"(i) Order of this Court dated 26-12-1978 appointing the Sole Arbitrator by consent of the parties.
(ii) Claim, written statement, affidavit, rejoinder affidavit and annexures thereto from 1 to 588, cross-examination of the witnesses (3. Pages), proceedings 1 to 11 and notice served on the parties."
2. Notices were issued to the parties by this Court and in response to such notice the defendants, Government of Sind, have filed objections under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration- Act, supported by an affidavit of the Executive Engineer, Highway Division, Jacobabad. In reply a counter. Affidavit has been filed by the Managing partner of the plaintiffs firm. I heard Mr. G.
Raymond on behalf of the plaintiffs arid Mr. Hussain Adil Khatri on behalf of the defendants. Case of the parties was well pleaded by' both the learned counsel and at length. It may be stated at the outset that the award dated 6-10-1979 of the Sole Arbitrator is a non-speaking award. However, as one of the main challenge to the award, by Mr. Hussain Adil Khatri was that the award is, on its face, unintelligible and in the arguments before me repeated references were made to the contents of the award, I consider it necessary to reproduce here t he entire award dated 6-10-1979 :- "Award.-The parties relating to the contract for tine construction of Link Road from Indus Highway to A.I Bilawal Khan Road via Bukhsbapur bearing No. TC/G-55, leading to chum amounting to Its.
18,58,275 (Rupees Eighteen Lac Fifty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred and Seventy-five only) by the plaintiffs/claimants.
(2) I was appointed Sole Arbitrator by the Honourable High Court of Sind in Suit No. 552/75 filed by the plaintiffsunder section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the defendants in connection with disputes that had arisen between the parties.
(3) I, Syed Haider A.I Pirzada, having taken upon myself the responsibility to arbitration in the dispute in the above-referred matter, called upon the parties to file their respective claims, replies, affidavits, rejoinders written statements, documents and other alleged evidence that they considered necessary before me. After going through the aforesaid documents, agreements, measurement books, bills and other correspondence and hearing both the parties.
I hereby make and publish the day the 6th October 1979, the final Award as under :- "(a) I allow and hold the Claimants/Plaintiffs to be entitled to a sum of Rs. 9,49,859 (Rupees Nine Lac Forty- nine Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-nine only) in full and final settlement. The defen- -dants have already paid a sum of Rs. 1,51,998 (Rupees One Lac Fifty-one Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-eight only) to the plaintiffs and a sum of Rs. 5;300 (Rupees Five Thousand Three Hundred only) to the Income-tax Department on behalf of the plaintiffs. The balance amount comes to Rs. 7,92,361 (Rupees Seven Lac Ninety-two Thousand Five Hundred and Sixty-one only) which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendants with interest at six per cent. Per annum from the date of Award till payment ' is made.
(b) I hereby order the parties to deposit the fees of the undersigned, Sole Arbitrator in the sum of Rs. 20,000 (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) to be equally shared by the parties that is to say Rs: 10,000 (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to be paid/deposited by each party:"
3. Learned counsel for the defendants raised the following contentions before me in his challenge to the award :-
(a) On its face, the award is unintelligible.
(b) The Sole Arbitrator has not applied his mind to the case before him and that this is evident from the award itself.
(c) The claim of the plaintiffs was in respect of damages and neither any evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs before the arbitrator proving any damage suffered by them, nor is there any such evidence on record. According to learned counsel, therefore, this was a case of no evidence.
(d) The Sole Arbitrator had been appointed by consent of the parties in Suit No. 552/75, which was an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants, and in para. 9 whereof the plaintiffs had stated that they had suffered losses of Rs.9,99,134, whereas in the award the Sole Arbitrator has mentioned that there was a claim of Rs. 18,58,275 by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had filed a claim of Rs. 18,58,275 before the Sole Arbitrator which was in excess of the amount mentioned by the plaintiffs in their application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 552/75). The contention was that the reference to the Sole Arbitrator was made in Suit No. 552/75 and, therefore, the plaintiffs as well as the Sole Arbitrator were confined to the claim of Rs.9,99,134 and the Sole Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by "entertaining the claim of the plaintiffs in excess of this amount and by referring to the claim of Rs. 18,58,175 in the award.
