1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-The petitioner was an assistant in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan. By order dated 25-1-1978 his services were terminated on the ground that he was no longer required. He, therefore, filed a representation to the Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs on 6-2-1978. The case was dismissed by a memorandum dated 9th March, 1978, which is reproduced below:-- "Islamabad, the 9th March, 1979.
2. Memorandum With reference to his application dated 6-2-1978. Mr. Malik Parwez Akhtar is hereby informed that his request was considered but it is regretted that it cannot be acceded it.
3. (Sd.)
4. (Muhammad Jan Siddiqui), Officer on Special Duty (Admit.)
5. Malik Parwez Akhtar, House No. D-244, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi."
6. The case of the petitioner is that he did not receive the said order and, therefore, filed an Appeal (No. 1 of 1979), before the Minister, which was again rejected on 7th March, 1979, and this order was communicated to the petitioner, exactly on the same address on which the first order dated 9-3- 1978 was communicated. The petitioner then filed an appeal against the last mentioned order before the Services Tribunal, Islamabad.
7. An objection was raised before the Tribunal that the appeal was time barred as the petitioner's departmental appeal had already been dismissed by the Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs on 6-2-1978 and the petitioner could not take advantage of the second order of dismissal of his appeal by the Minister of Religious Affairs. The case of the petitioner was that he had not received the first communication and, therefore, had filed an appeal against the only communication received by him which was well in time.
8. The learned Tribunal, however, held that both the communications were posted to the petitioner on the same address, namely, House No. E-244, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi, and it was not inclined to believe that-the order communicated to the petitioner vide memo dated 9-3-1978 in response to his departmental representation dated 6-2-1978 was not received by him. Further, the second appeal submitted to the Minister on 20-1-1979 was not admissible under the law as it was submitted after a lapse of more than 11 months after the submission of his departmental representation on 6-2-1978. It was pointed out that if no answer was received to his departmental representation dated 6-2-1978, the proper course for the petitioner was to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal within thirty days after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days of the non- receipt of any communication regarding his representation, instead he chose a wrong channel and submitted a second appeal to the Minister for Religious Affairs, which was not provided by law.
9. In the result, the appeal filed before the Tribunal was held to be timebarred and, accordingly, dismiss. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
10. Mr. M. S. Siddiqi, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the petitioner did not receive any reply to his departmental representation submitted on 6-2-1978 and no evidence was placed before the Tribunal that such a reply had, indeed, been posted for transmission to the petitioner.
11. We are snot persuaded to agree. A presumption exists that official ` acts are regularly performed. In the file of the Department, there is a cop of the reply sent to the petitioner concerning his departmental representation submitted on 6-2-1978 as it is addressed on exactly the same address on which the order dated 7-3-1979 was sent; there is no reason why the earlier order should not have been received.
12. Be that as it may, as observed by the Tribunal, the petitioner should have, after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days in which his departmental representation should have been decided, filed an appeal within 30 days thereof before the Tribunal as provided by law, In these circumstances, no case is made out for exercise of this Court's jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution.
13. This petition must, therefore, fail and is dismissed hereby.