' FAISAL ARAB, J.--- The deceased petitioners Nos.1 and 2 were owners of City Survey No,2140-B situated in Mohalla Kot Mir Janullah Shah, Rohri Town. Out of this survey number, deceased respondent No,1 agreed to purchase 2500 square feet from them. Upon failure to complete the transaction deceased respondent No,1 filed suit for specific performance of contract in 1981. On 19- 2-1985 suit was decreed and on 13-3-1985 decree was drawn. In terms of the decree, the petitioners Nos.1 and 2 were directed to 'execute registered sale-deed within one month after accepting the balance sale consideration amount of Rs,10,750 and in case of default Nazir of the Court was to execute the sale-deed on their behalf. As the petitioners Nos.1 and 2 failed to execute sale-deed the respondent No,1, in June, 1985 filed execution application which was allowed on 12- 9-1985. The order whereby the decree was allowed, states that several chances were given to the petitioners Nos.1 and 2 to file their objections to execution application which they failed to do and on account of their non- appearance without any intimation and in absence of any stay order from the appellate Court the execution application is allowed. Nazir of the Court was directed to execute the sale-deed after the respondent No,1 had deposited the balance sale consideration.
The respondent No,1 on his part deposited the balance sale consideration on 20-5-1986. In the meanwhile the appeal preferred by petitioners Nos.1 and 2 against the judgment and decree was dismissed for non-prosecution on 6-10-1986. They did not pursue the matter any further, hence judgment and decree attained finality and as well as order of disposal of execution application dated 12-9-1985 passed by the executing Court.
' As the judgment and decree attained finality and the execution application was also disposed of and the balance sale consideration was also deposited by respondent No l's legal representatives all that was left to be done, was the execution of the sale-deed by the Nazir of the trial Court in favour of respondent No,l. However, this was not done until after the attorney of the legal representatives of the respondent No,1 moved an application under Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. Dated 2-4-2004 for such purpose. This application was opposed by the legal representatives of the petitioners Nos.1 and 2 on the ground that the application is barred by time as the execution was allowed on 12-9-1985 and the said application was moved on 2-4-2004 i.e. After 19 yeaRs, It was also argued that when the application under Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. Was filed both judgment- debtors and the decree-holders had expired and therefore, no legal proceeding can be initiated by or against a dead person.
' The objections of the legal representatives of the judgment-debtors were rejected and the sale- deed was ordered to be registered in the name of respondent No,
1. The legal representatives of the petitioners Nos.1 and 2 preferred revision application which was dismissed on 22-2-2007. On 10-3- 2007, the Nazir of the trial. Court executed sale-deed in favour of respondent No,
1. On 6-7-2007 the present Constitutional Petition was filed.
' Mr. Abdul Naeem, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased petitioners argued that application filed under Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. Whereby registration of sale-deed was sought was moved after about 19 years of the grant of execution application and as the time for filing such application was governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, which provides three year period, such application ought to have been dismissed as time-barred. He next argued that proceedings by and against a dead person are a nullity and void therefore, no order on the application under Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. Could have been validly passed as the same was filed on behalf of respondent No,1 who was already dead and was filed against the petitioners who too were also dead. In support of his contention that the proceedings against a dead person are void and that the application filed under Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. Was barred by time, he relied upon the following case-law:--- ' 2011 CLC 731, 2001 SCM R 1, 2004 CLC 1482, PLD 1974 BJ 25, PLD 1975 Lahore 909, 2003 M LD 22, PLD 2008 SC 3, 2007 M LD 355, 2007 SCM R 621, PLD 1994 SC 294, 1986 CLC 2972, PLD 1981 BJ (sic); PLD 1990 SC 1 and 2011 SCM R 8.
' Learned counsel for the legal representatives of the petitioners also referred to section 50, C.P.C.
Which is reproduced as follows:- ' 50.41) Where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied; the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.
(2) Where the decree is executed against such legal representative, he shall be liable only to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of and, for the purpose of ascertaining such liability, the Court executing the decree may, of its own motion or on the application of the decree-holder, compel such legal representative to produce such accounts as it thinks fit. Mr. Abdul Qadir Shaikh, learned counsel for the legal representatives of respondent No,1 argued that under the decree the petitioners were called upon to execute the sale-deed upon receiving the balance sale consideration but admittedly at no stage, they came forward to receive the amount and execute the sale-deed. Upon such failure, he argued that it was for the Nazir of the Court to execute sale-deed on their behalf. Hence the failure was on the part of the petitioners or their legal representatives to come forward and execute the sale-deed. This failure on the part of the petitioners left nothing in the proceedings to be done except the registration of the sale-deed by the Nazir of the Court in favour of respondent No,1 or his legal representatives. He next argued that the execution proceedings came to an end when execution application was allowed vide order dated 12-9-1985 and at that time both the petitioners were alive, therefore, the proceedings cannot be said to have been initiated against dead persons.
