' The petitioner Messrs Muhammad Sharif Chiragh Din filed a civil suit against Pakistan through Secretary, Defence for a declaration that the petitioner did not enter upon a contract with the defendant for the supply of fresh vegetables and fresh onions in Sialkot Supply Area for the period from 1-7-1973 to 30-6-1974 vide tender and contract dated 8-3-1973, and by way of consequential relief they claimed that the defendant (Pakistan through Secretary, Defence) be restrained from pressing the plaintiff Messrs Muhammad Sharif Chiragh Din) for enforcing the terms and conditions of the said tender and the alleged contract.
' Quite subsequent to the above-mentioned suit filed by the petitioner, the respondent (Pakistan through Secretary, Defence) instituted a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs, 10,32,808.74 as damages on account of the failure of the petitioner to supply the goods stipulated in the contract.
The petitioners applied before the learned trial Court under section 10, C. P. C. For the stay of the case entitled "Pakistan v. Messrs Muhammad Sharif Chiragh Din". The learned Civil Judge after hearing the parties did not accede to the request and instead directed the consolidation of the two suits i,e, Messrs Muhammad Sharif Chiragh Din v. Pakistan through Secretary, Defence" and "Pakistan through Secretary, Defence v. Mesers Muhammad Shari, Chiragh Din". The order dated 17- 1.-1977, passed by the learned Civil Judge, 1st Class, Sialkot, consolidating the two suits is being impugned in this Court in revision.
2. The case on behalf of the petitioners has been brilliantly argued b Mr. Muhammad Salim Shahnazi, Advocate who has maintained that the cause of action and the subject-matter in the two suits being substantially and essential the same section 10, C. P. C. Was attracted to the case, because the parties were the same in both the suits and the petitioners i,e, Messrs Muhanuna Sharif Chiragh Din had instituted the declaratory suit earlier in time and in the suit filed by the petitioners, the matter substantially in issue was existence or non-existence. Of the contract dated 8-3-1973 and in support of the proposition the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Janana De Malucho Textile Milli Ltd. v. Waqar Ahmad Chaudhary (1), Sakhawat Hossain v. Chowdhary Muhammad Sarwar and another t2), Syed Alauddin Ahmad v. Md. Mustafa (3). The cases have been read extensively at the Bar. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1972 SC 34 (2) PLD 1978 Dacca 557
(3) PLD 1971 Dacca 286 {{FOOT NOTE}}
3. Mr. Zia Mahmud Mirza, the learned standing counsel for the Government of Pakistan, has controverted the assertions of the petitioners. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondents-
(1) that the revision is liable to dismissal on the short ground that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction it is not the practice of this Court to interfere with the discretion armorers passed by the lower Courts and in this regard he has placed reliance on Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v.
Sultan Mahmood Khan PLD 1970 SC 139, and
(2) that section 10, C. P. C. Would be attracted only if there was complete identity of the subject- matter in its entirety and it is not enough that the suit filed between the parties earlier in time involves a few common issues and in support of this proposition he has placed reliance on Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Modern Embroidery & Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 1976 Kar. 249 which sums up and re-states the law on the proposition till to date.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and analyzed the case- law cited at the Bar. The cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable on facts. The first case cited by the petitioners is PLD 1972 SC 34. Instead of supporting the proposition of the petitioner this case lends some support to the case of the respondent. In that case the two suits in question did not involve all the issues in common and it was noted : "The reliefs claimed in the two suits were different and there was no risk of contradictory decrees being passed by two different Courts on the same issues."
' In the above-cited case, it is clear that the first suit was for mere declaration and in the second suit the plaintiff was Mut walli of the Waqf and the matter in issue in the second suit was not precisely the same as in the first suit and the mere fact that one or two issues were common in two suits has been found to be not sufficient for bringing the suits within the scope of section 10, C. P. C.
' In the case in hand, one of the common issues in the two suits is the existence or non-existence of the contract dated 8-3-1975 between the parties and there is a risk of two contradictory decrees being passed in case the suits are tried separately, and in the above-cited case their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the view expressed by Cornelius, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Chaudhari Muhammad Ar-wl v. Mst. Sardar Begum (1). The view expressed in Chaudhari Muhammad Afzai's case was that "if there was a common issue arising in both the suits, then the trial of that issue in the Lyallpur suit should have been stayed and not vice versa". I do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that Chaudhari Muhammad Afzal's case approved by the Supreme Court covers the case of the petitioner in its entirety. Ch. Muhammad Afzal's can is distinguishable on facts. There were common issues arising in the two suits, but not all the issues were common in the two suits and the case did not lay down the proposition that irrespective of the difference of issues in the two suits the suit later in time had to be stayed. In this view of the matter, in my humble view Ch. Muhammad Afzal's case which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Janana De Mahalucho's case goes against the petitioners. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1949 Lah. 16 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' The next case relied upon by the learned counsel is Sakhawat Hossain v. Ch. Muhammad Sarwar.
