Brief facts of the case are that one Abdul Ghafoor was Lambardar of Chak No. 151/G.B. Toba Tek Singh. On his death applications through publication were invited in the slot for appointment of Lambardar. On proclamation of notice 12 candidates filed their applications but during the process Muhammad Sarwar son of Murad, Babar Hussain son of Fa2al Khan, Ali Hassan son of Fazal Khan and Ali Akbar son of Abdul Ghafoor withdrew their applications and only 8 persons remained in field.
2. After observing all the codal formalities on recommendation of the revenue staff finally on 12.07.2005 District Officer Revenue (Collector) ordered for appointment of Respondent No. 4 as Lambardar for the said patti under Rule 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules 1968.
3. Against order of appointment of Respondent No. 4 as Lambardar, Appeal No. 7-L of 2005 by one Ghulam Hussain, Appeal No. 8-L of 2005 by one Muhammad Afzal, Appeal No. 9-L of 2005 by one Muhammad Aslam, Appeal No. 10-L of 2005 by one Iftikhar Ali and Appeal No. 16-L of 2005 by one Nasir Ali were filed before Respondent No. 2 who vide his detailed order dated 31.10,2006 finally set aside the appointment of Respondent No. 4 Asghar Ali and remanded the case back to District Revenue Officer for further proceedings in the matter with a direction that same may be completed within three months from date of receipt of this order.
4. Against order dated 31.10.2006 Asghar Ali filed appeal which has been numbered as ROR NQ. 74 of 2006 whereas Muhammad Aslam and Iftikhar Ali preferred Revision Petitions Nos. 231 & 354 of 2007. The learned Senior Member Board of Revenue/Respondent No. 1 after final adjudication of the matter accepted appeal of Asghar Ali whereas revisions filed by Iftikhar Ali and present petitioner were dismissed, by virtue of said order dated 12.07.2005. Resultantly Asghar Ali once again was declared as Lambardar of the said patti.
5. Instant writ petition has now been filed by petitioner impugning order dated 17.03.2010 alleging that impugned order is not sustainable as Respondent No. 1 has restored order dated 12.07.2005 ignoring the fact that rule of primogeniture has been declared un-Islamic. Reference is made to Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (PLD 1999 S.C. 484) He further submits that the order impugned is not sustainable firstly on the ground that Respondent No. 4 is not permanent resident of the patti, rather he is resident of Faisalabad, as such cannot look after interest of the patti which factor has been ignored by Respondent No. 1. He further submits that on the basis of remand order dated 31.10.2006 matter was sub-judice before RespondentNo. 2, hence Respondent No. 1 could not finally settle the same. It is also alleged that it has been wrongly observed that Rajputs are more in number than Awans in the said patti. It is further contended by learned counsel that while passing order Respondent No. 1 has factually erred in holding that petitioner is owner of 31-Kanals whereas' he is owner of 50-Kanals 4-Marlas. He also alleges that his father was Lambardar of Mauza Muhammadopur before partition, which factor has not been taken into consideration by the learned Court while passing the impugned judgment. Reliance is placed on Nazar Hussain and others v. The State and others, (2005 CLC 1228).
6. I have considered arguments of the learned counsel for petitioner and have gone through the record.
7. The grounds taken for calling into question and rejection of the order dated 17.03.2010 are mostly of factual nature, as such cannot be gone into through this petition as the same have been thoroughly considered firstly by the revenue staff, on the basis of which District Revenue Officer (Collector) / Respondent No. 3 after considering all the facts and recommendations has passed the order which has been upheld up to the Apex Court i.e. Board of Revenue. The only legal ground submitted by the learned counsel was that rule of primogeniture has since been declared as un- Islamic, as such the order under attack is not sustainable and liable to be set aside.
