ZAFFAR Hessian MIRZA, J.-Appellants Miro, Rakhio, Muharram and Iqbal were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dadu for the murder of Ismail. All the four appellants were convicted and sentenced to death by judgment dated 11-6-1978. On reference for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to them and appeal filed by them, the High Court of Sind upheld the convictions of the appellants and confirmed the death sentence awarded to appellants Muharram and Iqbal, but altered the death sentence awarded to the remaining two appellants Miro and Rakhio to imprisonment for life each vide judgment dated 30-4-1980. This appeal by Special Leave arises out of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court.
2. The facts leading to the death of deceased Ismail, as set out in the F. I. R. Lodged by informant Piral at P. S. Mehar, District Dadu on 26-4-1976 at 9-15 p. m. Briefly stated are that informant Piral lived in village Nihal Suhag. On the date of occurrence, viz. 26-4-1976 Roshan son of Ismail developed stomwhachp who was to be taken by the informant, deassd Ismail " same other son of the deceased by the name Shahan in Ismail's tonga to village Loung Tunio. The party left their village at about 'Tipahri' time. While they were on their way and had covered about two miles from their village, having reached Raj Wah near Datto Wah, they suddenly saw the appellants emerging from the bed of Raj Wah. Out of the appellants Rakhio was holding a pistol in his hand and the rest were armed with hatchets. The appellants are said to have challenged the complainant party saying that they would not spare Ismail as they had to avenge the murder of Lai Box. There--upon the deceased and his companions alighted from the tonga and Ismail started running towards the eastern direction. Appellant Miro then chased him, while appellant Rakhio fired a shot from his pistol aiming at Ismail, but it hit on the back of appellant Miro who fell down. Deceased Ismail also fell down due to fear. In the meantime, appellants Muharram and Iqbal inflicted hatchet blows to Ismail on his head. After that the culprits left taking appellant Miro with themselves towards their village side. The deceased was found to have bled from his injuries and to have died on the spot.
The motive for the murder as disclosed in the F. I. R. Is that deceased Ismail had been done to death in retaliation for the murder of Lai Bux, a relation of the appellants for whose murder the deceased was tried along with others and was convicted and had come out from Jail after serving out his sentence.
After recording F. I. R., S.H.O., Mehar Police Station proceeded to the scene of offence and secured the dead body of the deceased from there. He also secured blood-stained earth and empty cartridge from the scene of occur--rence. After some further investigation, he arrested appellant Miro on the same day from his village and found injuries on his person. Appellant Rakhio, Muharram and lqbal were arrested on 28-4-1976. The Investigating Officer secured blood-stained clothes from appellant Miro as well as a blood-stained hatchet at his pointing. A pistol was secured on the information received from appellant Rakhio along with two live cartridges from his house. Similarly appellant Muharram produced a blood-stained hatchet and blood-stained clothes. Also appellant lqbal produced a hatchet which, however, did not bear blood stains.
4. The prosecution case was supported at the trial with ocular testimony of informant Piral and P.
Ws. Roshan and Shahan. Additionally, reliance was placed on the evidence of motive, circumstantial evidence of firearm injuries on the person of appellant Miro and the recoveries mentioned above. In addition, there was evidence of the Ballistic Expert who opined that the empty secured from the scene of occurrence had been fired from the pistol secured from appellant Rakhio which was also found to be in working order. The evidence of Medical Officer Dr. Khan Muhammad Shaikh shows that the deceased received eight incised injuries on his head and shoulders. Appellant Miro had pellet injuries on his back and the back of his left arm which were simple in nature.
5. The plea of the appellants was of total denial of the prosecution case and false implication on account of enmity over the murder of Lai Bux, the uncle of appellant Miro. As regards the injuries found on his person, the latter gave a vague explanation that while he was going to his lands, all of sudden P. W. Roshan fired a pistol shot at him near Raj Wah. The testi--mony of the eye-witnesses as supported by the circumstantial evidence mention--ed above, was accepted as reliable and trustworthy both by the trial Court as well as by the High Court. They were accordingly convicted and sentenced as already mentioned.
