' NAIMUDDIN, J.-This petition under Article 100 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 calls in question the order dated 11th August 1980, passed by the District Judge, Dadu and Election Tribunal, Dadu, whereby the learned Tribunal set aside the election of the petitioner to the Town Committee, K. M. Shah, District Dadu from Unit comprising of Wards Nos. 6 and 7 of the aforesaid Town Committee under the following circumstances :- "(1) The petitioner alongwith respondents Nos. 1 to 3 contested the election for membership of the Town Committee, K. N. Shah, District Dadu from the above mentioned constituency on 25th September 1979, and having secured the highest number of votes at polls, he was declared elected from the said constituency to the Town Committee. He had a lead of six votes as against respondent No. 1.
(2) Respondent No. 1 being aggrieved by the declaration of the petitioner as successful from the said constituency filed an Election Petition, being Petition No, 7 of 1979, before the Provincial Election Authority, Sind at Karachi among other grounds on the ground that he was a lessee of Town Committee of K. N. Shah, for collection of Octroi tax in respect whereof he was in arrears of Rs, 17,500 which he in spite of several demands had failed to clear up.
(3) The Election Tribunal on the pleadings of the parties framed the following 9 issues :
(1) Whether the opponent No. 1 is defaulter of the Town Committee ?
(2) Whether the Opponent No. 1 had obtained polls in the name of People's Party ?
(3) Whether the Opponent No. 1 was a candidate of People's Party and has sought support on party basis ?
(4) Whether the Opponent No. 1 committed hindrances and irregularities on the day of polling ?
(5) Whether the Opponent No. 1 is liable to be disqualified ?
(6) Whether the Election from Wards Nos. 6 and 7 of Town Committee K. N. Shah, is liable to be set aside ?
(7) Whether the petitioner is entitled to be declared as a successful member from Wards Nos. 6 and 7?
(8) Whether wrong and illegal votes were cast in the election of the Ward? If so, what is the effect ?
(9) What should the order be ?
In order to decide the same the learned Tribunal recorded evidence of the parties. At the stage of arguments, respondent No. 1 did not press Issues Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6,
8. On Issue No. 1 the Tribunal in view of the provisions of section 37 (2) of the Sind Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), which provides grounds of disqualification from being elected as and from being a member of any council, held that since the petitioner was admittedly a defaulter in respect of a sum of Rs, 17,500 which he was to pay to the Town Committee, K. N. Shah, even on the date of declaration of his result, he was so disqualified under clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 37 of the Ordinance. In this regard the learned Tribunal relied on the following part of the deposition of the petitioner recorded by it : "When Martial Law Authorities had pressed me through Mukhtiarkar I had made payment of Rs, 5,000 to the Town Committee. About Rs, 18,000 were outstanding till the day of polling. I had paid Rs, 5,000 after the election. I have not made the payment of the remaining amount because still Committee has to render account as such dispute is there."
4. We have heard Mr. S. Nasiruddin in support of the petition. Mr. S. Nasiruddin, contended that admittedly the petitioner not having any existing contract on the date of nomination or election, was not disqualified from being elected or being a member simply because he was indebted to the Town Committee. The only question, therefore, that requires consideration is, whether on the above finding it could be said that the petitioner was not disqualified from being elected or being a member of the Town Committee. He, however, conceded what the law contemplates is that a candidate should not have any pecuniary interest in the Council which included a Town Committee. Mr. Nasiruddin, however, submitted that a debtor to a Council cannot be said to have any pecuniary interest in the Council for according to him, a person who is indebted to a council has nothing to gain or receive by way of benefit or advantage from the Council. In fact, he is under an obligation to meet his liability. In or view the submission is not correct. The expression pecuniary interest has not been defined in the Ordinance, therefore, it is to be understood in its ordinary dictionary meaning and according to 'The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII, the word 'pecuniary' means `having regard to money; of which money is the object', and include money, resources in money, money matters and 'interest' means that which is to or for the advantage of any one; good, benefit or profit or advantage, and a person who has to pay some money to a Council, in or view has, therefore, pecuniary interest therein for the existence of liability to pay the debt could be effected in more than one way. He may use his influence in such a way that the Town Committee may not at all enforce its claim or it may delay its action to recover the same, or write it off. This expression came up for interpretation in Brown v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1), while construing the provisions of section 76 of the Local Government Act, 1933 (Amended by Local Government Pecuniary Interest Act, 1964) which makes it necessary for any member of local authority who has pecuniary interest in a contract or proposed contract to disclose the fact in certain circumstances, Donovan, J., at page 192 of the report observed as follows :- "The Council was voting to free all tenants other than Councilor tenants from the liability to make future additional payments in respect of lodgers or sub-letting. The appellants voted in favour of that proposal, and, therefore, voted to preserve their own liability, actual or possible. The object of section 76 (1) is clearly to prevent Councillors from voting on a matter which may affect their own pockets and, therefore, may affect their judgment, and a Councillors judgment may be affected by a proposal to preserve his liability just as much as by a proposal to terminate it, particularly where other persons in a like situation are being relieved from the same liability In these circumstances, no narrow construction ought to be put on the words "pecuniary interest" in their context in section 76(1), in particular they ought not to be construed and the contrary has not been suggested as meaning pecuniary advantage. The appellants had a pecuniary interest in the sense that an existing liability in the case of some, and a possible future liability in the case of others, was doing to be maintained, and in that way their pockets were or might be affected."
These observations fully support the view we have taken above. It was therefore, necessary for the petitioner to have cleared the debt before contesting the elections.
' M r. S. Nasiruddin, however, referred us to Karam Dad Khan v. Muhammad Yaqub and others (2), Abdul Ghafoor v. Nur Muhammad and others (3) and Muhammad Hassan v. Election Tribunal, Jacobabad and others (4). In the first two cases the question of meaning of the expression 'pecuniary interest' was not at all raised or considered. Therefore, they are not relevant. However, in the last-named Karachi case the effect of the expression was considered but the view taken therein does not support Mr. S. Nasiruddin. In this case respondent No, 3 at the material time was a contractor of the Town Committee in question and had obtained a contract for collection of Octroi on behalf of the Town Committee and had to pay several thousands of rupees to the Town Committee on account thereof. With reference to these facts while considering the provision of section 53 (1) (f ), Electoral College Act, 1964, it was observed by Waheeduddin Ahmad, J., at page 351 of the report as follows :- "It is further provided that if he has otherwise any pecuniary interest in such Council or Committee he will also be disqualified from standing as a candidate in such election. The contention of {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) (1956) 2 A E R 189 (2) PLD 1965 Lah. 622
(3) PLD 1966 Lab. 423 (4) PLD 1966 Kar. 348 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Memon that the pecuniary interest referred to in the clause under consideration should be of the same nature as it described in the earlier part of the clause cannot be accepted as good argument. There are two grounds contemplated for the disqualification of a candidate. If he is found to have otherwise any pecuniary interest in such councils or committees, he has no right to stand as a candidate for the election of the Electoral College" and accordingly the order disqualifying respondent No, 3 was upheld."
' We, therefore, find no substance in this petition and accordingly dismiss it.