls within the category given in sub-clause (a) of sub-para, (iv) of para. 2 of the notification stood specifically excluded, from the operation of the notification itself and thus the petitioner could not lay claim for purchase of the land even if it be assumed that the notification was applicable to the petitioner also. These contentions also therefore fall.
11. Apart altogether from the above position that the contentions raised by the petitioner have no force it may also be pointed out that the writ petition suffers from laches having been filed two years after the passing of the impugned order. There is no explanation offered in the writ petition as to this delay but it was urged at the bar that the petitioner had been pursuing the remedy of a suit.
This worsens the case of the petitioner in that the petitioner had failed in the suit as also in the subsequent appeal and had not further agitated the matter which gave finality to the orders passed by the civil Court. The writ petition therefore would not be maintainable in this view of the matter as well.
12. The invocation of the jurisdictions f this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution without having first availed of the remedy of filing an appeal, revision etc. As provided by section of the Colonization .Of Government Lands Act, 1912 read with the provisions of the West Pakistan Lands Revenue Act, 1967 is also misconceived.
13. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution should not be allowed to be invoked if the petitioner had -'not availed of the other adequate remedies available. The petitioner has not been able to give any explanation as to why those remedies were not availed of by him.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion I find no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.