Imam Bux Baloch, J.--Brief facts of the instant petition are that the Petitioner was selected on merit by the Respondent No. 2 on account of his outclass performance in domestic cricket as a specialist leg spinner and after selection he played for the Country in test cricket, one day internationals and twenty/twenty matches and became the fourth ever highest wicket taker in the test cricket for Pakistan, The Petitioner submitted that due to his best performance the Pakistan won the matches many times for which he has been awarded "man of the match" awards many times. He claimed that due to his performance he was selected to play for the Essex County in the U.K. wherein he also performed meritoriously and his selection in both the squads i.e. Pakistan's Cricket Squad as well as the Essex County was purely on merit. He submitted that despite the fact that after the retirement of Australian Cricketer Shane Warne the petitioner is perhaps the only leg spinner of high standard in the world of cricket, the Respondents are not willing to utilize the Petitioner for Pakistan. It has been further stated that Essex County team players namely Tony Palladino and Mervyn Westfield during a night out, most probably in drunken state, talked about spot fixing, which was undertaken in a Pro 40 Match between Essex County and Durham County of September 2009. The rumour spread around and ultimately came to the notice of the management of the Essex County by way of a ridiculous complaint by one Mr. Tony Palladino. The management reported the matter to the ECB who reported the same to ICC suggesting that the matter should be given to the local Essex Police for further investigation. All the gossip mongering had taken place when the Petitioner was in Pakistan. He further submitted that when the Petitioner returned to UK to play for Essex County in April/May 2010 he was required to attend some interview with British Police, before whom he appeared and the interview was conducted on 14.05.2010, whereafter the Petitioner was required to again attend on 15.09.2010, the U.K. Police technically arrested the Petitioner and released him on police bail. The Petitioner received a letter from the England and Wales Cricket Board dated 27.05.2010 by way of a show cause notice as to why the Petitioner's registration with the Essex Country/ECB should not be suspended. On receipt of such notice the Petitioner alongwith his Lawyer and Consultant met with the Chief Executive of the ECB and explained his position as well as the actions of the authorities and urged that until the Petitioner is found guilty, his registration cannot be suspended or cancelled. The Petitioner's contentions were accepted and no further action was taken by the ECB and kept his registration intact, neither the U.K. Police nor the Essex County Cricket stopped him from playing cricket and he continued to play such county as well as for Pakistan with Australia and England in July and August, played in England, whereafter he was dropped. The Petitioner was registered with the ECB to play for the Essex Cricket County in August 2010. The Petitioner received a letter from the British Police, informing that the he is no longer required for interview scheduled on 15.09.2010 and the entire investigation against him was dropped. The Petitioner returned to Pakistan and was selected for national cricket squad to play the test series against South Africa in Dubai in October 2010 and after attaining three weeks' training camp of PCB held at Ghaddafi Stadium Lahore, just two days before the scheduled departure to Dubai the Petitioner received a telephone call from one of the officials of the PCB informing that he is no longer required to travel to Dubai with the National Squad, upon which the Petitioner made inquiries from Mr. Wasim Bari, the then Chief Executive Officer of PCB who pleaded ignorance and directed him to contact Mr. Zakir. The Petitioner contacted Mr. Zakir Khan, Director Cricket Operations (International), who informed the Petitioner that PCB has some reservations against the Petitioner but did not disclose any one of them. Thereafter, the Petitioner repeatedly requested Mr. Zakir Khan to at least divulge the reasons for dropping the Petitioner from the National Cricket, ultimately via telephone and email Mr. Zakir confirmed to the Petitioner that his clearance was required by PCB from the Essex County, English Cricket Board, the International Cricket_ Council and the British Police. Upon such requisition the Petitioner approached the concerned Boards and secured two letters, both of which contained no adverse allegations against the Petitioner, the same was informed to the PCB. After providing such information to the PCB the Petitioner presumed that it will essentially end the matter, however, for the reasons best known to the Respondents they did not consider the Petitioner for selection in the ensuing cricket series against South Africa, West Indies and New Zealand so also for the World Cup, all such took place in the year 2010-2011. The Petitioner addressed many letters himself and through his lawyer but no heed was paid. The Petitioner also stated in his Petition that he has attended the meetings of the Integrity Committee of the Respondent No. 2 in December 2010 and January 2011 but till filing of the Petition the fate of the Petitioner has been kept in dark. He further stated that the Respondents are demanding the police tapes, which were in possession of British Police. He further stated that the Petitioner has been referred to be a tainted player. Such demand of the Respondent No. 2 for police tapes is unreasonable.
