DECISION ' This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned Fifth Labour Court, given on 11-3-1980, dismissing the grievance petition preferred by the appellant against the termination of his services by the respondent establishment, on the ground that the grievance petition was not maintainable as he was not a 'workman' for the purposes of the Standing Orders, being employed as a Chowkidar.
2. The sole issue which falls to he considered for the purposes of this appeal is whether the appellant, who admittedly was employed as a Chowkidar and who had been dismissed from service on the charge of committing theft, after holding a domestic enquiry in which it is alleged by the respondent-Company that the charge of theft was fully established, is required to be a workman for the purposes of Standing Orders or the I. R. O. In order to file and maintain a grievance petition under section 25-A, I. R. O. It was strongly urged by Mr. Abdul Rashid, the learned counsel for the appellant, that only a workman, as defined in the I. R.0., is entitled to maintain a grievance petition under section 25-A, and that a chowkidar or security guard is a workman falling within the definition of workman as given in the said Ordinance. In support of his contention the learned counsel has relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shahzar Khan v. Sind Lobour Court. No doubt in the reported case their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that a person is required to be a worker for the purposes of I. R. O. For maintaining a grievance petition under section 25-A, I. R.0., and that further ahead security guard is a worker for the puposes of I. R.0., but as pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson & Johnson v. Zubair Ahmed and others, decided on 10-9-1979, the attention of their Lordships of the Supreme Court possibly was not invited to the then recent amendment in the Standing Orders by Act V of 1972,1 whereby a workman aggrieved by his dismissal from service or termination of his services in any other way was entitled to prefer a grievance petition in the manner provided under section 25-A, I.
R.0. It was accordingly held in that case that whereas the right to re-instatement, if a dismissal or termination of services was illegal or mala fide, was conferred by the Standing Orders, the procedure for the enforcement of that right was provided by section 25-A, I. R.0. Accordingly, a person has to be at workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders in order to successfully challenge his dismissal or termination from service. Now, a chowkidar obviously is not employed to do manual or clerical work, whether skilled or unskilled. As such, he will not fall within the definition of workman as given in the Standing Orders as held by the Karachi High Court in the case of Shahzar Khan v. Sind Labour Court. Although the above decision was reversed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court but this was done on the ground that the definition of worker as given in the I. R.
0. Was applicable for purposes of entitlement to file an application under section 25-A, and not the definition as given in the Standing Orders. The finding that a Chowkidar does not fall within the definition of workman as given in the Standing Order was not disturbed.
3. Since the appellant is not a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, no right is conferred upon him to challenge his dismissal from service under section 25-A, I. R.
0. As such, I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned Labour Court and would dismiss the appeal. 1977 SCM R 103 1976 PLC 196