' ZAKIUDDIN PAL, J.-Respondent No. 1, Mst. Shaheen Khakwani, who still claims to be the wife of the appellant irrespective of the fact that the appellant claims to have divorced her, submitted an application under section 5 (2) read with section 6 of the Court of Wards Act, 1903, to the Board of Revenue Punjab, for the purpose of assuming the superintendence of the property of her minor children from the appellant, situated in Chak Haiderabad. Tehsil Khanewal, nistrict Multan. The particulars of the minor children with their names and ages have been given in the application Annex : 'I', appended with the writ petition. One of them Shehzad aged 11 years is admitted by respondent No. 1 to be in the custody of the appellant. It was alleged in the application that since the appellant was a man of extravagant habits and was squandering away the property of the minors who were incapable of managing the same themselves, therefore, respondent No. 1 who is their mother may be appointed manager of the property.
2. It is admitted that the Deputy Commissioner, Multan, in exercise of his powers under section 11 of the Act has submitted his report and the matter is now pending adjudication before the learned Commissioner, Multan, as to whether superintendence of the property in question should be assumed under the Act.
3. During the hearing of the case an application was submitted before respondent No, 2, Commissioner, Multan Division, under section 11 of the Act for grant of interim relief protecting the wheat crops grown on the land of the minors. Yet another application was moved by respondent No, I before respondent No, 2 for taking into possession the agricultural machinery, buildings of the stores, workshop shed and residential property being part and parcel of the agricultural land, by the receiver and for the appointment of an interim manager of the land in question in order to make arrangements for the purpose of showing the Kharif crop of 1980. Both the applications were granted by respondent No, 2 vide his orders dated 23rd April, 1980 and 27th April 1980 (Annex: `M' & respectively. By his order dated 23rd April, 1980 respondent No, 2, Commissioner, Multan Division, directed the District Collector, Multan, to appoint Tehsildar Khanewal as an interim receiver of the wheat crop belonging to Almas Khakwani, Taskeen Khakwani, Zahid Khakwani and Momina Khakwani, minors to get it harvested and maintain its accounts. By another order dated 27th April, 1980 he directed the Tehsildar, Khanewal to take possession of the land and the connected property belonging to the minors.
4. The validity of both the interim orders passed by respondent No, 2 was challenged by the appellant through Writ Petition No, 5688 of 1980 mainly on the ground that standing crops and agricultural equipments being not immovable property could not be taken into possession under the Punjab Court of Wards Act. The writ petition was, however, dismissed in limine on 26th May, 1980 on the ground that a Court or a tribunal having jurisdiction to pass a final order possesses powers to make interim orders otherwise circumstances may be created that the purpose of the final order may be defeated.
5. The main question involved in this case is whether respondent No, 2, Commissioner, Multan Division, is competent under section 11 or any other provision of the Court of Wards Act to pass such orders as impugned in the present case. Section 3 (a) of the Punjab Court of Wards Act, 1903 defines "immovable property" covering land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but according to this definition, "immovable property" shall not include growing crops or grass. "Land holder" has been defined a person who possesses any interest in the land, whether as proprietor, assignee of the land revenue, lessee of waste lands or otherwise. "Ward" has been defined any person superintendence of whose whole or any part of his property or whose person and property both have been assumed under the Court of Wards Act. According to section 4 of the Act, Commissioner of Division within the limits of which any ward ordinarily resides or any property of a ward is situated shall be the Court of Wards in respect of the person and the property of such ward.
Subsection (2) of section 4 provides that Court of Wards may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on it directly or through the Deputy Commissioner of the District in respect of any ward or whole or any part of his property. According to section 5 of the Act any landholder may apply to the Court of Wards for assuming the superintendence of his property. Similarly, under section 6 of the Act. Court of Wards can assume on his own motion, superintendence of the property or the person of a minor landholder. According to section 11 of the Act, Deputy Commissioner of a District where the property is situated can hold inquiry in order to satisfy himself as to whether action should be taken under the Act before the Court of Wards is moved to make an order under section 5 (2) or section 6 of the Act. He is authorised under this provision of law to pass such orders during the pendency of the inquiry for taking into temporary custody and protecting the person or property, or both, of a landholder.
6. Section 12 (2) of the Act provides that for the purpose of protecting the property, or any part thereof, of any landholder during the pendency of inquiry under section 11 the Deputy Commissioner may subject to the direction and control of Court of Wards take possession thereof and appoint a manager and such caretaker in respect thereof as he may deem fit.
7. Section 16 of the Act provides that when property of any landholder has been released from the superintendence of the Court of Wards then such landholder shall not be competent to alienate the whole or any part of the immovable property, which has been so released, in any manner, or to create charge upon such property extending beyond his life time without the previous sanction of the Board of Revenue. It may be mentioned here that this is the only provision in the Act wherein the words "immovable property" have been used otherwise in all the subsequent provisions the word property' has been used.
8. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the 4ppeliant by relying upon the definition of "immovable property" as given an section 3 of the Act that since the landed property/immovable property alone can be taken over by the Court of Wards for superintendence proposes under the relevant provisions of the Act, therefore, wherever in the Act the word `property' occurs, it has been used in context of immovable property as defined in section 3. He has further argued that the word situate' as used in section 4 of the Act is in relation to immovable property and as such the word 'property' used in various provisions of the Act cannot be interpretted as meaning movable and immovable property, both.
9. It has also been argued by relying upon sections 11 snit 12 of the Act that it is the Deputy Commissioner of a district alone, where the immovable property is situated, who can pass such interim orders for the temporary custody and protection of the person or property or both or such landholder, as he thinks fit. It is submitted that the word 'land-holder' as used in various provisions of the Act also connotes that the word "property' as used in the Act means immovable/ landed property only and not the movable property.
10. As mentioned above the words 'immovable property' have been used only in section 16 of the Act. It is significant to notice that in th A first line of this section the word 'property' has been used. It has been stated that when property of any landholder in respect of whom an order has been made under subsection (1) or on the basis of the last ground stated in subsection (2) of section 5, is released from the superintendence of the Court of Wards, such landholder shall not be competent without the previous sanction of the Board of Revenue to alienate whole or any part of the immovable property which has been so released, in any way. If the word 'property' does not cover movable as well as immovable property then there was no occasion for the Legislature to distinguish immovable property by using such word. Since according to the Legislature the word 'property' covers movable as well as immovable property, therefore, in order to restrain a landholder from alienating the immovable property after the release of his property. Movable as well as immovable the words 'immovable property' have been used, otherwise as in other provisions of the Act the word 'property' alone would have been used. The definition of immovable property as given in section 3 of the Act is to be read in conjunction with the provision as contained in section 16 of the Act. It means that after the release of B immovable property the same cannot be alienated in any manner but the crops or grass standing thereon can be disposed of as in the case of such restriction they will go waste. In view of the restriction as contained in section 16 of the Act it was necessary to define immovable property which cannot be alienated after its release from the superintendence of Court of Wards otherwise such restriction would have also been applicable to the growing crops or grass which would perish if they are not removed in due course of time. In certain cases as generally known a landholder , may not be in a position to sell his land under section 16 of the Act after its release from the Court of wards but he can dispose of the standing crops of the grass grown thereon.
11. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the word 'property' as used in various provisions of the Act relates to immovable property alone does not appeal to sense. There is no doubt that an application by a landholder or on his behalf for his benefit, may be made to the Board of Revenue for the purpose of assuming the superintendence of his property in the given circumstances but that does not mean that if that landholder also owns movable property along with his immovable property then no order can be made by the Court of Wards before or after assuming the superintendence even if there is likelihood of such movable property to be wasted or squandered. The Act itself has been enacted to safeguard the interest of the land holders by protecting their property and if the Court of Wards cannot pass any order in relation to movable property then the same can be just wasted in the absence of any such order. We are sure that this is not the intention of the Legislature. If the Court of Wards cannot pass any order protecting movable property before assuming the superintendence of property of landholder in spite of the fact that it is likely to be damaged it would wean that the aforesaid property would be allowed to be damage before the final order is passed. We are sure no such inference can bel drawn from the provisions of the Act which aim at safeguarding the property of a ward.
12. According to law construction of a statute should be made in a manner which will suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Unreasonable, artificial or anomalous constructions should be avoided and where two possible constructions are available, the more reasonable one should be chosen. Where construction of a statute will facilitate the smooth working of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, the same should be adopted. This view gains strength from the 'Interpretation of statute' by Maxwell, 1969 Edition, pages 96, 201 and 203. The same view has been taken in Nemat Ullah Qureshi and another v. Balqees Sitara (1). It has been held in that case that the provision of section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act is not restricted only to cases where application for appointment of Guardian has been made under section 10 of the Act. The aforesaid provision of section 12 can also be availed of for the purpose of granting temporary custody even in a case pending under section 25 of the Act. It was argued before the Court that since section 12 of the Act was in Chapter II which related to appointment and declaration of Guardian, therefore, provision of section 12 could be invoked only in cases under section 10. It has been held that there is nothing in section 12 of the Act restricting it to a case pending under section 10 of the Act. It can also be applied in cases pending under section 25 of the Act, irrespective of the fact that it is in Chapter II of the Act. This view is supported by Sardar Muhammad v. Mst. Nasima Bibi and others (2). It has been held that interpretation of a statute should be beneficial, advancing and not frustrating the object of legislation.
13. As discussed above the object of the Court of Wards is to preserve and protect the property from extravagance and waste. If the word 'property' as used in various provisions of the Act, does not include movable property as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant then the same would be wasted and squandered which is not the intention of law.
