These petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 arise out of the same facts and I will therefore dispose of both of them by the same judgment.
2. The, respondent Fazal Imam and Khalil Ahmad are employees of the petitioner who preferred their applications under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 before the respondent No. 2, who after hearing the parties, allowed the applications and directed the petitioner to deposit Rs.
44,146.50 and Rs. 15,100 respectively within a week for payment to the respondents. These petitions challenging the orders dated 31 7-1979 of the- respondent No. 2, have been preferred by the petitioner.
3. The respondent are admittedly the employees of the petitioner. They set up their cases before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Authority under the Payment of Wages Act that they were in services of the petitioner since 1967 and 1972 respectively. Their services were illegally terminated by the petitioners on 14-11-1977 and 1-11-1977 respectively without assigning any reason for it and no such letter of termination of their services was issued to them. They were drawing Rs. 975, Rs. 600 per month respectively at the relevant time. They therefore claimed their legal dues to the tune of Rs. 44,146,50 and Rs. 15,100 under various heads. The defence of the petitioner in substance was that the respondents were not entitled to any benefit and that their services have not been terminated by the petitioner but in case of the respondent Fazal Imam, his services have been transferred to the new management along with the Mills and he himself has stopped to go to that Mill for the reason best known to him. The respondent Khalil Ahmed had himself resigned and had left the job without making overcharge of the machinery under his charge and a number of machinery parts were missing and the same were lying inoperative for which he has liable to indemnify the recurring loss. The respondents examined themselves and one witness in support of their claims and closed their side on I9-5-1979. The matter was put off for the defence but the petitioner failed to lead any evidence till 18-7-1979, till his side was ordered to be closed. Since the petitioner did not bring anything on record in cross-examination and also failed to adduce any evidence in rebuttal of the respondents' evidence, their applications were allowed by the impugned orders dated 31-7-1979.
4. The first question raised by Mr. M. Sadiq, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 in this case is whether the petitions are maintainable in view of section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 which has provided an appeal against the order of the Authority. Therefore there being adequate remedy provided by the Act, this petition is liable to be dismissed. He has placed reliance on 1974 PLC 89.
5. Mr. Burney, the learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand has contended that the order of the respondent No. 2 being without jurisdiction and the provision of appeal against it, putting a mandatory condition to deposit the amount payable under the direction of the Authority, before preferring the appeal under no circumstances could be treated as an adequate remedy in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In order to support his contentions, he has relied upon--------------
(i) PLD 1972 SC 279 and
(ii) PLD 1975 Kar. 202:
6. I have carefully considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondents. I have also gone through the citations referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. It is true that a High Court may if it is satisfied that -no other adequate remedy is provided by law, can set aside the impugned order if it is found without jurisdiction. But the question in this case is if the existence of another remedy provided by law because of condition of the payment under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act would not be a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court. I think, unless a conclusion is arrived at that the appeal provided by the Act is not adequate remedy, there is no power to act under Article 199 of our Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to examine as to what kind of appeal has been provided by the Act so as to determine if it is actually an adequate remedy. The relevant provision of section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act of 1936 reads as under: "Section 17. (1) An appeal against a direction made under I (subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 may be preferred, within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made) before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXXIII of 1969 within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose. All appeals pending before any "Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXXIII of 1969), within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose;"
(a) by the employer or other peoson responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees: Provided that no appeal under this clause shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied a certificate of the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with the authority, the amount payable under the direction appealed against, or,
(b) by an employed person or, if hehas died, by any of his heirs if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from the employed person or from the unpaid group to which be belonged exceeds fifty rupees, or
(c) by any person directed to pay penalty under (subsection (4)) of section 15."
7. It is clear from the provisions of the above section that the orders of the Authority is appealable and no appeal under clause 17 (1) (a) of the Act shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a. Certificate of the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with the authority, the amount payable under the direction appealed against: which is obviously with a view to paying up what can be equated to a decretal amount, that is the money ordered to be paid by means of a final order under the proceedings itself. There is nothing wrong with the condition that the appellant has to deposit with authority, the amount payable under the direction appealed against before preferring an appeal against the orders of the authority. It is usual practice of the courts even in ordinary civil litigation to refuse to stay execution of money decrees except upon the condition that the decretal amount be first deposited in Court. This lends support from the case of Mohammad Fazil v. Commissioner for Payment of Wages 1974 PLC 89. The cases referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are entirely on different facts and are not of much help to him in this case.
8. After considering all the facts and circumstances. I have - come to the conclusion that the appeal provided by the Act is adequate remedy and the petitioner has failed to avail of it before invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of our Constitution. These petitions are not maintainable and are therefore dismissed with no order as to costs under the circumstances.