6. Leave to Appeal was granted by this Court in order to re-appraise the evidence on record to see if the principles laid down by this Court for safe administration of criminal justice have been followed in this case.
7. In support of this appeal mainly it has been contended before us that there are inherent improbabilities in the evidence of the prosecution which clearly indicate that this was a case of an un witnessed crime and the appellants have been falsely implicated due to enmity. In this behalf, learned counsel sought to point out several improbabilities in the prosecution version of the account of the incident. Firstly, it was argued that prosecution has failed to explain how the assailants could divine the intention of the complainant party to take P. W. Roshan along the road passing through the place of occurrence at the psychological moment, so that they could carry out their nefarious design and in particular, how they could reach the spot' two miles away in advance when the complainant party was traveling in a vehicle which would ordinarily be expected to go faster than the men going on foot. It was further argued that the alleged conduct of the complainant party to leave their tonga when confronted by armed assailants and for the deceased to attempt to escape the murderous assault, is highly unnatural and contrary to ordinary course of human conduct. The submission was that it would be more natural for the deceased to have driven away his tonga to escape the impeding harm.
8. We have carefully considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants in the light of the evidence on record. It appears to us that no serious effort was made at the trial to challenge the correctness of the account of the incident deposed to by the prosecution witnesses.
As already remarked, the case of the prosecution as far as direct evidence of the occurrence is concerned, rests on the testimony of the three eye-witnesses, who have given clear and consistent narrative of the events of the incident, as were also describ--ed in the earliest version of the prosecution case in the F. I. R. There is nothing positive in the cross-examination of these witnesses which can suggest any improbability of the nature or extent which can justify the discarding of the substantial evidence incriminating the appellants as, to the immediate act of killing of the deceased. As to whether the appellants could gain knowledge or whether they could not at all have gained the knowledge of the proposed journey of the complainant party, no foundation was laid in the cross-examina--tion of the witnesses. In absence of circumstances excluding or reasonably excluding the probability of such knowledge, it would be wrong to throw over board the testimony of witnesses on a mere suggestion at the argument stage, that the appellants could not have known that deceased was to pass along the road near the scene of occurrence. Similarly there is nothing on the record to indicate that it would be highly improbable for the assailants to reach the place of incident in advance to catch the complainant party. Human ingenuity specially when inspired by strong motivation like the passion for revenge, can' devise methods of achieving its object in diverse ways which may appear the surface inscrutable and it cannot, therefore, be said, in the circumstances of this case, without anything in the evidence to support such an inference, that the culprits could not have known the proposed journey of the complainant' party along the road at the relevant time and that they could not reach at the place of incident in advance. It may further be said that in the very nature of things these facts were within the special knowledge of the appellants and the P. Ws. Would not normally be aware of these matters.
9. There is no doubt that the witnesses produced at trial are all close, relations of the deceased, but it is axiomatic that mere fact that witnesses area partisan or inimical, does not render their testimony ipso facto unreliable. Question of the veracity and reliability of such witnesses is to be examined is the overall circumstances of each particular case, as they may be witnesses o c truth.
In the present case, on a review of the entire evidence it appears to that these witnesses are natural witnesses whose testimony is not liable to be discarded as untrustworthy. No contradiction on any material point has been pointed out in their testimony. Similarly there is nothing improbable in the complainant party leaving the tonga at the time of the incident. After all in a situation like the one described by the witnesses, when four assailants armed with deadly weapons confront them with the dire challenge to avenge the murder of their relation, the complainant party, specially deceased Ismail who was the object of the murderous assault was more likely to act impulsively, when they were unarmed and one of the assailants was armed with a fire weapon, who could cause harm even if the tonga had been driven away.
