1. ' SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.---F.I.R. No,77 of 2010 was recorded at Police Station Saddar, district Jacobabad on 23-5-2010. Complainant was one Muhammad Ibrahim and he stated that on 20-3- 2010, some thieves have entered in the house of his uncle and had caused injuries to his 'cousin and in the firing two thieves were killed. The headman of the thieves conveyed that they would teach complainant party a lesson. On the fateful day the complainant along with his two brothers and four other relatives went to the fields for paddy seedling and after finishing the work they were returning to their village when at , about 1-15 p.m, on link road, a group of nineteen persons comprising of four unidentified persons; eight armed with K.K, two armed with guns (including present applicant), four armed with T.T pistols, two armed with rifles and one armed with repeater, alighted from eight motorcycles and encircled them. The alleged culprits stated that they would get revenge and all of them fired indiscriminately. The present applicant along with his another accomplice is alleged to have fired at Muhammad Ishaque. It is also stated that firing of the accused persons hit their own party members and the accused persons took their injured colleagues and fled away. After the culprits had fled, it was found that three persons had been injured and all of them were found dead. As far as present applicant is concerned, he is alleged to have, as stated above, fired on Muhammad Ishaque who it is alleged to have received firearm injuries on chest and abdomen. Bail application was dismissed by the trial Court for the following reasons: "The name of the present applicant/accused is appearing in F.I.R. With specific allegation that; he and absconding accused Farzand fired and killed Muhammad Ishaq. In that situation it would be pre mature to say that; he is innocent and has been involved in this case falsely. No doubt co- accused Mir Hassan has been admitted to bail but the reason for his admission on bail was that; he was attributed role of ineffective or aerial firing. His case was distinguishable to the case of present applicant/ accused. The complainant and his P. Ws. May be related inter se but their relationship is not enough to disbelieve their version at this stage. They are natural witnesses to the incident. There appear reasonable grounds to believe that; the present applicant/accused is guilty of the offence, for which he is charged. No case for grant of bail to him is made out, consequently his present applicant for his release on bail is dismissed. ".
2. ' Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that after investigation policq submitted its report and disbelieved the F.I.R. In respect of four accused persons. Learned counsel relied upon maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one respect is false in all respects) and contended that the entire F.I.R. Must be disbelieved. Learned counsel next contended that enmity between the parties is admitted. Lastly learned counsel contended that no specific injuries had been attributed to the applicant. Learned counsel relied upon numbers of cases of law to which we shall refer at due places.
3. ' Mr. Rashid Mustafa Solangi, learned counsel for the complainant submitted that specific allegations have been levelled against the present applicant and medical report of the deceased Muhammad Ishaque shows that there were several injuries on his body. Regarding the police report in letting of the persons named in the F.I.R., learned counsel submitted that the police report is not binding upon the Court.
4. ' Mr. Altaf Hussain Surahiyo, learned State Counsel vehemently opposed the grant of bail application and submitted that from the site of incident, 13 empties of K.K, 15 empties of 30 bore pistols, 6 empties of 303 gun and 12 other empties were recovered.
5. ' I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and have also gone through the record. Mr. Jatoi first of all relied upon the case of Tariq Bashir and 5 others v. The State PLD 1995 Supreme Court 34. The honourable Supreme Court has observed as under:-- "7. As regards the first category of offences (punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, or with ten years imprisonment) the provisions of section 497(1) are not punitive in nature. There is no concept of punishment before judgment in the criminal law of the land. The question of grant/refusal of bail is to be determined judiciously having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Where the prosecution satisfies the Court, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed the crime falling in the first category the Court must refuse bail. On the other hand where the accused satisfies the Court that there are not reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of such offence, then the Court must release him on bail. For arriving at the conclusion as to whether or not there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty of offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or with ten years' imprisonment, the Court will not conduct a preliminary trial/inquiry but will only make tentative assessm ent, i.e, will look at the material collected by the police for and against the accused and be prima facie satisfied that some tangible evidence can be offered which, if left unrebutted, may lead to the interference of guilt. Deeper appreciation of the evidence and circumstances appearing in the case is neither desirable nor permissible at bail stage. So, the Court will not minutely examine the merits of the case or plea of defence at that stage.
