1. ' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.-The petitioners have challenged the order of the learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, whereby he has held that the respondent No, 3 the Union were competent to raise the industrial dispute and further that the application filed by the Union under section 32(1-A) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) was maintainable.
2. ' The petitioners are manufacturers of Hoseiry Products of Cotton and the respondent No, 3 claim to be a General Union of workers registered under the law and the Collective Bargaining Agent. The petitioners deny having recognised respondent No, 3 as a Collective Bargaining Agent. It is alleged that in June 1972, the respondent No, 3 forced the petitioners to sign an agreement under coercion and pressure. Thereafter the respondents No 3 served a charter of demands dated 16-6-1973, which was challenged by the petitioners, inter alia on the ground that the respondent No, 3 had no locus standi to serve it. This was followed by strike notice dated 30th June 1973. During the pendency of conciliation proceedings a meeting was fixed on 6-9-1973, which happened to be a public holiday. It seems that thereafter no meeting was held. Thereafter, the respondent No, 3 resorted to strike. During the continuance of this strike, the petitioners filed an application under sections 34 and 45 of the Ordinance before V Sind Lahour Court, who after hearing the parties passed an order on 4-10-1973 prohibiting the strike. The application was finally disposed of on 13-2- 1974 holding that the strike was legal. On 2-2-1974, the respondent No, 3 filed an application under section 32 (I-A) of the Ordinance before respondent No, 2 to which objections were filed by the petitioners. By his order dated 19-9-1974, the respondent No, 2 dismissed the application of respondent No, 3 on the ground that due to delay of about for months in filing the application it was not maintainable. Both the petitioners and the respondents filed cross appeals against the order of respondent No,
2. Both the appeals were heard by respondent No. 1, who by the impugned order dated 22nd January 1975, dismissed the appeal of the petitioners and allowed the appeal of respondent No,
3. None of the respondents have filed any counter-affidavit.
3. ' Mr. Hassan A. Shaikh the learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the impugned order on two grounds, namely, that (I) as respondent No, 3, the Union, were not competent to represent the workers, the entire proceedings were illegal and, (2) after the termination of the strike, remedy under section 32 (I-A) of the Ordinance, could not be availed by the respondent No, 3.
4. ' Before dealing with the first argument, it is pertinent to mention that the application filed by the petitioners under section 34 of the Ordinance was decided by the V Sind Labour Court on 13th February 1974, after hearing parties and considering the evidence which was produced at that time. The respondent No, 2 held that the respondent No, 3 were competent to represent the workers and the strike which commenced from 8th September 1973, was legal and in accordance with the provisions of law. Against this order of respondent No, 2 the petiiioners went in appeal, which was dismissed by the respondent No. 1 on 28-3-1974. The petitioners then filed a Constitution petition in this Court being Constitution Petition No, D-384 of 1974, challenging the legality and validity of the order of respondent No, 2 dated 13-2-1974 and the order passed by respondent No, J. It seems that the petitioners withdrew the Petition on 5th February 1975, which was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
5. ' It is thus clear that the order of Respondent No, 2 holding respondents No, 3, competent to serve the strike notice remained operative. The petitioners strangely enough have not made any reference to these material facts in their petition. The non-disclosure of these facts seems to be intentional as immediately after withdrawing Constitution Petition No, D-384 of .1974 without referring or challenging the said order of 13-2-1974 they have filed the present petition inter alia challenging the competency of the respondent No, 3 to raise an industrial dispute. The petitioners have not disclosed material facts, which came to or notice during the arguments. This very fact by itself disentitles the petitioners from seeking discretionary relief.
6. ' Mr. Ali Amjad, learned counsel for the respondent No, 3, while pointing out these facts has stressed that since the order of Respondent No, 2 holding respondent No, 3 competent to raise an industrial dispute has neither been set aside nor challenged, the petitioners cannot re-agitate this question in these proceedings. The determination of the question relating to the competency of respondent No, 3 entirely depends upon determination of disputed questions of facts, which were considered by the respondent No,
2. We have examined the file of Constitution Petition No, D-384 of 1974 and find that the respondent No, 2 after considering the evidence produced before him came to a conclusion, with which we are not inclined to interfere at this stage. Nor would we like to investigate into the disputed facts in these proceedings. In view of this discussion the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no force.
7. ' In support of the second contention, Mr. Hassan A. Sheikh, the learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance and has submitted that as the application was filed by the respondent No, 3 about for months after the order of prohibition was passed the application was not maintainable. He has further contended that the application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance should be filed during the continuance of the strike and not after its termination. According to him the strike terminated on the date when order of prohibition was passed. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the case of Employees' Union v.
8. Monnoo Motors and Others. In this case application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance was filed during the conciliation proceedings and before the commencement of strike. The main question for consideration in that petition was whether an application under section 32(1-A) of the1 Ordinance could be made during the conciliation proceedings. It was in this context that the following observation was made :- "The dispute has to be raised in a particular manner, it is the party raising the dispute who can move an application under this subsection either before going on strike or during its continuance.
