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1981 PLC 849

MESSRS KARACHI PIPE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs Mirra JAN BEG

Citation1981 PLC 849
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No, KAR-520 of 1979
Date1980-01-26
Judge(s)Z. A. Channa
ResultAppeal dismissed

DECISION This appeal is directed against a decision by the learned Second Labour Court, given on 22nd October, 1979 allowing the grievance petition of the respondent workman against the punishments awarded to him of withholding of increment for one year, confirmation of his suspension period and warning.

2. The respondent, who was employed as a Compounder in the appellant establishment, was charge-sheeted for supplying on 11th June, 1978 wrong medicine to an employee of the establishment, by name Khan Zada, and misbehaving with the latter's brother, Muhammad Siraj. A domestic enquiry followed in which it is stated that the respondent admitted his fault in delivering wrong medicine to Khan Zada He, however, did not admit the allegation of misbehaving with Muhammad Siraj. On the basis of his admission and the report of the Enquiry Officer, the appellant establishment ordered, firstly, that the respondent's increment be stopped for a period of one year, secondly, that his suspension period from 8th June, 1978 to 12th July, 1978 be confirmed and lastly he warned. The respondent challenged the said action against him before the learned Labour Court, which has held that the action taken against the respondent was invalid in that the charge- sheet was issued by an incompetent authority and further the respondent was not served with a second show-cause notice which is a statutory requirement. It accordingly set aside the orders of the appellant establishment and directed the said establishment to pay to the respondent all his legal dues according to law.

3. I have heard Mr. Samiullah Khan, who appeared for the appellant establishment, and Mr. Hassan Asghar Rizvi, the learned counsel for respondent. Mr. Samiullah Khan assailed the, impugned order of the learned Labour Court on two Courts. He contended that the learned Labour/Court had misconceived the legal position in bolding that the charge,sheet was required to be issued under the signature of the factory manager. According to the learned counsel a charge-sheet can be issued by any duly authorised officer of the Management and it is only in cases where punishment of dismissal is accorded that approval of the employer is necessary, as provided in clause (4) of Standing Order 15. I am inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. Standing Order 15 does not lay down the mode for the issuance of a show-cause notice or the holding of an inquiry except in cases where punishment of dismissal is awarded to a workman. No provision of law was referred to me requiring the signing of the charge-sheet or the issuance thereof by the employer himself in case where punishment of dismissal is not awarded. However, the charge- sheet, in all cases, has to be issued by the Management or a person authorised by the Management in this behalf. In the instant case, the charge-sheet was issued by the Personnel and Industrial Manager. He is a responsible officer of the Management and in the absence of evidence to the contrary. I am inclined to the view that the charge-sheet or show-cause notice issued by him would be quite valid. I am, therefore, of the view that the charge-sheet issued by the Personnel and Industrial Manager in the instant case, was a valid one and no infirmity can be found therein.

4. It was next submitted by Samiullah Khan that no second show-cause notice was necessary in the instant case as, firstly, the respondent workman, in his statement before the Enquiry Officer, had admitted delivering wrong medicine to the patient, and secondly the law requires issuance of second show-cause notice only in cases of dismissal and not in cases of award of lesser punishment. As already pointed out the Standing Orders do not lay down the mode for taking disciplinary proceedings against employees in cases where the penalty for dismissal is not B imposed. No doubt, even in such cases, the proceedings against the workman must be fair and full opportunity has to be given to him to, defend himself. This, however, does not mean that a second show-cause notices required to be given to him in all cases. Mr. Rizvi submitted that issuance of second show-cause notice is a requirement of the principle of natural justice. I regret that I am unable to agree with his contention all that theprinciple of audi alteram partem (no person shall be condemned unheard) enshrines is that adequate opportunity should be given to a person to defend himself and to explain the circumstances appearing against him before any punishment is imposed on him. In the instant case, the respondent workman was issued a show-cause notice and thereafter a proper domestic inquiry was conducted in which full opportunity was given to him to defend himself. In these circumstances I feel that the requirements of natural justice have been fully met.

5. It was finally argued by Mr. Hassan Asghar that the inadvertent act of the respondent workman in giving medicine meant for one patient to another patient does not amount to misconduct for the purposes of Standing Order 15 and consequently no punishment for misconduct, as provided under the said Standing Order, could be imposed on the respondent. The action against the respondent is purported to have been taken against him under sub-clause (i) of clause (3) of Standing Order 15. Action under that sub-clause can only be taken if it is established that the workman is guilty of habitual negligence or neglect of work. It was contended by Mr. Rizvi that a single act of neglect of work does not fall within the said sub-clause. In other words that the qualification of 'habitual' is applicable not only to negligence but also to neglect of work. The learned counsel's contention finds support from the decision in the case of Safee Development Corporation . Even otherwise, I am inclined to the view that the words 'neglect of work' cannot be inferred from a solitary lapse on the part of a workman, specially if the lapse is inadvertent, as in the instant case. Before a person can be punished for neglect of work it must be shown that such neglect occurred not only on a single occasion but on a number of occasions or at least for a certain, minimum period. In the instant case, the supplementary charge-sheet issued to the workman indicates that the action of the respondent was considered not desirable and could be1 considered as carelessness or a mistake. Such act would, thus, appear to fall under Standing Order 15(1)(10(d), in respect of which only a fine can be imposed and not a punishment specified in clause (2) of Standing Order 15. It might be argued that the acts specified in clause (3) of Standing Order 15 are illustrative and not exhaustive. Even if this be correct, since the legislature has specifically included the act of carelessness in the acts which are to be punished with fine only, the fact established against the respondent cannot be treated as misconduct, entailing the punishment of dismissal. I am, therefore, of the view that the punishment of stoppage of increment could not have been imposed on the respondent workman in respect of his act of carelessness.

6. For the reasons stated by me above, I find no merit in this appeal and would dismiss the same. 1965 PLC 304

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