DECISION The appellant, who was employed as a Die-fitter in the industrial establishment of M/s. Atlas Autos Ltd., respondent No, 2, was dismissed from service with effect from 29th October, 1977, on the basis of a domestic enquiry in which he failed to participate. The appellant challenged his dismissal orders by way of a grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. The grievance petition, however, was dismissed by the learned Second Labour Court, vide his decision, dated 3rd January 1980. The learned Labour Court has taken the view that the domestic enquiry against the appellant was fair and impartial and full opportunity was given to the appllant to defend himself but he deliberately and obstinately refused to participate in the same as he was not allowed to be represented in the domestic enquiry by one Sikandar Hayat, who is stated not to have been a worker in the respondent establishment at the relevant time. The learned Labour Court. Further found, on the basis of the enquiry proceedings, that the charge of habitual negligence of work had been satisfactorily established against the appellant and the enquiry proceedings sufferred from no infirmity. He, accordingly, dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant who has now come up in appeal before this Tribunal.
2. 1 have heard Mr. Sadiq Khan, who appeared for the appellant. The respondent establishment has remained absent and hence I have not had the advantage of hearing their contentions. The first ground on which Mr. Mohammad Sadiq Khan assailed the impugned order of the learned Labour Court was that the appellant inter alia was charged with resorting to go slow, but, this allegation has not been established. The learned counsel pointed out that the expression 'go-slow' has been defined in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, to mean :- "the organised, deliberate and purposeful slowing down of normal output of work by a body of workers in a concerted manner and it is not due to any mechanical defect in' the machinery, failure and defect in power supply or shortage of raw material and spare parts of machinery.
' It was submitted by the learned counsel that an essential component of `go-slow' was concerted action by a body of workers but in the instant case the admitted position was that there was no concerted action and the evidence led in the enquiry at best attributed slow-working to the appellant. The short answer to his contention is that the expression `go-slow' as used in the charge sheet has not been used in the technical sense in which the term is defined in the aforesaid Ordinance but has been used in the ordinary parlance to mean doing work very slowly, much slower than is normally done or is expected to be done. That the expression `go-slow' has been used in this sense is made clear from the elucidation given in the charge sheet itself wherein it has been asserted that the appellant, in the month of August, had generally been working for not more than three hours on an average every day. Furthermore, neither in the report of the Enquiry Officer nor in the second show-cause notice served upon the appellant has it been stated that the appellant was found guilty of resorting to go-slow tactics. As such, I find no substance in the contention of the learned counsel of the appellant.
3. It was next contended by Mr. Mohammad Sadiq that the dismissal order against the appellant were mala fide. He submitted that the entire proceedings against the appellant were as a result of his testifying in favour of a co-worker by name Amir Zada in a domestic enquiry held against him though he was pressurised by the Management not to give evidence in Amiz Zada's favour.
However neither in his grievance notice nor in the grievance petition has this allegation been made by the appellant. Furthermore, there is only the bare word of the appellant in support of his allegation. It was pointed out by Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., delivering judgment on behalf of the Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad (PLD 1974 SC 151), that mala fides is one of the most difficult things to prove and the onus is entirely upon the person alleging mala fide to establish. A mere allegation that an action had been taken wrongly is not sufficient to establish a case of mala fides, nor can a case of mala fides be established on the basis of universal malice against a particular class or section of the people. In order to make out a case of mala fides, a person must establish that the action taken against him was not taken for any purpose authorised by law but for the personal aggrandisement of the person empowered with the power to make the order or because the person so authorised to take action bore a personal grudge against the person in respect of whom the action was taken. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever that the dismissal orders passed against the appellant were either colourable exercise of the power conferred by law or were a misuse of the lawful authority vesting in the Management or issued in consequence of any personal grudge which the Management had against the appellant. As such, this contention of the learned counsel appears to be entirely without substance.
4. It was finally submitted by Mr. Mohammad Sadiq that the charge of habitual negligence, for which the appellant was given the drastic punishment of dismissal, had not been established. As already pointed out, a proper domestic enquiry was held against the appellant in which repeated opportunity was given to him to participate but he obstinately refused to do so on the ground that he was not being allowed to be represented by Sikandar Hayat, who was the President of the Workers Union. In his enquiry report the Enquiry Officer has explained that the refusal to be represented by Sikandar Hayat was due to the fact that the later was not an employee of the respondent establishment and consequently the appellant could not be allowed to be represented by him. Under the law a worker is only entitled to be assisted in the enquiry by a worker and not by an outsider. Consequently, the insistence of the appellant to be represented by Sikandar Hayat was unwarranted and left the Enquiry Officer no other choice but to hold ex parte proceedings. In B these proceedings, three witnesses were examined, namely Zafar Hussain, Shop-in charge of the Section in which the appellant was employed, Noor-ul-Huda, Production Controller and Anwar Ali, Foreman in the Die-shop. All these witnesses have testified to the fact that not only the appellant on repeated occasions, was found to be either not doing work or working with slow-speed but also was found absent from his place of duty and either found roaming about or sitting with senior- typist, Mohammad Ali. The production record as well as the time-sheet for the month of August, 1977, were produced before the Enquiry Officer and he found that on 12 working days, from 17th August, 1977 to 31st August, 1977 the appellant worked on an average only 2-30 hours per day against normal average of 5.87 hours per day. It also came out in the Enquiry proceedings that on 20th July, 1977 the appellant had been charged with not listening to instructions of his superiors, falling to bring the material and roaming about here and there during working hours. These charges, it appears, were established against him but the Management took a lenient view and administer a final warning to him to improve, by its letter, dated 9th October, 1973. It, thus, appears that not only charge of habitual negligence of work was fully established against the appellant but also that the Management considered it necessary, in view of his past conduct, to dismiss him from service. This the Management was fully entitled to do so. I, therefore, concur in the view taken by the learned Labour Court.
4. In the result, I would dismiss this appeal.