' AMIR HANI MUSLIM, ,J,--Through this petition, the petitioners have challenged the impugned judgment of the learned Lahore High Court, by which the appeal of the petitioners was dismissed and judgment passed by the first appellate Court was maintained.
2. The case has a chequered history. The facts as incorporated in the impugned judgment are that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners Qadir Bakhsh was owner of land measuring 39. Kanal, 10 marlas situated in Chak No, 160/TDR Layyah. He entered into a sale agreement dated 27-1-1982 with the respondents in respect of the suit land for a consideration of Rs,1,11,400 out of which a sum of Rs,80,000 was received by him as earnest money. The balance sale consideration of Rs, 31,400 was to be paid to Qadir Bakhsh at the time of registration of sale deed. The sale under the terms of the agreement was to complete by 20-5-1985. Qadir Bakhsh refused to transfer the said land to the respondents within the stipulated period and instead filed a suit for cancellation of the sale agreement, which suit was withdrawn on 19-10-1983. On refusal of Qadir Bakhsh to perform his part of contract under the sale agreement, the respondents on 25-7-1984 filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement. The petitioners filed written statement in which it was pleaded that the price of the suit land was settled as Rs,50,000 and Qadir Bakhsh received only Rs,17,000 as earnest money, while the balance of Rs,33,000 was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale- deed. It was further pleaded that the inflated sale consideration of Rs,1,11,400 had been mentioned in the said sale agreement in connivance with the petition-writer, who drafted the same.
3. Qadir Bakhsh filed a suit for cancellation of the agreement, which was withdrawn on the basis of compromise through panchayat in which it was settled that sale deed would be executed with actual price of the land in question. Subsequently, the sale agreement was cancelled through Panchayat and respondents received back the earnest money. On the divergent pleadings of the parties, the trial Court struck various issues. On 10-6-1990, the predecessor of the petitioners Qadir Bakhsh made an offer to the respondent No, 2 that if he gave a statement on Holy Quran to the effect that agreement in question had not been cancelled, the suit of the respondents be decreed in their favour. The respondent No,2 made a special oath accordingly and the learned Senior Civil Judge decreed the suit in favour of the respondents on the same day.
4. Qadir Bakhsh preferred appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 10-6- 1990, which was accepted and the case was remanded back to the trial Court for decision afresh.
The suit was again decreed in favour of the respondents, by the trial Court. Qadir Bakhsh tiled appeal before the learned Additional District Judge which was again allowed and the case was again remanded for decision afresh on 16-4-1994 against which the respondents preferred FAO and the same was dismissed. The trial. Court, however, dismissed the suit of the respondents vide judgment and decree dated 5-12-1995 against which the respondents preferred appeal, which was allowed vide judgment dated 9-3-1999 whereby their suit was decreed. The petitioners filed Regular Second Appeal before the learned High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned judgment maintaining the judgment of the first appellate Court. Hence this petition for leave to appeal, by the petitioners, impugning the judgment of the learned Lahore High. Court.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that both the courts below were in error in dismissing the appeals of the petitioner as the judgments delivered by these courts were violative of the provisions of Order XX, Rule 5, C.P.C. His next contention was that the sale agreement, which was subject-matter of the proceedings, was attested by two witnesses and only one witness was examined, therefore, findings recorded by both the courts were not in consonance with law. According to him, law requires examination of both attesting witnesses of a document, which fact has not been taken note of while passing the impugned judgment.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and have perused the record. The first contention of the learned counsel that the judgments passed by the Courts below were violative of the provisions of Order XX, Rule 5, C.P.C. Is based on misconception. The impugned judgments have dealt with all the points raised and fulfil the requirement of law. Such judgment cannot be called in question merely on the ground that it has not discussed each and every issue separately. We have examined the judgment of the first appellate Court, which has dealt with all the points raised before it and the same has been maintained by the learned High Court in second appeal by a reasoned judgment. The wisdom behind the Rule 5, Order XX, C.P.C. Is that the trial Court and the first appellate Court should record findings on all the points and non-recording of finding on each and every issue would not be fatal to the judgment on the strength of the Order XX, Rule 5, C.P.C.
The contention of the learned counsel in this respect is without force.
7. The next contention of the learned counsel tin the petitioners is that the sale agreement, which was subject-matter of the proceedings, was attested by two witnesses and only one witness was examined, therefore, non-examination of the other attesting witness would amount to non-proving of the contents of the sale agreement. In these proceedings, the sale agreement has not been disputed and each and every page of the sale agreement was signed by the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners.. Once a document is produced and exhibited without any objection coupled with the fact that one of the attesting witnesses was also examined in support of such document, the requirement of proving the contents-of such document under the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order 1984, are met with. Even otherwise, in law, a document having been produced and exhibited without any objection, cannot be challenged either in appeal or before any other forum superior in hierarchy. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel on this count as well is without substance.
8. Moreover, the learned Judge in Chambers has given detailed reasons in the impugned judgment justifying dismissal of the second appeal. It has been observed.In the impugned judgment that the conduct of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was dicey and wavering throughout the proceedings. It has come on record that he himself offered before the trial Court that if respondent No,2 takes oath on Holy Quran that the agreement to sell has not been cancelled, lie would consent to the decreeing of the suit in their favour: This offer was accepted by the respondent No,2, who took oath special on Holy Quran before the trial Court and the suit was accordingly decreed on 10- 6-1990, against which decree appeal was preferred by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners which reflects his conduct before the courts below.
9. We, in the given circumstances, are of the considered view that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned High Court warranting interference by this Court. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed with costs and leave to appeal is refused.