This is a constitutional petition brought by the tenant against the order of the Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, dated 17-3-1980 whereby he accepted an appeal of the landlord from the dismissal of his ejectment petition by the Controller and directed the petitioner/tenant's ejectment.
2. Fateh Muhammad, the landlord, had instituted a petition for ejectment of the petitioner/tenant from Shop No. P-131 on the ground of his bona fide personal need. The solitary issue framed on this point was found against the landlord by the Controller, who held that the landlord's requirement was not in good faith because he was in possession of another shop adjacent to the one in dispute. The appellate Court, however, found that the adjacent Shop, i. e., shop No. P-132, which was in possession of the landlord, was being used .For residential purposes. He, therefore held that this fact did not derogate from the bona fide nature of the landlord's need.
3. Three shops figure in the evidence. These are Shop No. P. 131, which is in dispute, Shop No. P. 132 and shop No. P.
133. According to the .Evidence, Shop No. P. 132 was being used by the landlord for residential purposes while Shop No. P. 133 had been purchased by the landlord's wife in the name of her sons Farrukh Mahmood (minor) and Hashmat Mahmood. The landlord's case was that he had a factory in which he produced silk and polyester cloth and that he needed the shop in dispute for the purpose of opening a show room for the cloth. The contention of the tenant was that the shop was not suitable for a show room because the people with powerlooms'sold their products at Faisalabad and not at Chak Jhumra, where no one maintains any show room for display of cloth.
The evidence also revealed that the tenant had 2/3 other shops, some of which he had rented out.
4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner/tenant that the landlord having two other shops in the same locality, rather adjacent to the one in dispute, did not qualify for seeking the ejectment of the tenant. He obviously meant Shops No. P. 132 and P.
133. The reply to the argument was that the first shop was no longer a non-residential building, being used for residential purposes, and that the second one being not occupied by the landlord, there was no fetter in his way to the seeking of the ejectment.
5. A landlord can claim eviction of a tenant from anon residential building unless he (landlord) is occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situate for the purpose of his business any other such building suitable for his needs at the time. The question, therefore, is whether the disqualification so prescribed in obtaining in the present case. Shop No. P. 132, though owned by the landlord, is, according to the evidence, being used by the landlord for residential purpose. That being so, the shop could not be treated as non-residential building which term is defined under section 2(d) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to mean "a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade". It was held in Kodumal Kherajmal v. Dema Mal (PLD 1969 Quetta 21) that "the conversion of a room which is attached to a residential building into a bailhak or a sitting room cannot, therefore, be objected to, nor can it be urged that the said converted room continues to remain a shop and that, therefore, therespondent landlord must be held to be occupying another shop, in the same urban area". As regards Shop No. P. 133, the same is not owned by the landlord but by his two sons.
The evidence does not establish that the shop was in the occupation of the landlord either. He could be disqualified only if he himself was occupying hat shop. Ownership or occupation of his children could not stand in his way. This point had been dealt with in Abdur Rehman v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1971 B J 17) in which it had been held that "Sub-clause (b) of section 13(3) (l1) lays down a fetter on this power in so far as it makes it a precondition that the lanolord or `his said child' is not occupying a building in the same area suitable for his needs at the time. The word 'said' in the expression `said child' applies to a case where the landlord is asking for possession 'for the use of any of his male children' as provided in the previous sub-clause. In the present case, the landlord is asking for possession of the shop because he claims that he requires it in good faith for his own use. In such a case clause (b) would only require that he himself should not be occupying another building in the same area. The question of the occupation of a child would arise only if the eviction is sought for his benefit.
6. The constitutional jurisdiction 'can be invoked only where the impugned order suffers from such legal defect as would amount the defect in the exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal.
The constitutional jurisdiction is not meant for examining decisions on questions of fact. The bona fide need of the landlord is basically a question of fact and a decision by the Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter cannot be assailed in the constitutional jurisdiction befdre the High Court.
In Abdus Saltar Haji Ahmad v. Fazal Hussain (P L p 1969 Lah. 733), a Letters Patent Bench had set aside the judgment of a Single Bench upon the view that the questions of good faith and existence or non-existence of any other property in occupation of the landlord in the same urban area suitable for his needs were those of fact . See also a Division Bench decision in Pir Bakhsh v. Almas Begum (PLD 1971 Posh, 49).
7. I, therefore, find no merit in the writ petition, which I accordingly dismiss, though I make no order as to costs.