JUSTICE KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, CHAIRMAN: The appellants who are Bohra Muslims, belong to the Muslim sect or community of Bohra, feeling aggrieved by certain alleged institutions and practices of that sect known as (1) Imam, (2) Dai, (3) Amil, (4) Misaq, (5)
Barrat and (6) Raza, they filed a petition under Article 203-B of the Constitution for a declaration that the aforesaid institutions or practices were according to them against the Injunctions of Islam as envisaged in the aforesaid Article.
2. The petition was dismissed by the learned Federal Shariat Court by its judgment and order dated 3-8-1980 on the short ground that the aforesaid institutions or practices were not "law" as contemplated in the Article above--mentioned and hence the Court had no jurisdiction to give any declaration in that respect.
3. The appellants have now come up in appeal to this Court.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties but we must say that we find nothing wrong with the order under appeal. This Court has already held in Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta (PLD 1981 SC 120 ) that even though under Article 203-B of the Constitution a petition could be filed for getting a declaration that any "law" was against the Injunctions of Islam, but the term "law" did not include. "Muslim personal Law" which, as held by this Court, was that law which was applicable to Muslims alone as distinguished from the general law which was applicable to all citizens of Pakistan. It was further held by this Court that this was so because the Federal Shariat Court had not been given the power to interfere with the personal law of the Muslims which according to Article 227 of the Constitution could be practised by each sect according to its own belief and creed. Similarly in Saeedullah Kazmi v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1981 SC 42) it was held that by the term "law" was meant such "law", usage and custom which has the force of law, which was enforceable by a Court. It is obvious that the items above mentioned pertain to they faith and belief of the sect of Muslim Bobras and are not enforceable as above--mentioned, though otherwise Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, learned Advocate who appeared for the respondents/caveators, submitted, that the appellants had trot represented the correct position on the subject and their averments and pleadings in that respect were misleading but the learned counsel for the appellants persisted in his own stand. As we have held that the petition filed by the appellants was not maintainable; therefore, this Bench like the Federal Shariat Court cannot entertain this controversy.
5. The result is that this appeal has no merit, and is dismissed hereby.