' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.--- This petition for leave to appeal arises out of the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 26-7-2008 in Appeal No,15/CE/K of 2008.
2. The facts in brief appear to be that the petitioner was employed with the respondents Corporation in Pay Group No,VII as Assistant Manager (Maintenance) when a show-cause notice dated 4-3-2002 was served upon him containing certain allegations, purportedly under the powers conferred by the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, requiring him to appear before the Managing Director on 11-3-2002. The petitioner submitted a written reply in respect of allegations on 12-3-2002. However, by letter dated 9-4-2002 the petitioner was informed that after personal hearing on 13-3--2002 he was unable to prove his innocence and he stood retired compulsorily from service with immediate effect. The petitioner submitted a written representation against the order of compulsory retirement on 30-4-2002 and upon considering the same, the punishment of compulsory retirement was converted to demotion in Pay Group No,VI by an order dated 17-5-2002. There is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner ever represented against the order of demotion till 20th July, 2005 when through a letter addressed to the Chairman of the respondent he requested for withdrawal of demotion letter and placing him back in Pay Group No,VII with original seniority. Apparently he submitted another application for restoration of pay group on 12-5-2006 and once against on 31-10-2007. However, on 16-6-2008 the petitioner was informed that his request had not been acceded to by the management and thereafter he preferred an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal on 10-7-2008 which was dismissed by an order dated 26-7-2008 which is being impugned through this petition on the ground of being barred by limitation.
3. Mr. A.S.K. Ghori, learned Advocate-on-Record for the petitioner argued that the learned Service Tribunal took a wrong view of the law in holding the petitioner's appeal to be barred by limitation inasmuch as the said appeal was preferred within the prescribed time from the date of the final order of rejection of his departmental representation passed on 12-6-2008. To augment his contention learned counsel argued that his departmental representation dated 30-4-2002 remained undecided despite several reminders on his part till it was finally rejected on 12-6-2008.
4. We are afraid that the contention is ex facie untenable and stands contradicted by the material on record. It is evident that his representation dated 30-4-2002 stood finally decided on 17-5-2002 when after referring to the same the punishment of compulsory retirement was converted into demotion. It is also evident that the order of demotion was never questioned for about three (3) years till the petitioner requested for restoration of seniority on 11-4-2005 and thereafter applied for redress of grievance on 20-7-2005.
5. Faced with the above situation, Mr. Ghori argued that the Proviso of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act only for an appeal to the Service Tribunal and no limitation was prescribed for submitting an appeal review or representation to a departmental authority. In this context it needs to be explained that obviously such limitation is prescribed in the relevant service rules applicable to civil servants, which is thirty (30) days under the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules. No particular rules applicable to the petitioner provided for a departmental representation review or appeal have been placed before us to indicate that such representation was permissible and prescribing the time limit within which it could be made. On the other hand the action against him is purported to have been taken under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 on account of his being a person in corporation service as defined in section 2(c) of the Ordinance. Section 9 of the said Ordinance stipulates a representation against an order of reduction to a lower post or pay scale to be made within fifteen (15) days of its communication to the Chief Executive or such other officer or authority as he may designate. Admittedly no such representation is stated to have been made within prescribed time against the order dated 17-5-2002.
6. Even otherwise section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act provides that an order made by a departmental authority could be questioned before the Tribunal within thirty (30) days of its communication. The proviso to the aforesaid subsection however contemplates that when a provision for a departmental representation exists an appeal to the Tribunal may be preferred after waiting for ninety (90) days from the date of such representation. Evidently, the petitioner was neither entitled to make a representation at his sweet will after more than two (2) years of the impugned action nor await its result for more than four (4) years. No doubt the final order on a departmental representation even if passed after ninety (90) days could be questioned before the Service ,Tribunal through an appeal preferred within thirty (30) days of its communication.
Nevertheless it must be shown that the order was passed on his representation questioning the imposition of penalty. There is nothing on record to indicate that the order dated 12-6-2008 is on such representation.
7. Alternatively, Mr. Ghori argued that the punishment of reduction to a lower rank in terms of Revised Administrative Order No,4 of 2007 could only be confined to a period of one (1) year and, therefore, irrespective of the validity of the order of demotion, the petitioner was entitled as of right to be restored to his original pay group on 15-5-2003. Indeed if, it were so the petitioner could have acquired an independent cause of action on the aforesaid date and failure of the respondents to restore him to his pay group could have enabled him to make departmental representation or approach the Service Tribunal after the aforesaid date within the prescribed time. However, there is nothing to show that he ever did so. Even otherwise, the Administrative Order relied upon became unforceable in 2007 and there is nothing to show that such a restraint on the powers of the respondent-management existed at the time when the penalty was imposed. On the other hand section 3 of the Ordinance whereunder the proceedings were initiated empowers the competent authority to reduce a person to a lower post or 'pay scale without prescribing a limit of time. We, therefore, find no merit in this petition and would decline leave to appeal.