' MUNIB AKHTAR, J.--- Learned Additional Advocate-General Sindh is present along with Mr. Saleemuddin Memon Assistant Commissioner, Sakrand, Mr. Agha Bashir Ahmed DSP Shaheed Benazirabad and Mr. Munawar Mallah SHO P.S. Khadro District Shaheed Benazirabad. Written replies have been filed on behalf of respondent No,3 as also respondent No,4. The respondent No,3 (who is represented by the Assistant Commissioner) has simply stated that this respondent has not received any application by the petitioner for holding a public meeting at village Khadar. The respondent No,4 (the SSP, Shaheed Benazirabad) has stated that the place where the proposed meeting is to take place is District Shaheed Benazirabad, which is home district of the President of Pakistan and the District of late Mohatarma Benazir Bhutto. The respondent No,4 has stated that on account of the allegations regarding the alleged involvement of the president of the petitioner party in the death of Mohatarma Benazir Bhutto, there is great antipathy in the area towards the former and that therefore if the proposed meeting is held, there is danger of a law and order situation being created. The said respondent prays that this petition should be dismissed. His representative, Mr. Agha Bashir Khan stated on a query from the Court that the parawise comments were prepared on a report received from the SHO concerned, who is in attendance as noted above. The SHO, when queried by the Court, supported what had been stated in the parawise comments of the respondent No,4. However, on a specific query he admitted that no inquiry as such has been held to ascertain or establish the factual basis of the parawise comments.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is a registered political party, which wishes to hold a political meeting on 21-1-2012 at a specific location and place in village Khadar, which is admittedly the home village of Mr. Ghulam Rasool Unar, who is the chief organizer in Sindh of the petitioner political party. He prays that this petition be allowed and the petitioner be granted such assistance and protection as is warranted under law.
3. Learned Additional Advocate-General Sindh supported the parawise comments filed by the respondents Nos.3 and 4. He submitted that permission was required to be obtained by the petitioner in terms of sections 30, 31 and 32 of the Police Act, 1861 (which is now once again enforced in the Province of Sindh), but this had not been applied for or granted and hence the petition ought to be dismissed.
4. In his right of reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid sections of the Police Act were merely regulatory in nature, and in fact required the police authorities to properly regulate the matters therein specified and that therefore these sections did not go against the petitioner's case but rather supported it. He relied in particular on Article 16 of the Constitution and submitted that it was the fundamental right of the petitioner party to assemble at a designated place and that this right could not be denied.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also learned Additional Advocate-General Sindh and have considered the parawise comments that have been filed by the respondents as noted above.
6. In the first instance we would draw attention to Article 4 of the Constitution. Clause (2) of this Article is presently relevant and states that "no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited by law". Thus, it is the duty of the State, if it seeks to prevent any person from doing any act to show that such act is specifically prohibited by law. As noted above, the learned Additional Advocate-General relies upon the aforementioned sections of the Police Act in this regard.
7. Insofar as the issue of fundamental rights is concerned, it is important to remember and keep in mind that while each fundamental right is a separate and distinct right enforceable as such, all the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution also constitute an interconnected whole and it may be the case that in any given situation, two or more fundamental rights may simultaneously be applicable. Thus, not merely are fundamental rights to be considered and applied separately, they must in an appropriate case, be regarded in their totality and applied as such. Each fundamental right may be likened to a strand, which is strong enough on its own, but the rope (i,e,, the fundamental rights taken together). Formed by the intertwining of these 'strands is stronger still, and it is this rope that anchors the fundamental constitutional protections of the citizens of, and persons for the time being in, Pakistan. When we examine the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that it is not only Article 16 but also Article 17 that is fully engaged in the present matter. Article 17 relates to the freedom of association and clause 2 thereof deals specifically with the rights of the citizens to form and be members of a political party. Article 17 has been considered at length by the Supreme Court in the seminal case of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 473. While all the judgments delivered in that case merit close attention, we would for present refer only to the leading judgment of Nasim Hasan Shah, C.J. And the observations made by his Lordship at pages 558 and 559. His Lordship cited (at 558) the observations made by the Supreme Court in its earlier decision in Abul A'la Maudoodi and others v. Government of West Pakistan and another PLD 1964 SC 673, where it was, inter alia, observed that the "forming of associations necessarily implies carrying on activities and the mere forming of the association would be of no avail" (at pg. 764, per Kaikaus, J). It was also observed in the earlier decision (and cited by his Lordship) that:-- "The ordinary conception of a political party includes a right within the framework of the Constitution to exert itself through its ,following and organization, and timing all available channels of mass communication, to propogate its view in relation to the whole complex of the administrative 'machine, including the Legislatures, in respect of matters which appear to it to require attention for the amelioration of conditions generally throughout D the nation, for improvements particularly in administrative procedures and policies as well as in the legislative field, even to the extent of proposing and pressing for amendment of the Constitution itself." (pg.
692 per Cornelius, C.J.)."
