AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, J. --- Through this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed that the judgment dated 04.12.1997 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Khanpur District Rahim Yar Khan be declared to be without lawful authority and be set aside.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption on 20.02.1984 for possession in the Court of Civil Judge, Khanpur against Abdus Sattar vendee, the predecessor of respondents Nos. 1 to 5, regarding the purchase of agricultural land measuring 25-Kanals, 05- marlas situated in Chak No. 65/P, Tehsil Khanpur, District Rahim Yar Khan, through Mutation No. 63 sanctioned on 25.05.1984. The vendee/defendant died, therefore, amended plaint was filed and the legal heirs of vendee filed written statement and denied the right of preemption of plaintiff and stated that their father was a tenant over the suit property, therefore, plaintiff has no right of preemption. Learned Trial Court after framing the issues, invited the parties to produce their respective evidence which they done the needful. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, learned Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 25.06.1988.
On 18.10.1990 an application U/O. 47, Rule 1, under Sections 114 and 151 of the C.P.C. Read with Section 36 of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990, alongwith the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed by the respondents-defendants (judgment-debtors). The replies of these applications were called from the plaintiff-decree holder, who filed the same. Learned Trial Court vide order dated 14.06.1993 dismissed the applications. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the respondents-defendants filed revision petition before the Addl. District Judge, Khanpur on 29.07.1993, which was allowed on 04.12.1997 and the judgment and decree passed in the suit for preemption on 25.06.1988 was set aside and revision petitioners were directed to return the consideration amount within a week. It was also ordered that if the amount is not paid, this revision will be deemed to have been dismissed. Hence, this writ petition.
3. The arguments of this case were heard on 03.10.2011 and case was adjourned for today because on the file, record for repayment of money was not available. Today, learned counsel for the respondents placed on file the photocopy of challan No. 32-A depositing an amount of Rs. 28839/- in the revisional Court on 09.12.1997. This photocopy is attested by the learned counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not denied from the position that the respondents-revision petitioners have deposited the amount as ordered by the revisional Court within the stipulated period in the Court.
4. Through this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed that the judgment passed by the revisional Court dated 04.12.1997 is without jurisdiction and prayed that the same be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the decree passed by the Trial Court in pre-emption suit on 25.06.1988 was not challenged by the respondents-legal heirs of the vendee in appeal. They withdrew the sale price deposited by the petitioner, therefore, respondents Nos. 1 to 5 were estopped by law and equity to challenge the same. Further stated that Section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 was made available only for revival of pre-emption suits which were dismissed during interregnum period, therefore, Section 35 of said Act was not available with the respondents-revision petitioners.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents stated that the revisional Court has exercised jurisdiction in order to remove the illegality committed by the Trial Court twice and revisional Court has not passed any order beyond its jurisdiction. Further that order has been passed in aid of justice and quashed the orders illegally passed, in order to save the parties from perpetuating the illegal orders and judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record minutely.
7. The admitted facts are that suit was filed on 20.02.1984 and no decree was passed in the suit till 31.07.1986 which is a target date in accordance with the judgment of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as "PLD 1986 SC 360 (Sardar All and others v. Muhammad A.I)" that no decree was passed till 31.07.1986 and after that the suit was not dismissed, therefore, this case is of Section 34 the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and not of Section 35 of said Act. Admittedly, no Talab has been mentioned in the paint and also in the evidence. That no decree was passed before the target date. The case of the petitioner was not covered under sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.
8. The objection of learned counsel for the petitioner that review application was not competent before the Trial Court and the judgment-debtors were bound to challenge the judgment and decree in appeal. I do not agree with the 'contention of learned counsel for the petitioner because the powers of review have been given to the Court for these eventualities it was the duty of the Court to apply the law applicable to a /is but it seems that not only the lawyers who were representing the parties before the Trial Court but the Trial Court was also ignorant of the law applicable at that time enunciated by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. Needless to state that all the Courts in Pakistan are bound under the Constitution to follow the judgments and orders passed by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, therefore, Trial Court was bound to obey the pronouncement of august Supreme Court which has been ignored while passing the judgment and decree in favour of petitioner-plaintiff dated 25.06.1988. In these circumstances, the remedy of review petition was available with the respondents-judgment-debtors which they rightly filed. , Furthermore, the Trial Court has not exercised jurisdiction vested in it by law. The revisional Court having powers to correct the errors in the judgments and orders of the subordinate Courts, whereas the revisional Court has rightly exercised jurisdiction vested in it under the law-in order to save the parties from the illegal orders.
9. The facts of the case are very peculiar and when it is proved on record that the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in pre-emption suit on 25.06.1988 which could not have been passed, was without jurisdiction, and nullity in the eyes of law, therefore, to set aside that decree the period of limitation cannot be hurdle in the way of correcting an erroneous order or decree. In such-like cases, the refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of limitation will perpetuate the illegal orders.
10. In the light of what has been discussed above, I see no illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by the revisional Court rather the revisional powers have been rightly exercised in the aid of justice. Accordingly, this writ petition has no substance which is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. .