2. The Respondent No. 2 has filed counter affidavit, and amongst other, raised preliminary objection that the order against the Petitioner was passed by the Pakistan Cricket Board, having its Central Office at Lahore, as such this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. By accepting the selection, unique skills and exceptional performance of the Petitioner over the years, they denied several averments made by the Petitioner in the instant petition. Ins parawise comments, the Respondent No. 2 submitted that events narrated in paragraphs 8 to 13 of the petition came to its knowledge through different sources and the Petitioner was asked directly to clarify his position before the Integrity Committee of Respondent No. 2 in order to avoid any misunderstanding but he is reluctant till date in providing information/material required from him. It has been further stated that cricket has become a very lucrative sport, which involves glamour and money for all the affiliated individuals including the Players. The International Cricket Council (ICC) is the regulator of cricket worldwide and has taken serious notice of the corruption in cricket and devised strict Rules and Regulations to curtail and assassinate this menace from the sport. The Respondent No. 2 being the member of ICC is bound to follow such rules and regulations and has also taken stern steps against corruption, and other issues affecting the integrity of the players for which it has formulated Rules to control the same. After the unfortunate incident took place in 2010 involving three Pakistani Cricketers and attack on Sri Lankan Guest Team in Lahore and the International Teams had already refused to visit Pakistan, in consultation of and approval of ICC the Respondent No. 2 formed an Integrity Committee, whose sole function was to scrutinize the players whose integrity seems to be doubtful. After: coming into the knowledge of the Respondent No. 2 the arrest of the Petitioner in UK it became necessary that he may be called by the Integrity Committee in order to examine carefully the circumstances of his arrest and the charges involving integrity. The Petitioner was required by the Integrity Committee to provide certain documents including tapes of his police interview by the British Police but he failed to do so. Respondents No. 2 admitted the selection of Petitioner for the national squad to play test series against South Africa in Dubai and after he was stopped to play he was asked to provide clearance from the Essex County and ICC, in reply to which the Petitioner through his Counsel managed to get a letter from ICC, which did not serve the purpose. After exchange of communication the Respondent No. 2 assured the Petitioner's counsel that the Petitioner will soon be called to discuss the matter. Later on, he was called on 09.12.2010 and after several discussion on the issue he was requisitioned to provide (a) transcript of police interview; (b) copy of the complaint (c) any other police document, (d) details of bank accounts (Pakistan and Abroad) and properties (moveable and immovable) during last three years; (e) details of contracts from the sponsoring party and amount received and amounts received; (f) details of agents and their terms and conditions (g) details of amount paid to the agents for the said sponsorships and other endorsement for the last three years, to which he agreed to provide the same by 13.12.2010 and he was asked to again appear before the Integrity Committee on 15.12.2010. On 13.12.2010 the Petitioner's Counsel sent an email to Respondent No. 2 stating that "those tapes are held by the Police and are only released to Mr. Kaneria's lawyer, no other person or organisation is permitted to have a copy." On 15.12.2010 the Petitioner appeared before the Committee and assured that he will approach his lawyers for the tapes but the Petitioner's counsel extended threats that the name of Respondent No. 2's Adviser had been provided to Essex Police, to which the Petitioner was asked to behave properly and provide the requisite articles. It has further been stated in the parawise comments that England and Wales Cricket Board has confirmed the Respondent No. 2 that Essex County had not issued any clearance certificate and upon such confirmation the Petitioner was again asked to provide clearance certificate, which he failed to on pretext that neither of them (Essex County and ICC) knows what the clearance certificate is and the failure and lame excuses of the Petitioner to bring on record the requisitioned documents and taps only leads to the conclusion that the Petitioner is hiding something. It has been further stated that till date no order has been passed by the Respondent No. 2 against the Petitioner and in the event of any grievance the Petitioner can avail remedy under paragraph 35 of the PCB Constitution.
3. We have heard Mr. Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Taffazul Hussain Rizvi, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2.
4. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 at the very out set contended that this Court has no jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to entertain the instant Petition. He submitted that the Respondent No. 2 having its Central Office at Lahore and all the correspondence has taken place at Lahore, the Petitioner time and again has been called by the Respondent No. 2 is out of the jurisdiction of this Court, in such circumstances he submitted that this Court may dismiss the petition of the Petitioner on the sole ground of jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on the following case law:--
1. Sandaibar Enterprises (Put.) Limited versus Central Board of Revenue and others (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 334)
2 The Deputy Managing Director, National Bank of Pakistan, Principal Office, Jinnah Avenue, Dacca versus Ataul Huq (PLD 1965 Supreme Court 201)
3. Mst Shahida Maqsoob versus President of Pakistan through Secretary, Law Justice and Human Rights Division and another (2004 CLC 565)
4. Abdul Gbaffar Lakhani versus Federal Government of Pakistan and 2 others (PLD 1986 Karachi 525)
5. R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Clubm, ex parte Massingberd-Mundy (All England Law Reports Page 2007)
6. Mst. Shahida Maqsood versus President of Pakistan and another (2005 SCMR 1746)
7. M/s. Nadia Ghee Mill (Pvt.) Limited versus The Federation of Pakistan (1992 MLD 2154)
M/s. Ibrahim Fibers Limited versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary/Revenue Division and 3 others (PLD 2009 Karachi 154)
9. Sabir Din versus Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others (1979 SCMR 555)
10.Election Commission, India versus Saka Venkata Rao (AIR 1953 Supreme-Court 210)
11.Lt. Col. Khaioor Singh versus Union of India and another (AIR 1961 Supreme Court 532)
5. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Respondent No. 2
(PCB) having its branch at Karachi and that the Petitioner is performing throughout Pakistan and outside of Pakistan, all the High Courts of Pakistan have jurisdiction to entertain such petitions against the Pakistan Cricket Board. He contended that the Petitioner has received the letters at Karachi, hence this Court is competent under Article 199 to .adjudicate the instant petition and that this Court has territorial jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on the following cases:-
1. AR. Khan & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. versus Federation of Pakistan (2010 CLD 1648)
2. Nawabzada Muhammad Shahabuddin versus Chairman Federal Land Commission (1996 CLC 539)
3. Mehboob All Malik versus The Province of West Pakistan and another (PLD 1963 (W.R) Lahore 575.
4. Asghar Hussain versus The Election Commission of Pakistan and others (PLD 1968 Supreme Court 387)
5. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited versus Pakistan Agro Forestry Corporation (Pvt.)
Limited (2000 SCMR 1703)
6. Gulzar Ahmad Khan versus The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan, Islamabad (PLD 1997 Lahore 643)
7. Itehad Cargo Services, National Hotel. Lahore versus Rana Rafaqat All and 3 Others (PLD 2002 Karachi ,420)
8. The Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Peshawar and others versus M/s. Rais Khan Limited through Muhammad Hashim (1996 SCMR 83)
9. M/s. Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore versus The Copyright Board, Karachi and others (1985 SCMR 758)
10. Ghulam Haider Badini and 520 others versus Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Islamabad and another (1995 CLC 1027).
11. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique Anwar versus Faisalabad Development Authority and others (2007 SCMR 1126)
12. Chaudhry Akbar Ali versus Secretary, Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi and another (1991 SCMR 2114)
13.Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities and 2 others versus Syed Abdul Majid (1993 SCMR i171)
14.Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. versus Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad (1997 SCMR 1874)
15.M/s. Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited Karachi versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives, Islamabad and others (PLD 2006 Karachi 479) and submitted that this Court is competent to adjudicate the petition as cause of action accrued to the Petitioner at Karachi and so also at Lahore and contended that both the Courts at Karachi and Lahore have jurisdiction to entertain the Petition. He further contended that the case of the Petitioner falls within the category of judicial review of administrative/public action and that the superior Courts having jurisdiction in accordance with the concept of checks and balances, which his integral part of the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He further contended that this Court being a constitutional Court is required to see whether the functionaries of the State in connection of the affairs of the Federation, the Provinces or the local authorities have done the things in accordance with the law or actions have been taken otherwise. In such circumstances, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the basic principles are that in the realm of public actions every thing should be done with complete transparency and the decisions should be taken objectively on the basis of criteria as already has been determined and fixed in the Constitution.
6. Before going through merits and de-merits of the instant petition we have decided to take first preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 regarding the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan reads as under:--
199. Jurisdiction of High Court.--(1) Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law,--
(a) on the application of any aggrieved party make an order--
(i) directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the -Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order--
(i) directing that a person in custody within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court be brought before it so that the Court may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner; or
(ii) requiring a person within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court holding or purporting to hold a public office to show under what authority of law he claims to hold that office; or
(c) on the application of any aggrieved person, make an order giving such directions to any person or authority, including any Government exercising any power or performing any function in, or in relation to, any territory within the jurisdiction of that Court as may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II.
7. A perusal of the memo. of petition indicates that the thrust of the attack of the Petitioner was directed against the letters of Respondent No. 2 calling upon the Petitioner to appear before the Integrity Committee which is housed at Central Office of PCB, Lahore, all the correspondences were issued to the Petitioner from the Central Office of the Respondent No. 2 which is housed at Lahore.
