1. ' SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.---F.I.R. No,2 of 2011 was recorded at Police Station Gullo Siyal on 19-5-2011 for an incident, alleged to have taken place on 7-4-2011 at 1100 hours. Complainant stated that on the fateful day, he, his uncle, his cousin and other family members were present in the house when a group of 20 persons including both these applicants trespassed into the house and started to rob various articles and after having systematically robbed, one co-accused set house of the complainant on fire and remaining co-accused resorted to firing. Complainant went to Police but Police did not register F.I.R. He went to D.P.O. And it fell on deaf ear and finally, he approached Sessions Judge and on the orders of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Khairpur, F.I.R. Was recorded.
2. ' Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that there is delay of one month and 12 days in lodging of F.I.R. He further submitted that as far as setting house on fire is concerned, it was allegedly done by co-accused Nisar. He submitted that from the place of incident, no empty has been recovered and lastly, he contended that no motive has been alleged in. The F.I.R.
3. ' Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that present applicants have been named in the F.I.R. And statements of three witnesses have been recorded and they have fully supported the contents of F.I.R. He relied upon Ali Akbar v. The State, 2000 PCr.LJ 1796, Sajid Ali v. The State, 2009 PCr.LJ 130 and Falak Sher v. The State, 2004 PCr.LJ 1676.
4. ' Mr. Shyam Lal, learned A.P.-G., adopted arguments of Mr. Muhammad Tariq Maitlo. He also submitted that a number of have been registered against the present applicants and the present applicants are hardened and professional criminals.
5. ' I have considered the submissions, made by the learned counsel and have also gone through the record.
6. ' As far as delay in lodging of F.I.R. Is concerned, it is sufficiently explained. Firstly, the complainant approached S.H.O. And the S.H.O. Chose to ignore him. Thereafter, he approached D.P.O., who thought discretion to be better part of valour and turned a deaf ear. Lastly, he has to knock at the door of the Court and it was only upon orders of 1st Additional Sessions Judge that F.I.R. Was registered. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that even after the order was passed by Sessions Judge, it took complainant quite a while to record F.I.R. Delay in lodging of F.I.R. Is considered material primarily from the angle that a person lodging F.I.R. Could have cooked up a story or consulted others to give additional buffet through the allegations but in this case, an application under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. Was filed. Once application under section 22-A, Cr.P.C. Is filed, door or window available to the complainant to garnish his story is practically closed because if story, as recorded in F.I.R., varies, from the story as recorded in application under section 22-A, Cr.P.C, the defence would be perfectly correct and always agile in pointing out such contradictions.
7. B Therefore, delay in lodging of F.I.R. Is of no material consequence in the present case.
8. ' Second contention of the learned counsel was that it is co-accused Nisar, who set the house on fire. It may be pointed out that Mashirnama of place of Vardat, available at page 51 of the file, clearly states that when the place was inspected, house was in a total burnt condition. The applicants were members of an unlawful assembly and it is that assembly, which trespassed into the house of the complainant and C it is alleged that they committed robbery and thereafter set the house on fire. Prima facie, in terms of section 149, P.P.C. Every member of the assembly is equally liable and equally guilty. Moreover, it is stated in the F.I.R. That after house was set on fire by Nisar, all the other co-accused resorted to aerial firing. Where they celebrating a bon fire or was there any other purpose, in this aerial firing is something which may not be much difficult to discern.
9. ' Next contention of learned counsel for the applicants was that no motive has been alleged in the F.I.R. Indeed, it is so. But what greater motive can there be to commit the robbery and depriving someone of his valuables and give the existing tribal milieu of the society in the area.
10. ' It is also contended by the learned counsel that no empties were recovered. Indeed, it would be difficult to recover empties from a burnt house and that too after 42 days of the incident. Same would be the position of contention of learned counsel that no footprint marks were noted.
11. ' Learned counsel for the complainant relied upon Ali Akbar's case (supra). In the reported case, allegation was that applicant and his companions barged into the house of complainant party, committed robbery at gun point and forcibly took away valuable property. The bail was refused. In Sajid's case (supra) the allegation was that a van carrying cash was intercepted and six persons forcibly took away the cash. The bail was refused. In Falak Sher's case (supra) it was alleged that while the complainant along with his daughter was present in his house, 17 named accused and 4 unknown companions, all armed with firearms, entered the house, fired, scattered household articles and then sprinkled petrol, which they had brought and then set the house on fire. Case of Falak Sher (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. Present case stands at worst footings for the applicants on the ground that in Sajid's Case (supra), it was only robbery whereas in the present case it is burning of house also. Similarly, in Ali Akbar's case (supra), it was only robbery and in the present case, it is burning of house also.
12. ' Although learned A.P.-G. Argued that present accused persons are hardened criminals and are involved in a number of cases, in my opinion, every bail application is to be decided in the light of allegations made in the crime in respect of which that bail application has been moved. Present applicants have been accused of crime of robbing a family, trespassing into its house and then putting the house itself on fire. Such conduct does not deserve discretionary concession of bail.
13. ' Consequently, this bail application is dismissed.