DECISION ' On 15th April, 1980, respondent Nawab Shah made an application . Under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, to the learned Commissioner under the said Act, stating that he is the attorney of the guardians of one Ali Shah, who was an employee of the appellants and who died due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the appellants. Respondent, Nawab Shah, accordingly. Claimed a sum of Rs, 15,000 a death compensation from the appellants, presumably under the provisions of Standing Order 10-B. Notice of this application was given to the appellants and they were required to file their objections.
However, thereafter the appellants throughout remained absent in spite of the matter being adjourned from time to time. Accordingly, on 28th June, 1980, the learned Commissioner passed an order based on the unrebutted testimony of the respondent, directing the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs, 15,000 for payment to the heirs of the deceased compensation.
2. The appellants, on 26th July, 1980, submitted an application for setting aside of the ex parte order. The said application was supported by an affidavit of the Manager Administration of the appellants. The sole ground stated in the affidavit and his application for setting aside the ex parte order was that the Manager was unable to attend the hearing after the filing of the written objections because of acute Labour problems at Sites of the appellants. No details of the labour problems were stated nor was it even asserted that there was no other person who could be deputed to look after the proceedings. Furthermore, the appellants failed to attend the hearings of the restoration application in the result that the restoration application was rejected by the learned Commissioner by his order, dated 9th September, 1980. The appellants have now come up in appeal against the said order. It might be mentioned here that in the mean time the amount of Rs, 15,000 deposited by the appellants as compensation has been paid by the INK and Commissioner to the respondent, Nawab Shah, on behalf of two heirs of the deceased.
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3. Since rile present appeal has been filed much beyond the period of limitation an application for condonation of delay has been submitted by the appellants. Now an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act can only be filed against the type of orders specified in subsection (1) of section 30 of the said Act. Since the order, dated 9th September, 1980, rejecting the restoration application, is not an order of the type specified in the said section no appeal lies against the said order. So far as the first order is concerned, which was passed on 28th June, 1980, the limitation as regards the filing of appeal against the said order expired on 28th August, 1980, while the present appeal was preferred exactly three months later on 28th October, 1980. No grounds have been made out for condoning this delay for admittedly the appellants were aware of the passing of the impugned order prior 26th July, 1980, when they filed the restoration application.
It may also be mentioned that the appellants throughout been negligent in defending the proceedings against them: It appears from the record of the learned Commissioner that after filing the reply statement on 14th May, 1980, the appellants throughout remained absent till the passing of the order, dated 28th June, 1980, for the award of compensation to the respondent. Even after filing the restoration application, the appellants failed to appear before the learned Commissioner with the result that the restoration application was dismissed in default.
4. Mr. H.A. Jafri, the learned counsel for the appellants, urged that as the deceased was never in the employment of appellants, the order granting compensation to his heirs is bad in law. However, the appellants, because of failure to attend, allowed the evidence of the respondent to go unrequited.
In any case, as pointed out, the appeal is time-barred and no adequate ground for condoning the delay had been made out. I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal in limine.