(e) The Sole arbitrator has not considered and given his findings on the various issues which arose from the pleadings of the parties filed before the arbitrator. According to learned counsel for the defendant the arbitrator is guilty of technical or legal misconduct in--asmuch as he has not decided the real question at issue and controversy between the parties.
4. In respect of the first two objections, consolidated arguments were addressed by Mr. Hussain Adil Khatri, learned counsel for the defendants and not separately. I would, therefore, also take up the first two objections, referred to above, together. According to learned counsel for the defendant perusal of the award shows that on its face it is unintelligible and that it also shows or indicates that the sole arbitrator has not applied his mind to the matter and accordingly this was a clear case of misconduct on his part. The award, according to learned counsel, therefore, is liable to be set aside. The first contention was that the claim before the arbitrator was for damages but from the award there is no indication that the claim of the plaintiffs was for damages as the word "damages" has not been mentioned anywhere in the award. Secondly, it was urged, that in the award the sole arbitrator refers to a claim of Rs. 18,58,275 having been preferred. By the plaintiffs, whereas in the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 552/75), the amount of loss that had been suffered by the plaintiff had been mentioned as Rs. 9,99,134. By not making any reference to the figure of Rs. 9,99,134 it shows, according to counsel, that the sole arbitrator had not even perused the reference by this Court made in Suit No. 552/75 appointing him as the sole arbitrator. Thirdly, it was contended, that the sole arbitrator has used the word "in full and final settlement" in his award which according to counsel, would normally indicate that the case before him concerned settlement of accounts one party claiming certain amount from the other party and vice versa whereas in fact this was not a case for accounts but was a simple claim of damages preferred by the plaintiffs against the defendant. According to learned counsel, therefore, by using the words "in full and final settlement", there is the indication that the sole arbitrator was not even aware of the nature of the claim of the plaintiffs. According to learned counsel, these 3 points. Clearly indicate that the arbitrator had not applied his mind to the claim, the reply and the evidence produced before him, nor was he aware of the nature of the claim and, therefore, in the circumstances, it was a clear case of misconduct on the part of the sole arbitrator, result of which, it was contended, is that under the law the award given by him is liable to be set aside. In respect of the connected contention that the award on its face is unintelligible the argument of learned counsel for the defendant was that even in a case of a non-speaking award the law required the award to be intelligible on its face which, it was contended requires the award to show the precise controversy between the rival parties and the decision of the arbitrator.
Disposing of the said controversy in a clear and exact manner. According to learned counsel, from the face of the present award it is not clear, at all as to what was the controversy between the parties and what was the precise nature of the claim of the plaintiff and the defence of the other party and, therefore, the award is liable to be set aside as being unintelligible.
5. In my view the fact that the word "damages" has not been used by the sole arbitrator in his award would not, in the circumstances of this case, by itself, be a sufficient reason or ground for interfering with the award. The award shows that the disputes had arisen between the parties and a claim had been made by the plaintiff and part of this claim has been allowed by the sole arbitrator. Reference has been made in the award to the contract between the parties, without incorporating the contract in the award and it has further been mentioned that dispute arose in connection with the work under the contract. Sufficient data has been given by the arbitrator in his award and the mere omission of the word "damages" would not entitle the defendant to get the award set aside. On a question from me, learned counsel for the defendant took the stand that had the arbitrator employed words to the effect that "I award Rs.As damages", the award could not then have been challenged by the defendant, as according to him use of the word "damages" would have made the difference.
Frankly I find this distinction plainly superficial and of no substance. The fact that the arbitrator has not used the word "damages" in the instant case does not indicate that the arbitrator had not applied his mind to case before him. I further find from the written objections filed by the defendant in this case against the award that objection has not been taken that the arbitrator has not applied his mind -to the case.
