' This is an application for the exercise of the sua motu powers of revision of this Tribunal under subsection (3-a) of section 38, I. R.
0., in respect of a decision given by the learned Fourth Labour Court, on 25th March, 1980, dismissing the for appeals preferred by the applicant-Company against the orders of the learned Junior Labour Court directing the re-instatement in service of the respondents with full back benefits.
2. The services of the respondents, who were employed by the applicant-Company, were retrenched on 12th August, 1975. They challenged their retrenchment orders before a learned Junior Labour Court which allowed their grievance petition and directed their re-instatement in service with full back benefits. On appeal by the applicant-Company, the Labour Court set aside the orders of the learned Junior Labour Court and upheld the orders of retrenchment of the respondents. A constitutional petition was thereupon preferred by the respondents and the High Court remanded the case to the appellate Court for decision on merits, particularly on the issues whether the employment of the respondents was retrenched on account of shortage of orders or it was mala fide act because they had started a Trade Union of workmen. On remand the learned Labour Court has upheld the orders of the learned Junior Labour Court and dismissed the appeals.
3. The contention of Mr. Wasi Ahmed, the learned Representative of the applicant-Company, is that since the appellate powers of the Labour Courts have been withdrawn by the Labour Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, which inter alia abolished the Junior Labour Courts, and the power of hearing appeals from decisions/orders under section 25-A, I.R.O.' vest solely in this Tribunal, as provided in sections 37 and 38, I.R.O. Therefore, in proceeding with the appeals in question and deciding the same the learned Labour Court snatched at and exercised jurisdiction, which it did not possess. The contention of Mr. Wasi Ahmed, in short, was that since there was a change of forum with effect from 16th April, 1976, when the Labour Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, came into force, it was no longer competent for a Labour Court to bear appeals against the decisions of the Junior Labour Courts. The argument overlooks the provisions of section 4 of the aforesaid Act, which section reads as follows "4. Savings.-Nothing in this Act, shall be deemed to require the transfer to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of any appeal from a decision of a Junior Labour Court pending before a Labour Court immediately before the commencement of this Act and every such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by the Labour Court as if this Act had not come into force.
4. The aforesaid provisions stand in sharp contrast to those of section 3, which provides that any matter under section 25, I.R.O., pending before a Junior Labour Court before 16th April, 1976, shall stand transferred to the Labour Court.
5. Mr. Wasi Ahmed sought to argue that the provisions of section 4 of the aforesaid Act are strictly applicable to appeals which were pending before Labour Court but since the appeals in the instant case were not pending before any Labour Court when the said Act came into force. Section 4 will not apply to these appeals. I regret that I find no substance in this contention. The order of the High Court setting aside the appellate decision of the Labour Court and remanding the case to it for decision on merits has the effect of reverting back to the position as it prevailed before the said decision by the Labour Court was given and thus making the appeals pending before the Labour Court before 16th April, 1976.
6. I, accordingly, find no valid ground for exercise of suo motu ^powers of revision by this Tribunal.