' Respondents Mohammad Shah and Mohammad Sharif, who were employed in the appellant-Mills as roving operator and senior operator respectively, were arrested by the Police on 9th March 1979, in connection with a fire which had broken out in the premises of the appellant-Mills. It appears that they remained in jail up to 13th November, 1979, in the case of respondent Mohammad Shah and up to 4th February 1980, in the case of respondent Mohammad Sharif. Subsequently, on 10th February, 1980, they were acquitted in respect of the charge of arson. They reported for duties at the appellant-Mills but they were not allowed to perform their duties. Instead they were charge- sheeted on 17th February 1980, for remaining absent with effect from 10th March, 1979. On the basis of the Enquiry Officer's report, who found them guilty of remaining absent from duties from the respective dates of their release on bail or from the date of their acquittal, both the respondents were dismissed from service with effect from 23rd February, 1980. Both the respondents challenged the orders of their dismissal by means of grievance petitions made to the learned VIth Labour Court. Their petitions were allowed by the learned Labour Court, Vide its separate but similar decisions, dated 9th September 1980, and the learned Labour Court directed their re-instatement in service with back benefits. In coming to this decision, the learned Labour Court was influenced by 4 circumstances. The first was the failure on the part of the Management to take action against the respondents up to 17th February 1980, though admittedly they were absent from their duties up to that date and the Management was fully aware of the fact that they were in Jail. The learned Labour Court has characterized the proceedings against the respondents as not free from mala fides. The second circumstance which weighed with the learned Labour Court was that not only the Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Manager of the appellant Mills, who was himself the complainant in the arson case against the respondents but further the Enquiry Officer was a subordinate of the Manager. It was also considered by the learned Labour Court that the charge- sheets against the respondents were time-barred as they were not served upon the respondents within one month of the commission of misconduct by . The last circumstance which weighed with the learned Labour Court was that the enquiry was conducted in haste. The appellant-Mills, feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decisions of the learned Labour Court, have come up in appeal to this Tribunal.
2. The view taken by the learned Labour Court that the enquiry against the respondents was conducted in haste does not appear to be correct. The charge-sheets were issued to the respondents on 17th February, 1980 and were served on them the same day. According to the charge-sheets, they were given 3 days' time within which they had to make a reply to the charge- sheets. This period, I consider, to be quite adequate, considering that the charges against the respondents were their absence from duties. On 19th February 1980, the respondents were served with a further notice informing them that the enquiry would be held on 20th February, 1980, at 2,00 p.m. This notice was served upon the respondents on the same date. The enquiry itself was conducted on 20th February 1980 and it appears that the respondents participated in the enquiry.
As only a short point was involved in the enquiry, no fault can be found with the completion of the enquiry in one day. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 21st February, 1980, and on 23rd February 1980 the respondents were personally heard by the Manager of the appellant-Mills and thereafter the orders for their dismissal were passed. Merely because the enquiry proceedings were conducted promptly after the service of the charge-sheets on the respondents does not mean that the enquiry was conducted in haste. In fact the object of clause (4) of Standing Order 15 appears to be that the domestic enquiry must be conducted promptly. Any delay in the holding of the enquiry would not only be in violation of the spirit of clause (4) of Standing Order 15, but further would be a source of harassm ent to the workman concerned.
3. I regret that I also do not agree with the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the enquiry proceedings have become invalid or are irregular by reason of the fact that the Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Factory Manager of the appellant-Mills, who was the complainant against the respondents in the arson case. That case was wholly different from the charges framed against the respondents, the charges being absence from their duties. Since the Manager was the employer of the respondents, he was the proper person to issue the charge-sheets against them and also to appoint the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer, though a subordinate of the Mills Manager, appears to have conducted the enquiry fairly. In fact no aspersions have been cast on the Enquiry Officer by the respondents either in their grievance petitions or in their evidence before the learned Labour Court.
4. It is next to be considered whether the charges against the respondents are time-barred. In respect of each respondent, 2 separate charges have been made, the first is that they were absent from their duties with effect from 10th March, 1979, and the second charge being, in the case of respondent Mohammad Shah, that he was further absent from his duties with effect from 13th November, 1979, and in the case of respondent the respondents were admittedly in Jail, the charge is not a valid one. So far as the second charge is concerned, I find that the report of the Enquiry Officer Mohammad Sharif that he was absent from his duties with effect from 4th February, 1980, the respective dates of their release on bail. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Abdul Khalique Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant-Mills, that so far as the first charge in respect of both the respondents is concerned, it was not within time and further by reason of the fact that is to the effect that the respondents were absent from their duties either from the date that they were released on bail or from the date that they were acquitted. This shows that the Enquiry Officer himself was not clear in his mind as to the date from which the respondents were absent from their duties. Possibly even the appellant-Mills may not have liked to take back the respondents on duty during the period that they were still under trial for an offence of arson in the premises of the Mills in which they were employed. So far as the absence of the respondents is concerned after their acquittal by the Court, it may be mentioned that they were acquitted on 10th February 1980, while they reported for duty on 17th February, 1980. As such, they were absent from their duties for only 7 days. This absence does not constitute misconduct for the purposes of Standing Order 15. The dismissal in respect of the respondents thus cannot be sustained.
5. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would concur in the directions of the learned Labour Court regarding re-instatement in service of the respondents. Even if there were some hurdles or difficulties in the way of the respondents resuming their duties, on their release on bail, the respondents should have reported for duty immediately upon their acquittal. This, however, they failed to do and remained absent for a further period of 7 days. Furthermore, the respondents had been arrested by the Police in connection with an arson case and were in Jail on the orders of the Court. During all this period, admittedly they neither performed their duties at the appellant-Mills nor in fact they were in a position to do so. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the respondents are not entitled to back benefits for the period from 10th March 1979 up to 17th February 1980, when they reported for duty, but would be entitled to back benefits after the said period up to the date of their reinstatement. With this modification, the appeals of the appellant- Mills stand dismissed.