6. The fact that instead of making a reference to the claim of Rs. 9,99,134 but mentioning Rs.
18,58,275 as the claim of the plaintiffs, I find that this objection is also without any merit. No doubt in the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 552/75) -the plaintiffs had mentioned that they had suffered a loss of Rs. 9,99,134 but according to learned counsel for the plaintiffs this was a case of continuing losses and by the time the claim had been filed before the arbitrator, the plaintiffs had suffered further losses and that is why a claim of Rs. 18,58,275 was filed.
1 find from consent order dated 27-11-1978 of this Court in Suit No. 552/75, in which entire consent order has been reproduced in para. 1 of the objections (C. M. A. Of 1980), that "the disputes" between the parties were referred to the sole arbitrator and the reference did not restrict the plaintiffs from confining his claim to Rs. 9,99,134 before the arbitrator. A claim for Rs. 18,58,275 was made before the arbitrator and I do not see how the reference required the plaintiffs to restrict itself to the amount mentioned in their application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The plaintiffs may well have suffered further damages and in any case I do not find any reason to hold that the plaintiff could not file a claim of Rs. 18,58,275 before the arbitrator. Omission by the arbitrator to mention in his award the amount referred to in para. 6 of the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, is no indication that the sole arbitrator had not applied his mind to the case. Additional reason for not accepting this plea is that in the written objections such a challenge has not been made.
7. The third point raised in this connection was that this was a claim for damages which had been denied and as such the arbitrator was not expected to mention in his award the words "full and final settlement" as these words normally are used in rendition of accounts cases. According to Mr. Hussain Adil Khatri, the use of the words "full and final settlement" indicates that the arbitrator was not even aware of the nature of dispute let alone the amount that was being claimed by the plaintiffs. I am afraid I cannot agree with the learned counsel on this point as in my opinion just because the words "full and final settlement" have been used it would not follow that the arbitrator had not applied his mind to the -case or that he was not aware of the nature or extent of the claim made by the plaintiffs. These words can very well indicate that there was a larger claim made by the plaintiffs but the arbitrator was awarding a smaller amount which would finally "settle" or dispose of their claim. I also do not find any such objection taken in the written objections.
8. In my view the words of the award themselves do dot indicate or show that the arbitrator had not applied his mind to the case before him. I am, further of the view that on the face of the award it is not an unintelligible award. An added reason for coming to this conclusion is that those two objections, namely that the award is unintelligible and that the arbitrator had not applied his mind to the case, have not even been raised in the written objections filed by the defendant in this matter. These two objections accordingly have no merit and are accordingly dismissed.
9. The third challenge of learned counsel for the defendant was that it was a case of no evidence.
As observed earlier, the contention was that admittedly this was a case of , damages but no evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs for proving any damage suffered by them. Counsel, in the circumstances, urged that the record be perused by the Court to determine whether there was evidence before the arbitrator that the plaintiff had suffered the damages which had been awarded by the Arbitrator. To the extent that where there is an allegation that the award is based on n evidence, the Court can, even in a case of non-speaking award, peruse the record including the evidence while considering the objections/application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the contention of learned counsel is correct. And if the Court on such perusal findsthe award is based on no evidence, will be lawfully exercising jurisdiction in setting aside the award . . . . . However, it is also settled law that insufficiency of evidence or that on the evidence adduced before the arbitrationthe Court would have reach a different conclusion is not a ground for setting aside or interfering with the award. Keeping these principles of mind, I have perused the record of the arbitration proceedings in this case.
10. From the order of the sole arbitrator I find that the parties were allowed to file the claim and reply supported by documentary evidence. Affidavits were allowed to be filed by the parties. At the request of the parties, representatives of the parties were cross-examined by the other side and then arguments were heard by the sole arbitration at any stage of the arbitration proceedings by either party that the procedure adopted by the arbitrator was objectionable, irregular or illegal.
There is also no allegation in this regard in the objections filed against the award. No challenge has been made that a proper or adequate hearing was not granted to the parties. Apart from the contractual documents, correspon--dence exchanged between the parties, bills, statements relating to work done and other documents, the plaintiff had also produced their cash book, ledger book and over 350 payment vouchers as evidence in support of their claim. Then there are on record two affidavits on behalf of the plaintiff in support of their claim for damages. There is, therefore on record evidence relating to the damages claimed by the plaintiffs. While determining the objections/application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, I am not sitting in appeal against the award given by the arbitrator. As observed earlier, through a long chain of judicial pronouncements of Superior Courts, insufficiency of evidence has been considered to be no ground for setting aside an award.
