1. ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, J.--- This Civil Revision under Section 115, CPC has been directed against the order dated 25.3.2008 passed by the learned District Judge, Ghotki whereby the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has been dismissed consequent upon which the appeal filed by the applicant against the judgment and decree passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Ubauro dated 16.6.2007 and 20.6.2007 has been upheld.
2. The facts leading to the present revision application in brief are that the respondent filed suit for damages against application for malicious prosecution and his false involvement in false F.I.R under Section 435, PPC wherein he was challenged, was finally acquitted by the criminal Court in Cr. Case No. 60/2004 vide judgment dated 13.2.2004. After acquittal from the charge the respondent filed the aforesaid suit for damages to the tune of Rs. 100,000/- which was contested by the applicant and was finally decreed vide judgment and decree as stated above by Trial Court, against which, the applicant preferred appeal before the District Judge Ghotki, which was barred by seven days. As such application for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal was also filed alongwith the appeal, which was heard by the learned District Judge Ghotki who after hearing of the counsel for the parties, dismissed the application; hence the present revision application.
3. 2001 SCMR 1062, the case of Abdul Ghani v Mst. Shaheen and others reported in 2007 SCM R 834 and the case of Mst. Afroz Qureshi v Muhammad Ikram Siddiqui reported in NLR 1995 CLJ 549.
4. Admittedly the appeal filed by the applicant before the learned District Judge, Ghotki against the judgment and decree passed by learned lower Court was barred by seven days for which application for condonation of the delay was filed. In the said application the reason assigned by the applicant was that because of his paucity he could not arrange the Court-fee, therefore, the appeal could not be filed in time. The learned District Judge while considering the plea urged by the applicant did not satisfy with the same and dismissed the application. The plea which has been taken in support of condonation of delay, seems not to be reasonable and plausible for the reasons that in case, if, the applicant had no funds to pay Court-fee then he had to file appeal without payment of the Court-fee and seeking further time from the Court by filing of application under section 149, CPC for submission of the Court-fee, but neither the appeal was filed in time nor any application under section 149, C.P.C. Was filed before the learned District Judge. The plea advanced by the applicant regarding his paucity to arrange Court-fee, seems not to be reasonable and plausible to condone the delay of seven days in filing of the appeal. There could be no cavil to the proposition that after expiry of the limitation period a valuable right stands accrued in favour of the opposite party, which could not be snatched or brushed aside leniently. The party guilty of the limitation is duty bound and under obligation to explain each days delay in submission of the appeal when the period of limitation has expired. In the present case not a delay of single day has been explained by the applicant except the general plea regarding his paucity to arrange the Court-fee. The delay in filing of the appeal, has therefore not been satisfactorily explained and a valuable right accrued in favour of respondent which could no be denied to him to reap the fruit of the decree.
5. The learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently argued that the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal case, was based on benefit of doubt, which was not honour able acquittal, therefore, he was not entitled to claim damages on the basis of malicious' prosecution, but in my humble opinion the same ground is not available to non-suit the respondent for the reasons that there are authorities of the superior Courts to the effect that every acquittal is honourable acquittal. In the case of Attaullah Shaikh V/s WAPDA, reported in 2001 SCMR 236, the same observations have been made by the Hon-ble Supreme Court which is usefully quoted herein below for the sake of convenience:-
10. It is an admitted fact that the appellant was acquitted by learned Special Judge Icentral), Multan from the charges which were leveled against him. This Court, in the case of Dr.Muhammad Islam has laid down a dictum that all acquittals are ---honorable--- and there could be no acquittal which could be terms as --dishonourable--- The case of Mst. Afroz supra, relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, therefore does not apply to the circumstances of the present case.
6. The learned counsel for the applicant has additionally argued before this Court that the judgment and decree passed by learned lower Court was void, ab initio, therefore, no limitation run against a void order. The contention advanced by learned counsel for the applicant seems to be devoid of any force for the reasons that nowhere before the lower Court the said point has been urged by the applicant, even before the Trial Court it was not urged that the. Said Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the suit against the applicant on the point of malicious prosecution.
7. On a query of the Court, the learned counsel for the applicant candidly admitted that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate up on the case of respondent and in such state of affairs, and in view of the admission of the learned counsel for the applicant, it seems that the Trial Court had all the powers and. Jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the matter. Merely allegations regarding non-recording of any evidence from the applicant side is not tenable for the reason that as per record the applicant was afforded sufficient opportunity to lead his evidence which he did not avail, which was the negligent fault of the applicant, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court could not be termed to be a void order on this score. The judgment and decree passed by learned lower Court was therefore prefect, having jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the matter. The cases of Abdul Ghani, supra and Sarfraz, supra, relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant, in my humble opinion are entirely distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case and are inapplicable.
8. For all the aforesaid reasons and circumstances, I do not find any merit in the present Civil revision application and it appears that the jurisdiction vested with the learned District Judge, was exercise legally and properly. The revision application is therefore dismissed summarily alongwith listed applications. . .