1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.--This order will govern Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 246 of 1973, and K-9 of 1978. The former is directed against the order of the District Judge, Sahiwal, dated 1st of March, 1973, and the latter is against the order of the Fourth Additional District Judge, Karachi, dated 30th of November, 1977, dismissing Revision Petition No. 2 of 1973, and Civil Revision No. 127 of 1.977, respectively.
2. In Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 246 of 1973, the dispute relates to the gift of land measuring 229 kanlas and 19 marlas in favour of the petitioners who are the daughters of the respondent from his first wife Mst. Noor Ilabi. It was the case of the respondent that the husband of the first petitioner colluded with the revenue staff and got a gift mutation attested in favour of the petitioners. The respondent challenged the legality of this mutation before the revenue authorities and as he was not successful he filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that the mutation was ineffective and he continued to be the owner of the land in dispute. He further prayed for the possession of land. The suit was resisted inter alga on the grounds of under-valuation of the suit for the purpose of court- fee, lack of jurisdiction of the civil Court and the validity of the gift mutation. The trial Court framed issues to cover the controversy which as struck left the onus of proving these issues on the petitioners who filed an application under Order XIV, rule 5, C. P. C. Seeking rectification of the burden of proof. This application was rejected upon which they filed the aforementioned revision petition before the District Judge, Sahiwal under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Ordinance No. XII of 1972, which application was dismissed.
3. In Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. K-9 of 1978, the petitioner claims to be the owner of the commercial and residential units built on Plot No. 291, Garden West, Karachi. He leased out a commercial unit to one Jumma Bhai on 1st of February, 1970, at a monthly rental of Rs. 100, but sometime during the first week of February, 1970, the respondent forcibly occupied the premises after evicting Jumma Bhai and locked the gate from inside upon which the petitioner initiated criminal proceedings but as these were not fruitful, he filed a suit bearing No. 1456 of 1970, under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for recovery of possession of the premises in the Court of the 4th Civil Judge, Karachi, which was ultimately transferred to the file of the 13th Civil Judge, Second Class, Karachi, who dismissed the suit on 31st of October, 1975. The petitioner filed a Civil Revision in the Court of the District Judge, Karachi, which was transferred to the file of the 6th Additional District Judge, Karachi. However, on 20th of May, 1976, it was dismissed for non-prosecu--tion. The petitioner, on 1st of July, 1976, applied for its restoration under Order IX, rule 9, C. P. C. Read with Order XLI, rule 19, C. P. C. And sec--tion 151, C. P. C. This application was transferred for hearing to the file of the 7th Additional District Judge, Karachi, who after hearing the arguments of the parties, dismissed the application on 30th of November, 1977. The petitioner now seeks to challenge this order through the above-mentioned miscellaneous application.
4. A question has arisen as to whether these applications are maintainable under sub-Article (3) of Article 185 of the 1973 Constitution from the order of the District Judge passed under subsection (2) of section 151, C. P. C. While exercising the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court.
5. In response to the notice issued by this Court, the Deputy Attorney---General appeared and contended that by the limited exercise of the powers as conferred on the High Court by clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of section 115, C. P. C. The District Court does not assume the status of a High Court and it continues to remain the principal Court of original jurisdiction as declared by section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention he referred to Articles 175 and 192 of the 1973 Constitution and section 2(24) of the General Clauses Act which defines a High Court.
6. Article 175 does not define a High Court but merely states that there shall be a High Court in each Province while Article 192 prescribes the Constitution of a High Court to consist of a Chief Justice and so many other Judges as may be determined by law or until so determined as may be fixed by the President. Sub-Article (2) of Article 175 and Article 199 deal with the jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Court. Besides, the Articles following Article 192 relate to the appointment of the Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court and the tenure of their service, terms of office and other matters relating thereto, whereas the District Court is a creature of the Code of Civil Procedure and derives its powers to function as such from the Code itself. The High Court and the District Court, therefore, are two distinct entities and have separate status as such. The Legislature in its wisdom while introducing subsection (2) in section 115, C. P. C. Has conferred on the District Court the same powers which the High Court exercises under subsection (1) while maintaining the distinction between the High Court and the District Court which is obvious from the opening words of the subsection, namely "The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1)." In other words, the Legislature had conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the District Court as was exercised by the High Court in dealing with the Civil Revision under section 115, C. P. C.
7. The object for this is not far to seek as the Legislature intended to lessen the congestion of work in the High Court by conferring the same powers on the District Court and giving finality to the orders of the District Court by introducing subsections (3) and (4). Again, in subsections (3 and (4) the status of the District Court and the High Court is maintained as such. Therefore, while deciding the Civil Revision, the District Court does not decide it as a High Court but as a District A Court and the mere conferment of the power would not alter the status of the District Court to that of the High Court for the High Court is a creature of the Constitution and exercises its jurisdiction in the manner and to the extent prescribed in the Constitution itself. Therefore, in sub-Article (3)Article 185, the word "High Court" can only mean a High Court as mentioned in Article 175 read with Article 192 and those following it in Chapter III of the 1973 Constitution. In Barkat Ali and others v. Bashir Ahmad and others Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1977 a somewhat similar question arose as to whether the conferment of judicial power on an officer would give to him the status of a full-fledged Member of the Board of Revenue within the meaning of section 3(2) of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act and this Court held in the negative.
8. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Application against the impugned order passed by the District Judges areincompetent and are hereby dismissed.