11. At this juncture I may refer to a connected argument raised by Mr. Khatri, learned counsel for the defendant. According to counsel the arbitrator, while forwarding his award dated 6-10-1979 to this Court, had also sent along the record of arbitration proceedings which included the documentary as well as the record of the oral evidence, and in the circumstances this entire record became a part of the award enabling the Court to Judge the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Champsey & Co. v. Jivraj Baloo Co.
(1). I, however, find that this judgment of the Privy Council does not assist the learned counsel. In this judgment Privy Council was of the view that an error in law on the face of the award means that the Court could find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which the Court finds to be erroneous. By sending the record alongwith his award, it cannot be said that the sole arbitrator in the instant case has incorporated the entire evidence as a part of the award. Further by a mere mention in the award that the parties had led evidence before the arbitrator and who had considered the same, the law does not raise a presumption that the evidence becomes a part of the award open to scrutiny through an application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. I may here refer to a passage from the judgment of Wahiduddin, J., in the case of Suleman Haji Muhammad & Co. v. State Bank of Pakistan (2), with which I am in respectful agreement. Passage at page 87 of the report is reproduced here; "On consideration of the case law on the subject it is very clear that the Court hearing the application for setting aside an award cannot constitute itself into a Court of appeal over the decision of an arbitration and cannot make a sifting investigation of the entire proceedings before the arbitrator unless it is first shown that the award is bad on the face of it. I have already cited the view of their Lordships of the Privy Council that arbitrators are both Judges of law and facts and in my view once the matter is found to be within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, it is not permissible for Courts of law to find out whether their decision is right or wrong on the facts urged before them by travelling outside the award for finding out what evidence was led before them and whether their conclusions are based on sufficient evidence. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Lahore High Court J. Kaikobad v. F. Khambatta AIR 1930 Lah. 280. In that case also it was urged that the finding of the arbitrator was based on insufficient evidence, but the Division Bench observed; An arbitrator is fully justified in rejecting in part of the case set up by either party and ascertaining the real facts according to his own view of the evidence. A counsel is not entitled to attack the findings of facts given by the arbitrator on the evidence led by the parties. Whether his conclusions are right or wrong is not a matter which is open for consideration by the trial Court of the Appellate Court on revision.
(1) AIR 1923 P C 66(2) PLD 1960 Kar. 78 This view is in accord with the view taken by this Court in .Messrs Overseas Cotton Company v.
Messrs S. M. Fazail & Co. PLD 1951 Kar. 27 approved on appeal by a Division Bench of this Court in PLD 1959 Kar. 320. I therefore do not find any force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the defendants and hold that in law it is not open to this Court to consider the evidence led by the parties before the arbitrator not set out and discussed in the award."
The objection that it is a case of no evidence has not merit and is accordingly dismissed.
12. The next objection taken by Mr. Hussain Adil Khatri learned counsel for the defendant, was that the sole arbitrator had travelled beyond the reference and as a result the proceedings as well as the award made by the sole arbitrator are illegal and liable to be set aside. As observed earlier, learned counsel for the defendant had taken up the stand that in para. 9 of the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 552/75), the plaintiffs had stated that they had suffered loss of Rs. 9,99,134, whereas in the award the sole arbitrator has mentioned this figure at all but has mentioned that the disputes between the parties led to the making of a claim of Rs. 18,58,275 by the plaintiff. In para. 6 of this judgment, while discussing other objections, I had observed that the reference to the sole arbitrator did not restrict the plaintiffs to a claim of Rs. 9,99,134 and they could file a claim for a higher amount. I further find that such objection has not been taken by the defendant in their written objections. I am, therefore, of the view that the order of reference did not restrict the plaintiff to the claim of Rs. 9,99,134 and by filing a claim which far exceeded this figure did not take the claim of the plaintiffs outside the reference. I am further of the opinion that in view of the consent order of reference being in general wide terms whereby "disputes" between the parties were referred to the sole arbitrator, it was also competent for the defendant to have filed before the arbitrator a counter-claim or a separate claim against the plaintiff's. There is no merit in this objection that the arbitrator travelled beyond the reference. This objection is accordingly dismissed.
