SH. AHMAD FAROOQ, J.---This judgment will dispose of Criminal Revision No, 1009 of 2010 titled as Rana Muhammad Sarwar v. The State and Criminal Revision No, 970 of 2010 titled as Abid Hussain v.
The State arising out of the order dated 26-8-2010 passed by learned Special Judge Anti Corruption, Lahore whereby he dismissed the applications of petitioners filed under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. for their acquittal in case F.I.R. No, 68 of 2006 dated 12-8-2006 registered with Police Station ACE, Lahore under sections 420, 468, 471, P.P.C. read with section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
2. Succinctly the facts of the case as disclosed in the F.I.R. are that Mst.' Najma Shaheen respondent got registered the case to the effect that she is owner of land measuring 5 marlas 45 feet situated in Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore which was fraudulently sold out without her knowledge by Muhammad Ayub accused in favour of Muhammad Bashir and Muhammad Shahzad accused through appointment of local commission by forging his identity card in connivance with the staff of Sub Registrar, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore and officials of Lahore Development Authority.
3. The present petitioners who were serving in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore, at the relevant time were associated in the investigation along with the vendor, the vendees and the attesting witnesses of the alleged bogus sale deed and after completion of formal investigation, the petitioners were placed in column No,2 of the report under section 173, Cr.P.C. with the recommendation that the case to their extent be dropped.
4. Despite above recommendations of the Investigating Officer, the learned trial Court summoned the petitioners to face the trial. The petitioners filed separate applications under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. before the learned trial Court which were dismissed vide order dated 26-8-2010 primarily on the grounds that the charge had been framed against them and it was observed in their bail granting order that their guilt required further inquiry, and as such, they were not entitled to be acquitted without recording of evidence. Hence, these revision petitions.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are not named in the F.I.R. and no role whatsoever is attributed to them in the preparation or registration of the alleged bogus sale deed and they have been involved in this case for the reason that at the relevant time they were also working in the office of Sub-Registrar, Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore. They further submitted that the petitioners had not processed any document or application submitted before the Sub- Registrar, for the registration of the alleged bogus sale deed. They contended that the petitioners are not beneficiaries of the transaction in question and there was no material available with the prosecution to substantiate its case. They further contended that learned trial Court dismissed the applications of the petitioners merely on the ground that in their bail granting orders it was observed that their guilt or innocence would be determined at trial after recording of evidence.
6. Conversely, learned Deputy Prosecutor-General opposed these revision petitions on the plea that since the charge had been framed against the petitioners therefore, without recording of prosecution evidence, the relief claimed by them was premature. He submitted that the question of their guilt or otherwise, would only be determined after recording of prosecution evidence.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the available record.
8. According to F.I.R., the sale deed in question was made by Muhammad Ayub/accused in favour of Muhammad Shahzad and Muhammad Bashir co-accused. There is nothing on record, which shows that the present petitioners had played any fraud with the vendor or the vendees. The petitioners are neither named in the F.I.R. nor any specific role of making connivance has been levelled by the complainant therein. The prosecution was bound to show the role played by the petitioners in the appointment of local commissioner on whose report the alleged bogus sale deed was registered but it has failed to do so. No incriminating material is available with the prosecution to link the present petitioners with the preparation of forged sale deed. Merely being staff of Sub- Registrar, the petitioners cannot be presumed to have facilitated the alleged forgery. There must be some cogent and solid evidence to involve the present petitioners in this case. No plausible reasons have been given by the learned trial Court for summoning the present petitioners to face the trial along with their co-accused named in the F.I.R.
9. So far as the contention of learned Deputy Prosecutor-General that the petitioners were not entitled to acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C, when the charge against them had been framed, it has been held in a case titled as Muhammad Aslam and others v. The State 2009 SCMR 1411, that the Court shall not be debarred from burying the proceedings by way of quashing, if it is of the view that continuation of the proceedings would be a futile exercise and wastage of time. It has also been held in a case titled as Abdul Sattar and others v. The State (1992 PCr.LJ 2054), that a duty is cast upon the court to see whether there is prima facie evidence available against the accused or not and if no evidence is available, then the accused is to be acquitted whatever may be the stage of the proceedings.
9.(sic.) The observation made by learned trial Court that resort to section 249-A, Cr.P.C. could not be made till recording of prosecution evidence is erroneous and devoid of any legal force because section 249-A, Cr.P.C. provides that "Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case, if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. From the bare reading of section 249-A, Cr.P.C, it is crystal clear that an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. can be moved at any stage of the proceedings. The learned trial Court has only to see whether on the basis of the evidence or material available with the prosecution, there is any probability of the conviction of the accused and if it finds that there exists no evidence or circumstances sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused and his trial would be merely an abuse of process of law, it has to exercise the powers vesting in it under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. to save the accused from the agony of a useless trial.
12.(sic.) The upshot of above discussion and observations is that the prosecution has failed to show availability of any material justifying the learned trial Court to continue with the trial. Hence, the charge against the present petitioners is held groundless because there is no probability of their conviction. In these circumstances, both the revision petitions are accepted and the impugned order dated 20-8-2010 passed by learned trial Court is set aside, the petitioners are acquitted of the charge levelled against them and their sureties shall stand discharged.