(8) The case-law on the subject of bail is very much clear that the bail order must be carefully balanced and weighed in scale of justice and requirement of relevant law. Reasonable grounds mean grounds which appeal to a reasonable and prudent man."
6. ' The above observations of the Supreme Court are seminal in nature and, therefore, deserve to be kept in view, any and every Court while considering a bail application but I have failed to see as to how case of the applicant is helped by the observations made by the Supreme Court in Tariq Bashir's case. To this aspect we shall revert later.
7. ' Learned counsel next relied upon the case of Syed Amanullah Shah v. The State and another PLD 1996 Supreme Court 241. In this case the accused was not present at the time of occurrence and was alleged to have instigated principal accused in presence of prosecution witness. Therefore case is materially and completely different from the case of the present applicant, where it is clearly stated that the present applicant was present at the scene of the offence with a specific role alleged. Mr. Jatoi next relied upon Mir Muhammad and another v. The State 1993 PCr.LJ 88.
8. What weighed in the Court was that accused was not said to have caused any injury to the deceased or any other inmate of the house. This again is therefore distinguishable. Because in the present case it is specifically stated in the F.I.R. That the present applicant along with another fired at deceased Muhammad Ishaque and medical report says that deceased had received several injuries. Mr. Jatoi next relied upon the case of Amanullah and another v. The State 1997 M LD 1470, what prevailed in the Court in this case was that majority of the accused charged with specific role of causing injuries to the complainant and other prosecution witnesses were found innocent during police investigation and therefore sanctity of F.I.R. Had become questionable. It was further observed that neither the stolen property had been recovered from the accused nor empty cartridges were recovered from the place of occurrence. In the present case empty cartridges have been recovered from the place of occurrence. Therefore, it is clearly distinguishable. Mr. Jatoi next relied upon Muhammad Amin v. The State 1994 PCr.LJ 369. This was the case under sections 324, 337-A(ii), 337F(ii), 379, 427 etc. The injuries in this case were 1. c.m x 1 c.m muscle deep. Nobody had been killed and therefore again the case-law is distinguishable. Lastly learned counsel relied upon the case of Paryal versus The State, 2006 PCr.LJ 121. It was observed that the State Counsel was not in a position to explain as to how accused had been let of as innocent persons and factual position in respect of presence or absence of co-accused had made the contents of the F.I.R.
9. Doubtful. In the present case, in the F.I.R. While presence of nineteen persons as stated but it is specifically stated in the F.I.R. That six persons fired at the deceased. None of those six persons have been let of by police. Therefore, the material available before the police is sufficient to connect the present applicant with the alleged offence. Therefore, on merits the present applicant is not entitled to bail.
10. ' The observations of the Supreme Court in Tariq Bashir's case (supra) lay down the general frame work for a Court while considering and deciding bail application and in no way lay down that irrespective of merits of the case bail should be granted in non-bailable cases.
11. ' As far as contention of learned counsel on the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is concerned, this contention has never been accepted in toto without reservation and as an in absolute rule by the judiciary in Pakistan. Moreover a Court has to fashion its way within the socio cultural milieu in which the Court operates. Socio cultural milien in rural areas of Pakistan appears to be that while lodging F.I.R. Attempt is made to rope in as many person as one can. But those persons fall in two categories; one is of those who are assigned specific roles and others is of those whose mere presence is alleged without any overt fact on their part. While falsus in no falsus in omnibus may be considered, at least at the bail stage, in respect of those who are given specific role, I do not find that it should be stretched to apply even in respect of those whose mere presence is alleged.
12. ' Result of the above discussion is that this Criminal Bail Application is found devoid of merits and is consequently dismissed.
13. ' Needless to observe that the trial Court while deciding guilt or innocence of the applicant in any way shall not, in any manner, whatsoever be influenced by any of the observations made above.