He submitted that petitioner No,2 Mst. Khair-un-Nisa died in the year 2000 and petitioner No,1 Mureed Shah died on 5-7-2005 whereas the execution application was allowed on 8-12-1985 i.e. Much before the death of these two judgment-debtoRs, He, therefore, contended that the argument of Mr. Naeem that the proceedings were initiated against dead persons was misconceived. With regard to the argument that the execution proceedings were filed by a dead person, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the respondent No,1 contended that after the death of respondent No,1 the right to seek enforcement of the decree devolved upon his legal representative who first appointed an attorney, ny executing power of attorney in his favour and on such basis the attorney filed execution application, therefore, the argument that execution application was filed by dead person is also misconceived. He also referred to Order XXII, Rule 12, C.P.C. Which reads as follows:--- Order XXII
12. Nothing in rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order.
' According to the counsel for legal representatives of respondent No,1, in execution proceedings it is not necessary to bring on record the legal representatives of the judgment-debtors by virtue of Order XXII, Rule 12, C.P.C. As regards plea of limitation that application filed under Order XXI, Rule 34, C.P.C. Seeking registration of the sale-deed through Nazir being barred by time, he argued that the judgment and decree attained finality so also appeal failed. Then the execution application was also allowed and the balance sale consideration was deposited in 1986 and there was only ministerial functions left with the Nazir of the Court to execute sale-deed in favour of respondent No,l.
' The time to file objections to execution application is available at a stage when execution proceedings are still pending. No objection was filed when execution proceedings were pending.
The registration of sale-deed was logical conclusion for enjoyment of fruits of the decree by the decree-holdeRs, ' In reply, counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased petitioners Nos.1 and 2 argued that the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 12, C.P.C., are in conflict with the provisions of section 50, C.P.C. And when there is conflict between the provisions of first part comprising of sections of C.P.C. With the second part comprising of Orders, then the provisions of first part have to prevail over the provisions of second part of C.P.C.
It is an admitted position that execution was allowed, vide order, dated 12-9-1985. Pursuant to the grant of execution application, the only obligation on the decree-holders was to deposit the balance sale consideration amounting to Rs,10,750 in order to get the sale-deed executed in his favour. Admittedly, the balance sale consideration was deposited by the decree-holders on 20-5- 1986. Hence, nothing was to be done on the part Of the decree-holders i.e. The legal representatives of respondent No,
1. It was for the Nazir of the Court to execute the sale-deed in favour of the decree-holdeRs, The delay in the execution of the sale-deed can only be attributed to the petitioners Nos.1 and 2, and after their death to their legal heirs or to the Nazir of the Trial Court.
After deposit of balance sale consideration there was no need for the decree-holders to move a separate application to seek registration of the sale-deed. It was obligatory upon the petitioners Nos.1 and 2 and after their death, upon their legal heirs to execute sale-deed in terms of the order of the Executing Court dated 12-9-1985. The failure on the part of the judgment-debtors cannot be made a ground to penalize the decree-holders by depriving them the fruits of the decree which has also been allowed to be executed in execution proceedings. Merely because sale-deed was not executed by the judgment-debtors or by the Nazir, the order dated 12-9-1985 passed by the Executing Court in favour of respondent No,1 cannot be made ineffective. The execution of the sale- deed was only a ministerial function, which the Nazir of the trial Court was to perform upon failure of the judgment-debtors to do so. It is well-established principle that the act of the Court shall, prejudice no one. In the present case, the decree-holders or their legal representatives cannot be denied the fruits of the decree merely because of the default of Judgment-debtors to discharge their obligation under the decree or of the Nazir of the trial Court. There can be a situation where a decree-holder can be deprived of the fruits of the decree when the decree-holder fails to file execution proceedings within the time specified by law or when the decree-holder fails to perform his obligation created under the decree. In the present case, it is not that after obtaining the decree, the decree-holder failed to file execution proceedings. The suit was decreed in February, 1985 and the execution proceedings were filed in June, 1985 i.e. Within 4 months and the execution proceedings were allowed in September, 1985. Hence, the execution proceedings also came to an end when it was allowed vide order dated 12-9-1985. A bare reading of the decree shows that balance sale consideration was payable at the time when judgment-debtors were to execute the sale-deed in favour of the decree-holder. Admittedly, it were the judgment-debtors who failed to execute sale-deed and in such a situation it was for the Nazir to execute the sale-deed after the decree-holders had deposited the balance sale consideration. The payment of sale consideration was contingent upon the execution of the sale-deed by the judgment-debtoRs, The Executing Court could have denied the fruits of the decree had the judgment-debtors themselves sought directions from the Executing Court to call upon the decree-holders to deposit the balance sale consideration within reasonable time and upon fixation of such reasonable time, had the decree- holders failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the specified time only then that the Executing Court could have recalled its order of execution of the sale-deed and denied the fruits of the decree to the decree-holder. Hence, it was upon the judgment-debtors to first come forward and seek deposit of balance sale consideration. Indeed, the indolence in this regard was solely on the part of judgment-debtoRs, ' Furthermore, there is no conflict between section 50(1), C.P.C. And provisions of Order XXII, Rule 12, C.P.C. Section 50(1), C.P.C., only -provides that before decree is satisfied if the judgment-debtor dies the Executing Court can execute the decree against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtoRs, Section 50(2), C.P.C., provides the extent to which the decree obtained against the deceased judgment-debtor can also be executed against his legal representatives. Hence, section 50 is enabling provision facilitating the decree-holder to get the decree satisfied by seeking its execution against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtoRs, It in no way comes in conflict with the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 12, C.P.C., which provides that provisions of Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII of the Code shall not be applicable to execution proceedings. Thus, it is not necessary at all that upon death of the Judgment-debtors during pendency of the execution proceedings that the legal representatives should be made a party. The decree can be executed without impleading the legal representatives of the judgment-debtors unless the decree-holder cannot get his decree satisfied without obtaining an order against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtors for its execution. Now that the sale-deed has been executed in favour of the respondent No,1 there is nothing left in the case.
' Vide order dated 3-5-2011, this Petition was dismissed and these are the reasons for the same.