In our view this fact would not be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of Lahore High Court within whose jurisdiction the main cause of action accrued. Article .199(1)(a)(i)(ii) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (herein after referred to as the Constitution) and that perusal of above clause (a)(i) of the above articles indicates that a High Court has power to issue a direction to a person performing within its territorial jurisdiction, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a province or local authority to refrain from doing anything which he is not permitted by law to do or to do anything he is required by law to do. Similarly, under sub-clause (a)
(ii) the High Court has powers to declare any act done or proceedings taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority.
8. We have observed that the Central Office of the Respondent No. 2 is located at Lahore and the Petitioner has to attend the Central Office of the Respondent at Lahore for appearing before the Integrity Committee and not before the sub office, which is located at Karachi. We have also observed that all the correspondences have taken place at Lahore. The arguments of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner is residing at Karachi and he has received all the correspondences at Karachi, hence part of cause of action may be seemed to be taken place at Karachi is without any substance.
9. As regards the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that cause of action accrued to the Petitioner at Karachi and so also at Lahore in our view Article 199 as it stand does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction, Provisions under Article 199 are not suits, they provides for extra ordinary remedies by a 'special procedure and give powers of correction, to the High Court over person and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. The powers under Article 199 vis-a-vis the reach of the High Court's powers have been considered in the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in cases of list. Shahida Maqsood, Sandalbar Enterprises and Sabir Din (supra) and so also in two cases from Indian jurisdiction. Article 199 of the Constitution and Article 226 of the Indian Constitution are parallel. In case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh, the Indian Supreme Court has noted the following observations:--
(16) Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. Proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extra ordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these. special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. These two limitations have already heel - indicated by us above and one of them is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. It is possible then to overlook this Constitutional limitation and say that the High Court. can issue a Writ against a person or authority even though it may not be within its territories simply because the cause of action has arisen within those territories? It seems to us that it would be going in the face of the .express provision in Article 226 and doing away within an express limitation contained therein if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced in it. Nor do we think that it is right to say that because Article 300 specifically provides for suits by and against the Government of India, the proceedings under Article 226 are also covered by Article 300. It seems to us that Article 300 which is on the same line as S. 176 of the Government of India Act 1935, dealt with suits as such and proceedings analogous to or consequent upon suits and has no reference to the extraordinary remedies provided by Article 226 of the Constitution. The concept of cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in Article 226, for by doing so we shall he doing away with the express provisions contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this may result in some inconvenience to persons residing far away from New Delhi, Who are aggrieved by some order of the Government of India as such, and that may be a reason for making a suitable constitutional amendment in Article 226. But the argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect the plain language of Article 226, nor can the concept of the place of cause of action be introduced into it for that would do away with the two limitations on the powers of the High Court contained in it.
10. Facts of the case of Shahida Maqsood case are that the Petitioner addressed a letter to the Collector Sales Tax and Central Excise Rawalpindi, informing him about the evasion of Excise Duty by Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, Headquarters Islamabad, while referring to the balance sheets of the Company for the years 1996-97 to 1998-1999 and made a disclosure of the fact that the PTCL was not paying central excise duty in respect of overseas calls made from Pakistan at the prescribed rate and duty, thereby causing huge loss of revenue. She filed a complaint before the Federal, Tax Ombudsman, which was disposed off with the observations that the Collectorate of Sales Tax had already taken action and settled the matter upto June 1998 with the PTCL. Being dissatisfied, the Petitioner filed an appeal against it before the President of Pakistan which was entertained and lastly the Petitioner received an intimation dated 17.10.2001 from the Section Officer, Law, Justice and Human Rights Division that the President vide his order dated 11.10.2001 was pleased to reject the revision of the Petitioner. The Petitioner then filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, before this Court, which was dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction in which one of us (Gulzar Ahmad, J.), was a member. The Honourable Supreme Court while dealing with the said petition has observed in paragraph 8 as under:--
8. Upon perusal of this precedent, we find that any decision or observation relating to the maintainability of a Constitutional Petition beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court on consideration of the provisions of Articles 98 and 153 of the Constitution, 1962 and Article 226 of the Indian Constitution would neither be relevant nor be of any assistance to the Petitioner in seeking extension of jurisdiction of the High Court beyond it territorial jurisdiction. The language employed in the Articles of the Constitution, which were considered in the reported cases is not on all fours with the language used in Article 199 of the Constitution 1973. Conversely, in Sabir Din v.
