' The services of the appellant were terminated by the respondent establishment, vide its letter, dated 14th October, 1978, upon his return from leave, which according to the appellant, was duly sanctioned by the respondent establishment. The appellant challenged the termination orders before the learned 1st Labour Court. The respondent establishment resisted the grievance petition of the appellant on the ground that it was not maintainable as the Standing Orders were not applicable to it since at no time it had employed more than 19 workmen. This contention found favour with the learned Labour Court which accordingly dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant, who has now come up in appeal to this Tribunal.
2. The only ground on which Mr. Salim Raza, the learned representative for the appellant, has assailed the decision of the learned Labour Court is that the evidence adduced before the learned Labour Court clearly established that the respondent establishment had been employing, during the relevant period, more than 20 workmen and hence the view taken by the learned Labour Court that the Standing Orders were not applicable to the respondent establishment was untenable. In support of his contention Mr. Saleem Raza referred me to the registers of wages, for the period from 1st April, 1977 to 31st March, 1979, produced by the respondent establishment in respect of its employees before the learned Labour Court. We are, however, only concerned with the period of 12 months immediately preceding the termination of services of the appellant i,e,, the period from 13th June, 1977 up to 14th October, 1978. During this period, in the month of January, 1977, according to the registers of wages. 19 workmen were employed in the respondent establishment, while 18 workmen were employed in the said establishment during the months of February and March, 1978.
The learned Labour Court has relied exclusively on the entries in this register for coming to the conclusion that less than 20 workmen were employed in the respondent establishment during the 12 months preceding the termination of employment of the appellant. However, it has been admitted by Anwar Ahmad, a partner in the respondent establishment, that besides the workmen whose names are entered in the register of wages, one or two saring workers were employed in the respondent establishment on a temporary basis for a day or 2 every month. Since Saringwalas were regularly employed every month, though they may have been employed only for a day or two, it means that they were also employed in the respondent establishment in the months of January. February and March. If they are added to the workmen whose names appear in the registers of wages, then the number of workmen in the respondent establishment would not be less than 20. It was submitted by Mr. Sabri, the learned representative for the respondent establishment, that from the mere fact that names of 18 or 19 workers are shown in the payment registers in the months of January, February and March, 1978, no inference can be drawn that this number of workmen actually worked or were employed in the respondent establishment, as some workmen may have resigned, abandoned their service or their services might have been otherwise terminated. There is, however, no evidence on record to even suggest that any worker had left the employment of the respondent establishment or his services were terminated during the aforesaid months. On the contrary, the payment register clearly shows that all the workmen had received their wages and had affixed their signatures or thumb impressions on revenue receipts in token of having received their wages. Furthermore, it was not even alleged by the 'respondent establishment itself that any workman had left its employment or his services had been terminated during the months of January to March, 1978. This contention of Mr. Sabri thus is without substance.
3. It was next submitted by Mr. Sabri that since the saringwalas were employed for 1 or 2 days in a month only. And they worked for a couple of hours a day only, they are not to be considered workmen employed in the respondent establishment. I regret that I find no force in this contention also. Admittedly the work to be performed by the saringwalas was of recurrent nature. Even if it was not of continuous character, and consequently it was found necessary for the respondent establishment to employ the saringwalas regularly for a certain period every month. It was immaterial whether they worked for a full shift or only for a short period of time. Since the saringwalas were admittedly employed at regular intervals, and their work was also of regular thought intermittent nature they would clearly be considered as workmen for the purposes of the Standing Orders.
4. It was finally urged by Mr. Sabri that the appellant had not, in his evidence, asserted that saringwalas were employed in the respondent establishment and consequently he could not now be permitted to raise this plea. Again, this contention of Mr. Sabri is without substance. It was specifically stated by the appellant in his affidavit before the Labour Court that in addition to the other workers, who were employed in the respondent establishment, 3 maroriwalas and 3 saringwalas were employed in the respondent establishment.
5. I am satisfied from the evidence on record that not less than 20 workmen were employed in the respondent establishment at least in the month of January, 1978, and presumably also in the months of February and March, 1978. As such, I am of the view that the Standing Orders were applicable to the respondent establishment and hence the appellants grievance petition was maintainable.
6. Since the respondent establishment had terminated the services of the appellant on the ground that he had remained absent from duties for a period of 10 days, it was necessary for it to follow the procedure prescribed in Standing Orders 15, which admittedly it has failed to do. The order of termination of services of the appellant, therefore, are clearly invalid.
7. The upshot of the above discussion is that I would set aside the orders of the learned Labour Court and allow the appeal and direct the respondent establishment 40 reinstate the appellant in service with full back benefits.