This case lends some support to the case of the petitioners wherein section 10, C. P. C. Was held to be applicable even though the relief claimed in a fresh suit was different from that claimed in the earlier suit. The facts of the two suits which were the subject-matter of the case before their Lordships of the Dacca High Court are not ascertainable in essential details, but I would with respect take note of the observations in respect of the existent rationale of section 10, C. P. C. : "The provisions of this section apply though the relief claimed in the second suit is not the same as claimed in the first suit. The difference in the relief claimed in the two suits is quite immaterial under this section. The identity of the matter directly and substantially in issue is material. This section is intended to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon two or more parallel litigations in respect of the same cause of action and the same subject-matter, or in other words litigations in which the matter in issue are identical."
5. In support of the argument that even if section 10, C. P. C. Was not attracted, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned trial Court should have stayed the proceedings in the subsequent suit in exercise of its powers under section 131, C. P. C. As the suit of the petitioners was nearing conclusion, whereas in the subsequent suit no substantial progress had been made, and in this regard the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Syed Alauddin Ahmad v.
Md. Mustafa (1). It cannot be overlooked that one of the prerequisites for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is the expediency in the interest of justice and the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised in aid of expediency in the interest of justice. In the case in hand the main consideration is the avoidance of contradictory decrees being passed on a very material issue and also the avoidance of multiple and prolonged litigation one after the other in the two suits which involve quite a few issues which are material for the just decision of the two suits, therefore, I am of the view that the expediency of the interest of justice lies in the consolidation of the two suits as directed by the learned trial Court by its impugned order.
6. Mushtak Ali Kazi, J. In Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Modern Embroidery & Textile Mills Ltd. Has taken pains to note the entire case-law to date on the facts and circumstances akin to the case in hand. The view expressed by Waheeduddin, C. J. In Muhammad Younas v. Nargis Sultana (2) by Dorab Patel, J. In Messrs Nigar Pictures v. Messrs. United Brothers (3) and by Mushtak Ali Kazi, J. In Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Modern Embroidery & Textile Mills Ltd. Can be summed up to lay down that for stay of subsequent suit under section 10, C. P. C. It was necessary that every matter in dispute should be directly and substantially in issue in the two suits ; and that there should be in its entirety complete identity of the subject-matter of the two suits and that it was not enough that the substantial issue should be the same in both the suits and this exposition aptly decides the fate of this revision.
' If we were to analyze the rationale behind sections 10 and 11, C. P. C. The two sections seem to be based on the principle that the multiplicity of litigation should be avoided and no one should be troubled twice for the same. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1971 Dacca 286 (2) PLD 1970 Lab. 41
(3) PLD 1970 Kar. 770 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' cause and bearing in mind the same principle and the plethora of case-law taken note of in PLD 1976 Kar. 249, I am of the view that the impugned order is a just and most expedient order that could be passed in the particular circumstances of the matters in hand and the impugned order has the blessings of the view taken in Adam Ltd. v, Muhammad Steamship Co. Ltd. (1) (for suits were consolidated) and Nur Elaht v. The State (2) (two criminal cases were consolidated).
' It is trite law that when a Court has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it has the jurisdiction to decide the same rightly or wrongly both in fact and in law, and in this regard I would refer to Joy Chand Lal Rabu v. Kamalakshah Chaadhry (3).
' The impugned order has been passed with jurisdiction, is a just and proper order, expedient and in the interest of both the parties, as it will conclusively and finally decide the entire issues comparatively in much less number of years than if the same were to be tried one after the other, No such jurisdictional defect or error of law has been pointed out so as to persuade me to interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and in this regard I would refer to Muhammad Swateh v. United Grain and Fodder Agencies (4) and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Zaki Muhammad Siddiquie (5).
7. The revision is dismissed. In the particular circumstances of this case, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1963 Kar. 514 (2) PLD 1966 SC 708
(3) PLD 1949 P C 114 (4) PLD 1964 SC 97
(5) PLD 1979 Kar, 179 {{FOOT NOTE}}