13. The last contention of learned counsel for the defendant was that the arbitrator was required to give his findings on all the issues which arose out of the pleadings of the parties. From the order sheet of the arbitrator I find that issues had not been framed by him and neither any request was made by any party for framing of issues by the arbitrator. Learned counsel had, however, argued that whatever issues arose out of the pleadings should have been specifically decided by the arbitrator and inasmuch as he failed to give his findings on each issue which arose out of the pleadings, the award is liable to be set aside as this amounted to legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. I am of the view that it is not necessary for an arbitrator to frame issues and even if issues are framed by the arbitrator it is not necessary for him to give separate findings on each issue but the law permits him to give one lump sum award without separate findings on each issue. What is required is that the arbitrator should give an intelligible and clear award and dispose of the controversy between the parties. In the present case, the arbitrator had referred to the dispute between the parties and the claim made by the plaintiffs. He also referred to the fact that documents had been filed and he had considered the pleadings as well as the documents and had heard the arguments of the parties. After this, through a non-speaking award, the arbitrator granted a lump sum amount to the plaintiffs. I see no illegality committed by the arbitrator in giving a lump sum award as I have already observed that it is not -necessary for the arbitrator to give separate findings on each issue.
I may refer to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Trading Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Aslam Saeed & Co. (1), in which at page 75 of the report the learned Single Judge observed as follows--- "Thus an arbitrator is not bound to give specific findings on each of the issues, nor he is required to state reasons for his conclusion. What is required is that he should give a clear decision on the case. So where the award is silent as to the objection raised before the arbitrator, it will be presumed that he had considered those objections and had rejected them."
14. As I have already observed, it is not the case of the defendant that the arbitrator did not allow evidence to be adduced, or that arguments were not heard at length by him. On the contrary the record shows that a number of hearings took place before the arbitrator. Having given full opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and having heard the arguments on behalf of the parties at great length, his non-speaking award cannot be set aside in the ground that separate findings on each issue, which arose out of the pleadings, have not been given by the arbitrator.
15. In support of the contention that the arbitrator was required to give his findings on issues, learned counsel for the defendant referred to the case of Jafar Brothers Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2), a Division Bench judgment and a recent decision of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in the case of Pakistan v. Aziz & Sons (3).
The Karachi case reported in PLD 1978 Kar. 585 is distinguishable as in that case the learned Judges of this Court were dealing with a reasoned award i.e. an award which gave reasons for the decision. Further their decision was based on the conclusion of the learned Judges in that case that there was no decision by the arbitrator as regards the real question at issue and for that reason the learned Judges decided that the award was bad for misconduct of the pro--ceedings.
The learned Judges were of the view that if from the award it is clear that the arbitrator has not given a decision on the real question at issue, it would amount to a case of technical misconduct on the part of the arbitrators. From a perusal of the award in the instant, case, there is no indication that arbitrator has not given a decision on the real question at issue. According to me from the award the real question at issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to any amount as claimed by them which claim was decided by the defendant and the arbitrator having accepted a part of the claim of the plaintiffs has given a clear decision. On the face of the award I do not find any ambiguity or any irregularity or illegality which could amount to technical or legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.
16. The other case an which great reliance was placed by Mr. Hussain Adil Khatri, learned counsel for the defendant, is PLD 1980 Lab. 422. That was a case of a non-speaking award and the case had come up before a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court who set aside the award on the ground of misconduct. Reliance was placed on certain passages from this judgment and paras, 14 to 18 of that judgment are reproduced here :-
(1) PLD 1973 Kar. 65 (2) PLD 1978 Kar. 585
(3) PLD 1980 Lab. 422 "(14) 1 have already referred to two exceptions to the rule that the Court must confirm itself to discovering errors apparent on the face of the award viz. (i) the matter is outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and (ii) the award is the result of fraud. In my view, there is another exception too. If the award itself is not complete or is unintelligible, it cannot be relied upon as an exhaustive document for discovering the error apparent on it.