Government of Pakistan 1979 SCMR 555 it was authoritatively held that as provided in Article 199(1)
(a) of the Constitution, the impugned action of the authority making the same should be within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of jurisdiction thereunder. In Sanaalbar Enterprise (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1997 SC 334 . while distinguishing Messers Al- lblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi 1985 SCMR 758, this Court observed that a perusal of sub clauses (a)(i) of Article 199(1) indicates that a High Court has power to issue a direction to a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of. the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do or to do anything he is required by law to do within its territorial jurisdiction. This view was reaffirmed in Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1998 SCMR 2389 and Anoud Power Generation Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 340.
11. In the case of Sandalbar Enterprises, which was also referred in the case of Shahida Maqsood the Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:--
6. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have pointed out the language originally employed in Article 98(2)(a)(i) of 1962 Constitution prior to the incorporation of clause (c) by the First Amendment Act, 1963, for distinguishing the case of Asghar Hussain u. Election Commission of Pakistan etc. PLD 1968 SC 387. The view found favour with the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the case in hand seems to be in consonance with Articles 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution. A perusal of the above sub clause (a)(i) of the above Articles indicates that a High Court has power to issue a direction to a person performing within its territorial jurisdiction functions in, connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do or to do anything he is required by law to do. Similarly, under sub-clauses
(a) (ii) a declaration without lawful authority or of no legal effect can be given by a High Court in respect of any act done or proceeding taken with its territorial jurisdiction by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority.
7. The Petitioners' prayer was for a direction to the Customs Authorities at Karachi not to levy the regulatory duty. The above relief could have been granted by the High Court of Sindh within whose jurisdiction the person performing the affairs of the Federation is discharging his functions.
We may observe that it has become a common practice to file a writ petition either at Peshawar, or Lahore, or Rawalpindi or Multan etc. to challenge the order of assessment passed at Karachi by adding a ground for impugning the notification under which a particular levy is imposed. This practice is to be depreciated. The Court is to see, what is the dominant object of filing of the writ petition. In the present case, the dominant object was not to pay the regulatory duty assessed by a Customs official' at Karachi. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant leave. Leave is refused.
12. In the case of Sabir Din, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-- "In this case the Disciplinary Committee of the respondents not only afforded more than adequate opportunity to the Appellant, as he was not only heard on two occasions to clear himself, but prior thereto was served with a proper charge sheet. In these circumstances, therefore, it is idle on the part of the appellant to contend that there was no material before the Committee to hold him guilty for his complicity in the issuance of the forged notification. We are, , therefore, satisfied that the impugned judgment of the High Court is unexceptionable."
13. In the case of Deputy Managing Director, National Bank of Pakistan and others versus Ataul Huq, following observations were made by the Honourable Supreme Court:-- "The conclusion that the National Bank of Pakistan is a "local -authority" in East Pakistan is one with which, speaking with respect, we find it entirely impossible to agree. The expression "local authority" has been used in statutory phraseology in the Indian sub-continent for a great many years, and is always understood to. mean an authority which is entrusted with the administration of a local fund.
Local authorities are bodies exercising within limited territories included a Province, powers which belong to the Province, but which by statute are delegated to the local authority. A local authority is ordinarily charged with functions of self-Government, and has power of making bye-laws, of imposing taxation, and of maintaining and administering a local fund. In fact, it is evidence from the order in which Article 98 mentions the three tiers of authorities that these are in a descending order of importance, first i.e., the Center, being the most important, a Province being next in order of importance, and a local authority being the last in that order. It is clearly impossible, in view of this clear distinction to treat the Center as being a 'local authority' at whichever place in Pakistan, it conducts its affairs. The National Bank of Pakistan was set up by a Central Ordinance, in order "to extend banking facilities generally and also to provide credit for agriculture and agricultural produce. It bears no resemblance to the recognized conception of a 'local authority'. The further facts that the Ordinance gives power to the Central Government to appoint the Auditors, as well as the President of the Central Board, are simply sufficient to show that the National Bank of Pakistan is a body entrusted with the conduct of certain affairs appertaining to the Center. It is a body which is constituted by Section 3 of the Ordinance to be "a body corporate having perpetual succession: which may sue and shall he sued in the name of the National Bank of Pakistan. There seems no doubt whatsoever that after the. Election Appeal Committee became functions officio through pronouncing its decisions in the two appeals which had been referred to it, the record of its proceedings became records of the Bank and it is clear also that what was sought in substance in the present case was a writ of certiorari for the certification of the said record to that Court so that investigation might be made as to he propriety and regularity of the proceedings of the Committee with a view to determine whether the final decision, being in the nature of a quasi judicial decision, should be maintained. Such a writ could only issue to the National Bank of Pakistan at its head office in Karachi where also the records in question were held, and it seems clear enough from the wording of the relevant provision in Article 98 that as Karachi is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Dacca, the writ sought could not have issued from that High Court. As has been observed already, it appears that the respondents to the petition for a writ were carefully selected and named in such a way as prima facie, to bring the action within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the point that the election in question was for electing two Directors from among the Dacca registered shareholders is not relevant, since relief was sought in respect of record kept at Karachi, in the custody of the National Bank and what was at stake was a seat on the Central Board of that Bank, which sits at Karachi. The argument that a part of the enquiry was held at Dacca is equally insubstantial, for the Committee was an agency of the Central Organization of the Bank and it seems quite clear that the discovery made by the Election Appeal Committee (we do not express any opinion as to whether their conclusion was correct or not) regarding the action of the representative of the East Pakistan Branch of the Pakistan Red Cross Society in casting the votes of the Society for a person, who had not been nominated for the purpose by the Socks itself, was made at one or other of the later meeting held in Karachi, where the recount was taken.