8. I am afraid that even this ground is not available to the learned counsel, for the reason that instant order passed by Respondent No. 3 was under Rule 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules 1968, criteria given in the said rule were taken into consideration while passing the impugned order dated 12.07.2005. Thus in the given circumstances the writ petition on this score cannot be maintained. The other reason for non-maintainance of writ petition is that a bare reading of order passed by Respondent No. 3 and impugned order clearly convey that the instant order has been passed keeping in view the provisions of Rule 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules 1968. Operative part of the order passed by Respondent No. 1 is re-produced as under: "3 . . . . . . . .In the matters of appointment of Lambardar, District Collector is the best judge to select Lambardar suited for the purpose. It has been repeatedly held by the Board of Revenue that choice of District Collector in selection of Larnbardar should not ordinarily be interfered with unless there is a glaring irregularity or miscarriage of justice. After going through the record, it is observed that order of the District Officer is in accordance with law and rules on the subject. Asghar All who has been appointed as Lambardar is matriculate, aged 55 years, owns 57 kanals of land and is elder son of deceased Lamberdar and above all belongs to majority community of Rajputs. Therefore he fulfills all pre-requisites of appointment of Lambardar and out weights all other candidates in his credentials. The District Officer (Revenue) after observing codal formalities and appreciating all the facts of the case has rightly appointed Asghar Ali as Lambardar of the Chak ...."
9. The order conveys and affirms the fact that impugned order has been passed while only considering Rule 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules 1968 and not Rule 19 which has been declared un-lslamic, as such the judgment referred to by the learned counsel is not applicable to the present case on all four corners.
10.As per settled law the appointment of Lambardar is not a vested right, as such it cannot be claimed. Reference is made to Muhammad Afzal v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 6 others, (2003 M LD 157) and Abdul Wahid u. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another, (1971 SCM R 719) wherein it has been so held that concerned authorities were the best Judges under law to consider suitability of candidates for appointment of Lambardar of the concerned village. It would obviously mean the patwari and its hierarchy who have recommended the name of the person so making him entitled to be appointed for the said post are the best neutral official functionaries to make the said recommendations.
11.The reasons weighed for accepting recommendations were that his father was earlier a Lambardar in the said patti and he had good interaction with the government officials concerned in the said revenue estate, unless and until they do not have a good understanding with each other the interest of the government cannot be properly served. Reliance is placed on Abdul Ghafoor and another v. Akbar Ali, (1992 CLC 617) and Subedar (Rtd.j Muhammad All v. Muhammad Anwar and 3 others, (1985 CLC 668).
12. The other consideration weighed before the Respondents No. 1 & 3 was that Respondent No. 4 belongs to the majority community as such in order to keep a better harmony and good relation, so keeping in view the interest of the government and the link with the populace the impugned order was passed. Reliance is placed on Ilam Din v. Dost Muhammad, (1992 CLC 1630).
13.It has further been held in Abdul Karim v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and 2 others, (1993 M LD 1628) that appointment of Lambardar could only be interfered in constitutional jurisdiction if there was any jurisdictional error in recommendation made by the concerned authority. Selection of Lambardar as discussed in the, present judgment was, the executive responsibility of the Revenue Officers up to the Board of Revenue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a reported judgment Abdul Wahid v. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another, (1971 SCM R 719) has held that the matter of appointment of a Lambardar is essentially an administrative measure and the claim to that office could not be laid as of vested right. In the present case after recommendation of the concerned staff up to District Officer Revenue while observing all the requirements as provided under Rule 17 (ibid), the appointment of Respondent No. 4 was preferred by Respondent No. 1, hence there is no legal infirmity or jurisdictional error pointed out in the appointment of the Lambardar. Reference is also made to Muhammad Jameel v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others, (2004 YLR 440), Shahbaz Khan v. Muhammad Umar and another, (1985 M LD 366) and Fateh Maseih v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others, (1996 SCM R 377).
14.Learned counsel further relied upon Nazar Hussain and others v. The State and others, (2005 CLC 1228), though this judgment has been referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner but the contents of the judgment and the law laid down do not help him in any circumstance. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: "Choice of the District Collector in appointment of Lambardar, should not be interfered with unless it was found to be patently perverse. During pendency of case, District Collector had submitted his reports thrice and had shown his satisfaction with performance of petitioner being representative of major community and he was considered to be the most suitable person in job of Lambardar.
Order passed by District Collector with regard to 'appointment of petitioner was restored and order of Commissioner was accordingly set aside."
15.As the case of the petitioner is not that the application of Rule 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules has not been properly applied and codal formalities were not met, therefore in absence of any other illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional error pointed out by the learned counsel, this writ petition is dismissed with no orders as to costs.