10. It seems to us, therefore, that the evidence of the witnesses w rightly believed and it was rightly held that the corroborative evidence avail--able in this case lends support to the evidence of the witnesses in material particulars. It may be stated in this connection that no serious attempt made to challenge the evidence of motive. In the first place, the appellants themselves in their statements have admitted that there existed enmity between the parties over the murder of Lai Bux, who was the uncle of appellant Miro. The last mentioned appellant has produced the judgment dated 1-11-1969 in Sessions Case No. 89/1968 in the Court of Sessions Judge, Dadu which shows that deceased Ismail along with four others was charged for the murder of Lai Bux and was convicted under section 304/149, P. P. C. And some other minor offences. He was, however, sentenced to imprisonment for two years. Both P. W. Roshan and P. W. Shahan in answer to questions in cross-examination have further stated that relations between the parties were strained after the murder of Lai Bux and the appellants used to threaten them with murder. As regards Miro, another additional piece of circumstantial evidence is the presence of injuries which fix in with the prosecution version as the injuries were found on the back of this appellant. As already observed, this appellant has admit--ted that he received this injury at the same scene of occurrence. It was vehe--mently contended on his behalf that this part of his statement cannot be used against him as it is not an admission in terms of section 17 of the Evidence Act. It was argued that the statement of the appellant can be taken in its entirety or rejected out right, but certain parts of it cannot be taken out of its context and used against the appellant. It was urged that the statement so taken does not in any way admit any part of the prosecution case, inasmuch as, according to the appellant he received the injury at the hands of P. W. Roshan and not as a result of a shot fired by appellant Rakhio. On behalf of the State, on the other hand, it was contended, that it is permissible under the law at least to take into consideration two points from the statement, namely, that appellant did receive the injury, on the same day and that the injury was received by him at the same scene of offence. However, we think that it is not necessary to enter into this question since the prosecution does not need to rely on this admission to fill in a gap in the evidence. The circumstance that appellant Miro received the injury in .The manner alleged by the prosecution is fully supported by the eye-witnesses and the medical evidence. This tends to support the inference that he participated in the crime. Suffice it to say that this kind of defence was not sought to be pursued in the cross---examination of witnesses so much so that no such question was put even to P. W. Roshan to indicate the circumstances in which he allegedly shot at appellant Miro. If, therefore, this part of his statement cannot be used against him, no benefit accrues to him as well for this reason. About his complicity, there is, however, enough other corroborative evidence comprising the recovery of blood-stained hatchet produced by him.
Against appellant Rakhio, the oral testimony is fully corroborated by the recovery of pistol and the Ballistic Expert's evidence that the empty recovered at the scene of occur- g rence matched with it.
Similarly in respect of appellant Muharram corrobora--tive evidence is furnished by his production of blood-stained hatchet and clothes. In regard to appellant Iqbal, however, it was contended that his case is distinguishable, inasmuch as, the hatchet produced by him was not found blood- stained and, therefore, there is no corroboration of the oral testimony against him. As already discussed, we agree with the view of the Courts below that the evidence of eye-witnesses is reliable and there is no reason to disbelieve them. It is also well established that in such circum-- stances, the evidence of such witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased. Their evidence that appellants Muharram and lqbal inflicted hatchet injuries to the deceased receives support from the number and nature of injuries as found by the Medical Officer. In Sohni v. Bahaduri (PLD 1965SC 111) it was held that the proposition that an interested witness's testimony should be corroborated by independent evidence is not of universal application and the question of such witnesses reliability must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of his evidence. If his testimony is found reliable, it was observed, the Court may accept it even without any corroboration. On an overall consideration of the circum-- stances obtaining in this case, it seems to us, therefore, that the conviction of appellant lqbal is sustainable on the evidence on record.
11. In conclusion, we consider that the conviction of the appellants are well based on the prosecution evidence as accepted by the Courts below and that the guilt of the appellants is established beyond any reasonable doubt. In our view, no well-established principle laid down by this Court, seems to have been disregarded in tile appraisement of evidence by the Courts below.
The appeal is according dismissed.