On these observations, we are satisfied that the claim of jurisdiction in the High Court of East Pakistan to issue a writ to quash the order of the Election Appeal Committee is not soundly based, and we accordingly allow this appeal and direct that the writ be recalled, but in the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs."
14. Now we are adverting to the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the case of LPG Association of Pakistan, authored by his lordship Justice Mian Saqib Nisar, while sitting on Single Bench and contented that the learned Single Bench of Lahore High Court after considering the case law cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 has come to the conclusion that the Lahore High Court having jurisdiction to entertain a writ against the Federation of Pakistan. The facts of the L.P.G. case are that the writ petition was filed to challenge the Competition Ordinance 2007 on the ground that the said Ordinance is no longer in existence as on account of Article 89 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 it stands repealed four months after its promulgation i.e. 02.10.2007; the provisions of the Ordinance especially 31(a), 41 and 42 thereof are ultra vires of the Constitution, void ab initio and of no legal effect. The writ petition was admitted for regular hearing, when on 27.05.2009 an application was made on behalf of the Applicant/Respondents Nos. 3, 5 to 8 under Order VII Rule 10 CPC asking for the return of the writ petition on the ground that under Article 199(1)
(a) of the Constitution, the Lahore High Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain it for the reasons that all the Respondents except Respondent No. 9, a proforma Respondent, function at Islamabad, the impugned notice has also been issued there, and therefore, it is the Islamabad High Court, which alone has the territorial jurisdiction in the matter. The learned Single Bench of Lahore High Court after considering of the fact dismissed such application and lastly has observed as under:-- "It is obvious from the above that the show cause notice in general and because of its peculiar nature in this case shall seriously affect the person to whom it is issued and the final order based thereupon can have far reaching adverse effects, therefore, the place where it is sent, communicated, served and received has the relevance for the purposes of the concurrent jurisdiction. In the above context, it is pertinent to specify the word "affect" which according to Black's Law Dictionary, Deluxe Sixth Edition, means "to act upon; influence; change; enlarge or abridge; often used in the sense of acting injuriously upon persons and things. To lay hold of or attack (as a disease does); to act; or produce an effect or result upon; to impress or influence (the mind or feelings); to touch." I am of the view that almost all the major traits of the meaning shall apply to the petitioner and both the Islamabad and Lahore High Courts have the concurrent jurisdiction in the matter, therefore, petition at Lahore has been competently and validly filed with the consequences that CM. No. 2202 of 2009 has no merits and is hereby dismissed."
15. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has invited our attention to the case of the M/s. Fecto Belarus Tractors in which a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under:-- "So far, jurisdiction under which the present petitions are being heard, it falls within the category of judicial review of administrative/public action. In exercise of such jurisdiction the Court is required to see whether the public functionaries have acted in accordance with the law. This jurisdiction of the Courts and particularly the superior Courts is in accordance with the concept of checks and balances which is integral part of the concept of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In exercise of this jurisdiction, of judicial review of administrative/public action, the Court is required to see whether the functionaries of the State in connection with the affairs of Federation, province or local authorities have done the things in accordance with the law or actions have been taken otherwise than in due, course of law. The basic principles in this behalf are that in the realm of public actions every thing should be done with complete transparency and the decision should be taken objectively and on the basis of criteria already determined and fixed. There is no room for subjectivity or the actions which smack of arbitrariness, favourtism or discrimination. If the yardsticks are not determined prior to the taking of decisions then the decisions are bound to be subjective and non-transparent, which are not the hallmarks of good governance. In a democratic set up the complete transparency and accessibility to the policy decision in pursuance of right of information are strictly observed. In the present case, we find that first, the modified decision of the ECC was kept secret to the extent that not only the persons from whom proposals were invited were not aware of the modified decision but the relevant officials of the Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives were also not aware of the correct position with the result that the advertisements were wrongly published giving condition of eligibility which was no more existing and omitting the eligibility condition which was holding the field. Secondly, the necessary detailed scheme was not worked out as highlighted above, with the result that the situation was uncertain and fluid which led to the subjective decisions which his reflected from the fact that some of the companies who had already existing manufacturing units were treated to be new conditions also although in the decision of ECC produced before this Court no such decision was taken by the ECC. Fourthly, the C.B.R. issues exemption notification to import of CKD condition also which is beyond the purview of decision of the ECC. Fifthly, the purpose of the scheme finds place in the advertisement only and no detailed scheme has been devised as to how this benefit shall reach the farmers. No safeguards have been provided in the absence of detailed modalities which were to be worked out by the Committee of the senior officers."
16.The facts of the case of Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt) Ltd., which was relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are that at the first time the learned Deputy Attorney General raised question of maintainability of proceedings on the ground that the impugned order was passed by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, functioning at Peshawar. It is noted that the proceedings came before the Honourable Supreme Court on the third round where the maintainability of the appeal was taken by the learned Deputy Attorney General and the Honourable Supreme Court was of the view that the learned Deputy Attorney General has not raised such preliminary objection during two rounds of the litigation upto the Honourable Supreme Court, hence the contention of the learned Deputy Attorney General were not considered. We have gone through the instant case, case law cited and we are of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of this case are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
17.The facts of the case of Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities and others, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are that a plot of land which was situated in Deh Thano, Tapo Malir, Karachi, according to the Petitioner belonging to the Evacuee Trust Property Board and the said property was declared by the Evacuee Trust Property Board to be the property of the Trust and its transfer to private person was illegal and ordered for the eviction of the Respondents and writ petition was filed in this Court which was dismissed being time barred.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application under Section 12(2) CPC claiming that the High Court has no jurisdiction in the matter as the jurisdiction as the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, Petitioner No. 2 had passed the order under MLR 57 and jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under Article 15 of the Original Constitution Order, 1981. This Court dismissed such application which was impugned in the Honourable Supreme Court where the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-- "It 'is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under the Provincial Constitution Order, 1981 to look into the validity of the order passed under the Martial Law Regulation, but in view of the law laid down in Federation of Pakistan v. Ghulam Mustafa Khan PLD 1989 SC 26, if any order passed by any authority under the Martial Law Regulation is void, without jurisdiction, mala fide or coram non judice, the superior Courts have the jurisdiction to entertain Constitutional petition. As pointed out earlier the application of MLR 57 depends upon certain considerations, conditions and investigations. Unless all the conditions specified in Para 1 of MLR 57 have been complied with or correctly been determined the provisions of MLR 57 cannot be invoked. The moot point challenged by respondent is that the property is a Sikni land and not an agricultural land. Secondly, the property was validly transferred to Abdur Rashid by the Settlement Authorities and since then it has changed hands which was purchased by bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration without any notice or knowledge of any illegality or fraud in the transfer of the property by the Settlement Department."
We have considered the facts of the above case, which in our view are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the instant petition.
18.We have also examined the facts and circumstances of the case of Chaudhry Akbar Ali (supra) but we found ourselves that the facts are different from the facts of the instant petition.
19.We have examined the facts of the case of Hafiz Muhammad Siddique Anwar, which the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon and we find that the facts of the said case are totally different from the facts and circumstances of the instant petition.
20.We have also examined the case of Ghulam Haider Badini and others, the facts of which are that Petitioners were employees of the Pakistan Television Corporation Limited and working in its various sections at Quetta TV Center and are liable to be posted/transferred at all the TV Centres /Headquarters and Boosters Set up by P.T.V. The P.T.V. is a corporation performing functions of the Federation and is fully controlled by the Government. The Corporation is authorized to levy and collect fee for the use of Television in pursuance of Television Receiving Apparatus (Possession and Licensing) Rules, 1970. It is further asserted that the P.T.V. is charging Rs. 250/- per annum per television. The affairs of the Corporation are being managed by the Government of Pakistan, through Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Islamabad through Chairman and Managing Director, respectively. The employees at present posted at Quetta T.V. Center and are under their administrative control. It is further averred that by means of an office Order No. HP/103/10683, dated 11.08.1988, issued under the instruction of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, a Special Allowance was granted at the rate of 20% of the progressive basic pay to the following categories of employees:--
(i) P.T.V. Headquarters, Islamabad.