' The forgoing observations, in our view, are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. One of the traditional and best known means adopted by political parties to propagate their views is to hold political meetings at which the views, aims and objectives espoused by the political party are articulated and placed before the public, not merely of the locality where the meeting is being held but in this day and age of the mass media and instant communication also the nation at large.
8. We would pause here for a moment and refer to an important point regarding fundamental rights. Fundamental rights have been placed in the Constitution not merely to protect acts, conduct and views that we may approve of but also, and especially, to protect views with which we may disagree or which we may even find unpleasant or unacceptable. In the context of freedom of speech (and the expression of views at a political meeting is one form of speech), which of course engages Article 19, what therefore is protected is not merely speech that the listener may approve of or agree with, but also speech that he may disagree with or even hate.
9. We now turn to consider the specific provisions relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General. Before doing so however, we would like to note that the rights embodied in Articles 16 and 17(2) are of course not absolute but are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. In the case of Article 16 such reasonable restrictions may be imposed in' the interest of public order, while in the case of Article. 17(2) reasonable restrictions may be imposed in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan. Therefore, as presently relevant, if the State wishes to deny citizens the enjoyment of the aforesaid fundamental rights, three things must be shown. Firstly, it must be shown that the restriction in question has been imposed by law. Thus, it is entirely irrelevant and insufficient for the executive to arrogate to, assume for, itself a general power in this regard simply for reasons (e.g.) of administrative expediency or convenience. Something expressly stated in a statutory provision must be shown to exist. Secondly, the Court must be satisfied that the restriction so imposed by law is reasonable and thirdly, the restriction must be relatable to the matter specifically provided for in relation to the fundamental right in question. Thus, the right of all the citizens to assemble peacefully and without arms under Article 16 can only be affected if the State shows some express restriction imposed by law, which is reasonable and which relates to the interests of the public order. In the case of political parties, the restriction must be relatable to what stated in Article 17(2).
10. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we now turn to consider the specific provisions relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate-General, i,e,, sections 30, 31 and 32 of the Police Act. A perusal of section 30 satisfies us that it has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The reason is that this section regulates (in its first subsection) the "conduct of all assemblies and processions on the public roads or in the streets or throughfares". In the present case, the activity proposed to be undertaken by the petitioner political party is a public meeting and not a procession or assembly on any public road, street or thoroughfare. Learned Additional Advocate-General referred in particular to subsection (2) of this section, but in our view that subsection merely follows on from subsection (1), the relevant portion of which we have already quoted. Therefore, this section is not applicable in the present case.
11. Insofar as section 31 is concerned, that in fact imposes a duty on the police to keep order on the public roads, public streets and thoroughfares, ghats and landing places and at all other places of public resort and imposes other similar duties on the police in relation thereto. In our view, this section also does not have any bearing on the facts and circumstances 'of the present case.
Section 32 only relates to penalties that can be imposed if orders made ,pursuant to the foregoing sections are not followed, and therefore obviously is of no relevance.
12. Since no other law was shown to us or relied upon, we arc, on a conjoint rending of Articles 16 and 17(2), satisfied that there are no restrictions of law, let alone any reasonable ones, imposed by law that would stand in the way of the petitioner political party holding its meeting at the designated place in village Khadar.
13. We now take up the matter of the apprehension expressed by the petitioner party regarding protection for, and during-the holding of, the meeting. We have already noted our considered view that the fundamental rights that are enshrined in the Constitution are intended to protect not merely views that a person or class of persons in any locality may approve of but also serve to protect views that may be disapproved of or perhaps even found abhorrent. In the parawise comments, the respondent No,4 has expressed certain views regarding the disapproval or even dislike of the president of the petitioner political party by least some of the people in District Shaheed Benazirabad. While as we have already noted, no proper factual basis has, as such, been shown as to why the respondent No,4 apprehends some sort of law and order situation developing, we must in the end apply the provisions of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution as they stand and in terms of what has been stated hereinabove. Accordingly, we direct the respondent No,4 to provide all such protection as in his view, is reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case, in order to enable the meeting of the petitioner political party to take place. However, we would like to clarify that the respondent No,4 shall be obligated to provide such protection as he, in the proper and lawful exercise of his own discretion and independent judgment, deems reasonable and not such protection as the petitioner political party itself may demand or deem appropriate. The actual deployment of forces (if so considered necessary by the respondent No,4) shall be at his discretion or at the discretion of his subordinate officers and we are confident that the respondent No,4 shall fully abide by and discharge his duties in accordance with law as explained hereinabove.
13. Learned Additional Advocate-General expressed an apprehension that the members of the petitioner political party may take out rallies and processions, which may lend to a disturbance in the area. We would clarify that the holding of the meeting in separate and distinct from the taking out of processions or rallies. The matter of any procession or rally would prima facie be covered by sections 30 and/or 31 of the Police Act and if any such procession or rally, as opposed to the actual meeting itself, is to be taken out by the petitioner political patty, it is expected that it will also abide by law and the terms of sections 30 and 1 (as applicable) of the Police Act, 1861.
This petition stands disposed of in the above terms.