(15) An award is a decision or a judgment on a cause or matter in difference referred to an arbitrator who is, no doubt, the final Judge of all questions both of law and of facts. It is distinguishable from the judgment in the sense that it is not necessary for the arbitrator to discuss the facts or to give reasons. A judgment on the other hand, must give facts in order to bring to the surface the dispute between the parties, the points of issue between them and all the decisions on those points.
(16) But it cannot be doubted that the award must be a self-contained document which would decide all the disputes finally. In order to be immune from being interpreted or varied or contradicted by extrinsic evidence it must speak by itself. In Vallabdas v. Keshavlal AIR 1927 Dom.
428 it was held that where an award is ambiguous and the ambiguity is on the face of the document it is not competent for the Court to launch into an inquiry to ascertain which of the two possible interpretations should be accepted by the Court as correct. In view of the ambiguity of the award it was not made a rule of the Court. In Haminder Singh v. Muhinder Singh it was held that where an arbitrator is not bound by the technical rules of procedure to write a reasoned judgment but he is required to give intelligible decision which determines the rights of the parties in relation to the subject-matter of the reference. In Maharajah Sir Joy Mangul Singh v. Mohun Ram Marwarse and another (1869) 12 W R 397 two arbitrators wrote and signed as their award separate papers bearing different dates. It was held that the award should be a Single instrument complete in itself.
Also see Lock v. Vullianny (1833) 2 N R & M 366. In Balawal Khan v. Captain .Vuhammad Alam Khan and others it was stressed that conclusions must be stated on the points referred.
(17) In order therefore to be immune from the possibility of extraneous matters having been referred to, the award must be intelligible, self-contained and complete document from which it could be found out as to what was the dispute between the parties and what is its decision.
(18) Looking at the present award, from this point of view it will be found out that it lacks all the essentials of an award. It cannot be found out as to what exactly are the disputes and which dispute has been, refused and which has been allowed and how much amount has been allowed against what particular category of claim. In order to read this award, and to understand it, it would be necessary to go through other documents for example the claim and counter claim which have not been made a part of the award by the arbitrator. It is not, therefore, a document for which extraneous evidence can be said to be irrelevant. In fact it cannot be understood without extraneous evidence. I cannot therefore, maintain the finding of the learned trial Court, that no other evidence would' be relevant in the present case."
The argument of counsel for . The defendant based on the reasoning of this Lahore High Court judgmentwas that in the instant case the award of the sole arbitrator lacks the essentials of an award inasmuch as it is not clear from the award as to what was the claim of the plaintiffs under each head and which claim has been allowed and how much amount against what particular category of claim awarded by the arbitrator. To the extent the said judgment re-affirms the principle regarding the two exceptions to the rule that the Court must confine itself to discovering errors apparent on the face of the award, namely, (i) the matter is outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and (ii) the award is the result offraud, I join the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in confirming the principle. The learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, h however, added one other exception to this rule which is that if the award itself is not complete or is unintelligible, it cannot be relied upon as an exhaustive document for discovering the error apparent on it. I respectfully agree. In my view, however, as observed earlier, the instant award is an intelligible and complete award. However, if the third exception mentioned in the Lahore judgment goes to the extent that from the award it must be absolutely clear as to how much amount has been allowed against what particular category of claim and which particular part of the claim has been refused and which allowed, I beg to differ with respect to such extension. In my view if the award is intelligible unambiguous and clear and finally determines the controversy between the parties, the award cannot be set aside on the ground only because the award does not specify as to how E much amount has been allowed against what particular category of claim and which particular portion of the claim has been accepted and which refused. In my view if a lump sum award is given in clear terms, n,)misconduct or illegality is committed by the arbitrator.
17. The objections raised by the defendant against the award are accordingly dismissed and the award is made a rule of the Court and I pass a decree in terms thereof. There will, however, be no order as to costs of these proceedings.
M. y. M. Objections dismissed.