(ii) Television Center, Islamabad.
(iii) P.T.V. Academy, Islamabad.
However, the Federal Government vide its order dated 18.12.1988 decided that 20% Secretariat Allowance would not be admissible to the new incumbent to the Secretariat of P.T.V., Islamabad. It is asserted that while same allowance had been granted to the employees performing their duties at Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta. Being aggrieved the Petitioners have challenged such order. The learned Single Bench of Balochistan High Court has observed:
5. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as adduced on behalf of the parties in the light of relevant provisions of law and record made available. Let we make it clear at the very out-set that the objection regarding jurisdiction of this Court as conferred upon it under Article 199 of the Constitution seems to be devoid of merits for the simple reasons that the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be ousted merely on the ground that Pakistan Television Corporation is located at Islamabad and does not fall within the territorial limits of this Court. The relevant portion of Article 199 of the Constitution is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-- "Jurisdiction of High Court.--(1) Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law,--
(a) on the application of any aggrieved party make an order--
(i) directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect; "Jurisdiction of High Court.-- The language as used is simple, plain and free from any ambiguity hence does not require any academic exercise for a scholarly interpretation. The above reproduced portion of Article 199 of the Constitution would make it abundant clear that writ can be issued against any person, who is performing in the Province any function irrespective of its nature relating to the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a Local Authority within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court. Pakistan Television Corporation is also performing its functions in Balochistan which is an integral part of its Net Work and license fee is also being collected from Balochistan in pursuance of the Television receiving Apparatus (Possession and Licensing) Rules, 1970. The Officers of Pakistan Television Corporation are being posted and transferred inside and Outside of Balochistan by the Corporation in exercise of authority vested in it under the relevant rules, the Programmes which are being televised from Quetta Television Center are subject to the scrutiny and approval of Pakistan Television Corporation at Islamabad, as such by no stretch of imagination it can be imagined that since the Headquarters of Pakistan Television Corporation is located at Islamabad, therefore, it does not come within the purview of Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. We would reluctant to presume such an intention as expressed by Mr. Mumtaz All Mirza, Deputy Attorney General on the part of the legislature unless the conclusion be inevitable or irresistible on the construction employed, which is not the case here. The jurisdiction being Constitutional cannot be taken away even by any law or enactment and where the law purports to usurp such jurisdiction then it would certainly be ineffective to that extent and subject to interpretation and scrutiny of High Court. In this regard, we are, fortified by the dictum laid down in the following authorities:--
1. Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed (PLD 1974 SC 151)
2. Mehardad v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1974 SC 193)
Another important aspect of the matter is that the provision as contemplated under Article 199 of the Constitution are read together and as such the words "without lawful authority" as used in clause (ii)(a)(1) of Article 199 of the Constitution are suggestive of the fact that Article 199 of the Constitution is applicable to all persons/authorities, Tribunals, Corporations and Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous bodies subject to Constitution and thus the Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be limited within the boundaries of a Province."
21. The case of Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore was considered by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mst. Shahida Maqsood's case and we refrain ourselves to comment upon it but we are of the view that the facts of the said case are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the instant petition.
22. We have give our earnest considerations to the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and that the law laid down regarding the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199(1)(a)(i)
(ii) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, we have to see what is the dominant object of filing this constitutional petition is to declare that failure of the Respondents to consider the Petitioner for selection into the national cricket team is completely without jurisdiction, mala fide, illegal, void ab initio and of no legal effect. In Black's Law Dictionary "dominant jurisdiction principle has been defined as under:-- "dominant jurisdiction principle.--The rule that the Court in which a case is first filed maintains the suit, to the exclusion of all other Courts that would also have jurisdiction."
23.We have already dilated upon the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court under Article 199(1)(a)
(i)(ii) and have observed that the Petitioner has to attend Integrity Committee at Lahore where the Central Office of the Respondent No. 2 is housed and all the actions taken by the Integrity Committee of Respondent No. 2 at Lahore. We have also observed that no action or correspondence initiated against the Petitioner at Karachi to confer the jurisdiction on this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. We have also observed that it has become a common practice to file Constitutional Petitions either at Karachi, Peshawar, Rawalpindi or Multan to challenge the orders passed by an authority which is situated without the jurisdiction of such High Court. We are also of the view that such practice is to be deprecated.
24.For the foregoing reasons we are of the view that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition, which is dismissed as such alongwith listed applications.