9. Subsection (1-A) of section 32, therefore, refers to the period after the expiry of the notice of strike period but before the actual commencement of the strike and at any time thereafter while the strike continues. So understood there would be no occasion to make an application under section 42(1-A) during the pendency of a conciliation proceedings. If the words "at any time" are given their widest connotation and given literal meaning it would enable a party to make an application under subsection (1-A) without any notice to the employer, without any attempt at bilateral negotiations or an attempt at conciliation making redundant the words 'the party raising the dispute' and "either before or after the commencement of a strike" and making inconsequential the context of the subsection and scheme of the Ordinance."
10. ' With great respect we agree with the above observation, but in or humble opinion it does not apply to the present case and is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the present case, the application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance was filed after the commencement of strike and during the period it was prohibited under section 45 of the Ordinance. In this context it has to be seen whether the application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance was competent. It would be convenient to reproduce section 32(1-A) which reads as follows :- "(1-A)-The party raising a dispute may at any time, either before or after the commencement of a strike or lock-out, make an application to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
11. In order to appreciate the correct legal position of this provision it is relevant to note the preceding provisions of the Ordinance. The scheme of the Ordinance is that before an industrial dispute is adjudicated upon by the Labour Court the parties have to comply with the mandatory requirements which include, firstly, negotiation, secondly, conciliations, thirdly, arbitration, and thereafter, the worker can resort to strike after expiry of strike notice period. This clearly demonstrates that the Legislature requires the parties to exhaust the entire proceedings before taking the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication. In the present case as stated earlier the respondent No, 3 had complied with all the pre-conditions imposed under Law for applying under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance. It was after the commencement of strike that the respondent No, 2 prohibited it on 4-10-1973, after which it could not be continued in defiance of the order of the Court. Section 45 of the Ordinance permits the Labour Court to prohibit continuance of a strike or lock-out. An application under section 45 can be made only when the strike or lock-out in pursuance of an industrial dispute has already commenced and is in existence at that time. The power exerciseable under section 45 is of an interlocutory nature by which Labour Court can prohibit a strike or lock-out provided an application under section 34 of the Ordinance is pending.
12. The prohibition ordered by Court does not put to an end the continuity of the strike or lock-out. It only interrupts or- suspends the continuance.
13. ' While interpreting section 32 (I-A) of the Ordinance the purpose and scheme of the Ordinance and the principle of interpretation should be kept in view. The object of the Ordinance is to regulate the relations between the employers and workmen and the avoidance and settlement of any differences or disputes arising between them or matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto. The Ordinance, aims at the settlement of disputes for which a self-contained procedure has been provided. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation, as held in the case of Abdul Majid Khan v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner Pakistan, Lahore, that an interpretation, which advances the object of legislation should be preferred. The remedy provided under the statute has to be promoted and any mischief that might retard its object has to be suppressed. Besides this, as held in the case of Khawaja Ghulam Sarwar v. Pakistan through the2 General Manager, P. W. R., Lahore if the words of statute are in themselves unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. Applying these principles to the unambiguous language of section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance let us consider the contention of the petitioners. If the period for filing the application is limited, as canvassed by thy learned counsel for the petitioners, then in or opinion it would amount violence to the unambiguous language of the statute and the very object of the Ordinance in some cases be stultified. The words "at any time either before or after the commencement of strike 'or lock-out" suggest the time when an application could be made. The period before the commencement of strike or lock-out as held in Employees' Union v. Monnoo Motors and others should be the period after the conciliation proceedings have failed and the parties have finally decided to resort to strike or lock-out, but before the commencement of strike or lock-out. The words "after the commencement of strike or lock-out"I indicate that once the strike or lock-out has commenced the party is entitled to make an application. The statute has no doubt fixed the starting point, but does not seem to have fixed the time, when the party may be debarred from making such an application. Although no terminus quo has been fixe under the Ordinance, it does not mean that the party entitled to apply shal have unlimited period at his disposal. After the termination of strike o lock-out application under section 32 (1-A) of the Ordinance can be file within a reasonable period which can be determined by considering the attending circumstances and facts of each case. Negligence and laches on the part of the party making the application may disentitle it from seeking this remedy. The acceptance of the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners will lead to anomaly. There may be cases where without reaching settlement the party may call off strike or lock-out and to suggest that the party will then be debarred from making an application for adjudication will not be in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Ordinance. In the present case, as could be seen, the strike had not terminated, but it was prohibited by an order of the Court, which finally declared the strike as legal. Such prohibition will not amount to termination, it will only be a suspension without prejudicially affecting the rights of the parties. In the present case the application under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance was filed during the period of prohibition and as the strike was declared legal, the respondent C No, 3 could have pressed their application for adjudication of industrial dispute by the Labour Court. In the circumstances the application filed by the respondent No, 3 was competent.
14. ' In view of the above discussion we find no merit in this petition, which is dimissed with costs. PLD 1975 Kar. 811 P D 1968 SC 154 PLD 1962 SC 142