' MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, J.---Petitioners Zamin Ali and Asif Ali, sons of Ali Hassan, have filed this petition under section 561-A of the Cr.P.C. For quashment of F.I.R. No,75 of 2005 dated 17th August, 2005, under section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, lodged by Assistant Director, FIA, Passport Circle, Quetta on the complaint of one Muhammad Essa.
2. The relevant facts of the above case appear to be that FIA Passport Circle, Quetta, on the complaint of above named Muhammad Essa, conducted inquiries and after completion thereof, it transpired that in the year 2003, the petitioners, along with absconding accused, namely, Ali Madad, who happened to be their brother, received huge amount from complainant Muhammad Essa for sending his brother Ghulam Raza to abroad for employment. It was alleged that the above named accused also sent the son of complainant, namely, Ghulam Haider to abroad, whose whereabouts are not known. It was further alleged that the accused persons also received numerous amounts from different persons for the purpose without any legal and lawful authority, however, after sending them to abroad, their whereabouts are not known. Consequently, the aforesaid case was registered.
3. Mr. Muhammad Qahir Shah, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that since, on the basis of same set of allegations, the petitioner's were tried and convicted by the Judicial Magistrate concerned, therefore, the registration of 2nd F.I.R. By the FIA authorities against the petitioners is in violation of section 403 of the Cr.P.C., Article 13 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution) and section 26 of General Clauses Act, 1897. It was next contended that the petitioners are facing rigors of the trial right from 2005 before the civil as well as criminal courts and have also been acquitted of the charge by this court, therefore, on account of compromise affected between the petitioners and complainant, there is no probability of conviction of the petitioners in the instant case and the proceeding before the trial court are abused of the process of law.
4. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel, representing the State, stoutly controvert the view point as canvassed by Mr. Muhammad Qahir Shah, with the submission that the order passed while dismissing application under section 265-K of the Cr.P.C. Being well reasoned reflects no infirmity and warrants no interference.
5. I have carefully examined the respective contentions of the parties and have perused the entire record with the eminent assistance of the learned counsel. The moot and pivotal question, which needs determination, would be that the petitioners, having already been convicted as result of a complaint, instituted by complainant Muhammad Essa against them under sections 406 and 420, P.P.C. By Judicial Magistrate-IV, Quetta by means of order dated 16th December, 2006, can be punished again by any other court or authority for the same charge, but under a different law?
Admittedly, the answer would be in negative. In view of the principle envisaged in the provisions enumerated in Article 13 of the Constitution, section 403 of the Cr.P.C. And section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a person cannot be punished or put in peril twice for the same offence/matter. It is well established by now that no person can be punished twice for one and the same cause. As mentioned hereinabove that as a result of proceedings initiated on the private complaint of Muhammad Essa, the petitioners were convicted and sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment under sections 406 and 420 of the P.P.C. By means of order dated 16th December, 2006 and the petitioners could have also been charged under section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, which was not done so. It would be too late in the day to initiate fresh proceedings against the petitioners under the garb of section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979.
6. I am mindful of the fact the simultaneous action can be initiated, subject to certain legal exception, but in view of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, simultaneous action cannot be initiated against the petitioners, for the reason that action against them has already been finalized and their acquittal by this court, on account of compromise arrived at between the petitioners and private complainant Muhammad Essa, has attained finality. The acquittal always carries double presumptions of innocence in favour of accused. It is a set principle of law that the courts are always reluctant to interfere in an acquittal order; unless and until it is shown that the same is perverse, ridiculous and shocking or the court has not taken into consideration any material evidence, having direct bearing on the case and since the acquittal of the petitioner has attained finality, therefore, registration of the 2nd F.I.R., in no way, is permissible under the law.
7. It is worthwhile to mention here that the person, once convicted or acquitted, not to be tried for same offence. The criminal charge once having been adjudicated upon by a competent court, that adjudication is final, whether it ends in acquittal or conviction and it may be pleaded at a bar in the subsequent prosecution for the same offence, whether charged with or without matters of mere aggravation and whether such matter relate to the intent with which the offence was committed or to the consequence of the offence.
' Admittedly, the offence under section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 was a lesser one and while trying the case under sections 420, 406, 417, 419, 467, 468, 471 read with section 34 of the P.P.C., the court was competent to convict the petitioners under section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, even without framing separate charge. The record reflects that the petitioners were not only subjected to criminal proceedings, but were also arrayed in civil litigation. After their conviction by the trial court in the complaint case, they were acquitted by this court. Needless to mention here that after their acquittal, the instant proceedings under section 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 have been initiated. I am afraid that after conclusion of the instant proceedings, the petitioners would be arrayed again under the provisions of the Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance, 2002. My such apprehension emerges from the record, as serious allegations have been levelled against the FIA authorities by the petitioners as well. There has to be an end to litigation in every legal system and in the instant case, the acquittal of petitioners by this court became final.
8. As has been observed hereinabove, besides the agony of criminal trial, the petitioners were also arrayed in civil litigation and this longstanding litigation finally ended on 24th September, 2007, when the petitioners were acquitted of the charge by this court on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties. The petitioners have already suffered a lot, as frankly conceded by the learned Standing Counsel and now re-opening of a past and closed transaction would serve no fruitful purpose. Needless to add here that on account of compromise effected between the parties, there is no possibility of the petitioners being convicted of any offence, as such, further proceedings of the case would amount to abuse of-the process of law.
' In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, the petition is allowed. The proceedings, pending against the petitioners Asif Ali and Zamin Ali, sons of Ali Hassan, before the Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Quetta are, accordingly, quashed.