14. In the present case it is admitted that the crops in question are standing only the land belonging to the minors. Whether transaction in their favour by the appellant by way of gift is benatni it is not for this Court to decide in the present proceedings. It can be got decided at the appropriate forum. As such if the Court of Wards thinks it just and proper to protect the interest of the minors in the standing crops or other movable property then appropriate order can be passed by the Court.'
15. As discussed above the word 'Property' as used in various provisions of the Act means movable as well as immovable property and since that can be assumed by the Court of Wards it means that it has got jurisdiction over both kinds of properties. When the Court of Wards can pass final order in relation to property whether movable or immovable E then it has got jurisdiction to pass an ancillary order in relation to the final order at any stage of the proceedings. The word 'situate' as used in section 4 of the Act, relates to property and it has not been specified that it has been used in context of immovable property alone. This {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1973 Lah. 442 (2) PLD 1966 Lah. 703 {{FOOT NOTE}} provision confers jurisdiction upon a Court of Wards in the given circumstances. If any property of a ward is situated within the jurisdiction of Commissioner of a particular Division then that Commissioner will have jurisdiction to deal with the property under the Act. The word `situate' having been specifically used in the said provision for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction does not lend any support to the appellant to show that jurisdiction of the Court of Wards extends only to immovable property.
16. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned orders, if at all to be passed, could only be passed by the Deputy Commissioner under sections II and 12 of the Act. We are afraid this contention has no force. The Deputy Commissioner of a district has been conferred power to take any such action and issue such orders which he may deem proper for taking into custody and protecting the person or property or both of a landholder while holding inquiry before referring the case to the Court of Wards for the purpose of assuming the superintendence of property. Under section 12 (2) of the Act he can take possession of the property and appoint a manager in respect thereof at the inquiry level subject to the direction and control of the Court of Wards. As mentioned above impugned orders have been passed by the Commissioner after the matter has been referred to him by the Deputy Commissioner after holding inquiry. Since he has jurisdiction to assume superintendence of property movable as well as immovable and can pass final order in relation thereto, therefore, he is competent to pass any interim order for the purpose of protecting the same.
17. According to law making of an interim order is part of working of judicial system and for that purpose no separate or specific provision is necessary to empower a Court to issue an interim order. Even in the absence of any such specific provision a Court has power to grant an interim relief in appropriate cases as the same is ancillary and incidental to the power to grant final relief.
Where a Court has power to pass an order finally it will generally have the power to grant interim relief unless such power is either expressly or by necessary implication excluded. Reference in this respect can be made to Syed Sardar Shah Bokhari v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the West Pakistan (1), Commissioner Khairpur Division. Khairpur and another v. Ali Sher Sirki (2). Sind Employees Social Securiiy Association and another v. Adamjee Cotton Mills Limited (3), Falahul Momineen Trust v. Abdullah (4), Zafar lqbal v. Province of Sind (5), Ch. Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore v.
Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad (6), Shahnawaz Limited v. Kit. Autos Cars Limited Karachi and another (7) and Mst. Ghaman v. Taj Din (8).
18. There is no doubt that there is no such specific provision in the Punjab Court of Wards Act, 1903 empowering the Commissioner while hearing the reference made by the Deputy Commissioner for the purpose of assuming superintendence of the property belonging to the minors to pass any interim order, but the same being ancillary and incidental to the {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) PLD 1965 SC 479 (2) PLD 1971 SC 242
(3) PLD 1975 SC 32 (4) PLD 1970 Kar. 179
(5) PLD 1973 Kar. 383 (6) PLD 1976 Lah. 1392
(7) PLD 1979 Kar. 38 (8) PLD 1968 Lah. 987 {{FOOT NOTE}} final proceedings, be has the power to pass such an interim order for theIG sake of preserving the property from being damaged permanently.
19. The fact that the word 'property' used in various provisions of the Act relates to movable as well as immovable property gets support from the Rules of General Procedure framed under section 54 of the Act. After assumption of superintendence of property Rules 14 and 15 provides for preparation of inventories of the entire movable property in the estate and the same to be revised from time to time. Rule 15 provides for taking into custody of title deeds, Government securities, certificates of guaranteed Railway Stocks, all deeds or other documents purporting to convey a title or claim to any valuable security and all valuables not required for the immediate use of the ward or his estate. All such articles according to the Rules are to be deposited in the District Treasury. When according to the Rules referred to above inventories of the entire movable property have to be prepared after its assumption then there is no reason to believe that the authority concerned cannot pass any interim order for the purpose of protecting the same before the final order is passed. The case-law cited above fully supports this view.
20. The learned counsel for both the parties have also raised other contentions but they have not been dealt with being not necessary for the adjudication of the points involved.
21. As a result of the above discussion it is held that the impugned orders dated 23rd April. 1980 and 27th April 1980 passed by respondent No, 2, the Commissioner Multan Division, vide Annexures 'M' and 'N' respectively are valid being within his jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, having no force is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.