DECISION ' The respondent, who was employed as a weaver in the appellant industries, was granted leave for 47 days with effect from 21st April, 1979, as he wanted to go to India to see his relatives. The leave was granted without pay as it appears that no leave was due to the respondent. Furthermore, while granting leave it was specifically brought to his notice that no extension of leave would be granted to him. The respondent, however, failed to resume his duties on the expiry of his leave on 6th June, 1979 but instead applied from India for extension of leave for unspecified period on account of his illness, by his letter dated 2nd June, 1979 which is said to have reached the appellant establishment on 10th June, 1979 as appears from the postal mark on the envelope containing the respondent's application for leave. A further letter, dated 21st June, 1979 was received from the respondent by the appellant establishment on 5th July, 1979 requesting for further extension in the leave granted to him. However, One day before the receipt of the second letter, i,e, 4th July, 1979 the respon- dent reported for duty at the appellant's establishment. The respondent was issued a show-cause notice on 5 July, 1979 in respect of his unauthorised absence with effect from 6th June, 1979. As the reply of the respondent to the show-cause notice was found unsatisfactory a domestic enquiry was held on 23rd July, 1979 and on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the services of the respondent were terminated with effect from 1st August 1979 on one month's pay in lieu of notice.
The order of termination of services of the respondent was made after a second show-cause notice was given to the respondent and his reply to the said notice was found unsatisfactory by the appellant establishment. The respondent challenged the orders of termination of his services before the learned second Labour Court which has directed the re-instatment in service of' the respondent with full back benefits and continuity in service. The learned Labour Court has based its decision on the view taken by it that the absence of the respondent from his duties with effect from 6th June, 1979 up to 5th July, 1979 was for reasons of his illness in India, in support of which the respondent had submitted medical certificates from an Indian Doctor before the appellant establishment. The learned Labour Court also repelled the contention of the appellant establishment that Standing Order 15 is not applicable to it since the number of workmen employed in it is less than 50, and in support of its view relied upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of' the Karachi High Court in the case of N. J. Silk Industries v. Presiding Officer, Fourth Labour Court (Contitutional Petition No, 60 of 1975).
2. The decision tithe learned Single Judge in the case of N. J. Silk ludustries came up in appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in PLD 1980 SC 283 and their Lordships, while expressly dissenting from the view held by the learned Single Judge, approved the different view previously taken by the same learned Single Judge in the case of Shafqat Silk Factory v. Presiding Officer, Second Labour Court, Karachi, and held that since Standing Order 15 is not applicable to industries employing less than 50 workmen, Standing Order 12 (5) cannot be pressed into service as it cannot operate in vacuum in the absence of Standing Order 15. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the most recent case of Al-Hassan Silk Mills Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court, reiterated the view taken by them in the case of N. J. Silk Mills and have held that by reason of the second proviso to section 1 (4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, the applicability of both Standing Order 15 and indirectly of Standing Order 12 (5) is excluded in respect of industries employing less than 50 workmen. As such, the case of the respondent does not fall to be considered either under Standing Ornery 12 (5) or Standing Order 15 but under Standing Orders 12 (1) and 12 (3).
3. The essential requirements of Standing Order 12 (I) read with Standing Order 12 (3) are, firstly, that while terminating the service of a permanent wrokman, he should be given one month's wages in lieu of notice, secondly, that the order of termination of his services should be in writing, and thirdly, that the order of termination itself should explicitly state reasons for the termination of services of the workman. All these requirements are fulfilled in the instant case. The order, dated 1st August, 1979 is in writing, it grants one month's wages to the respondent in lieu of notice and finally it specifically details the reasons for terminating the services of the respondent, which are that he unauthorized remained absence from his duties after the expiry of the leave granted to him. It is not disputed by the respondent that he had in fact remained absent from his duties with effect from 6th June, 1979 upto 5 July, 1979 after the expiry of the leave granted to him. His case, however, is that as he had fallen ill in India his absence was for reasons beyond his control. Even if it be assumed that the respondent, by reason of his illness was unable to resume his duties with effect from 7th June, 1979 though the evidence in the enquiry proceedings seems to suggest that the respondent had failed to establish his contention, the order of termination of services of the respondent cannot be seriously questioned before the Labour Courts as Standing Order 15 as also Standing Order 121 (5) are not applicable to the workmen employed in the appellant-establish- meat. At best, the Labour Court has to see whether the order of termination of services is in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order 12 (1) and 12 (3) and is not mala fide or colour exercise of powers. In the instant case, since the respondent had failed to resume his duties on the expiry of his leave despite the clear warning that no extension of leave would be granted to him the order terminating his services would appear to be in accordance with the law. I would, accordingly, set aside the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court and allow the appeal.