1. ' MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.---By this order I will dispose of an application moved by the plaintiff under section 13 of the Court Fees Act read with section 151, C.P.C. Praying to return/refund Court Fees affixed on the plaint on the ground that suit was withdrawn on the basis of compromise at initial stage, therefore office may be directed to issue necessary certificate in favour of the plaintiff.
2. In the supporting affidavit also, the plaintiff has stated that after filing of the suit, the plaintiff and defendant have compromised the matter outside the court, thereafter, the plaintiff and defendant moved application under Order XXIII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Which allowed vide order dated 8-3-2010.
3. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff and learned A.A.-G. The plaintiff had filed the suit for recovery of damages in the sum of 100 million Saudi Riyals against Saudi Air Lines. The brief facts of the case were that the plaintiff departed to Saudi Arabia to perform Umra by Saudi Air Line, Flight No,SV-703 B SU KHIJED PR18 0945 on 31-8-2008, boarding pass was issued from Quaid-e- Azam International Airport Karachi. The plaintiff was granted Visa No,2312483873 for one month. The plaintiff was to be returned on 30-9-2008 from Jeddah to Karachi, boarding pass for return was issued at Jeddah. It was holy month of Ramzan, the plaintiff had some complaints for some misbehavior of the air line staff. When he lodged his compliant, he was again misbehaved. Due to libelous attitude, the plaintiff suffered mental torture and agony. On his arrival, plaintiff had sent a legal notice to the defendant for recovery of 100 million Saudi Riyal through his counsel. The legal notice remained un-rebutted and after waiting for three months, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of damages. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff had filed application that both the parties have mutually settled their dispute outside the court and plaintiff has agreed to withdraw the suit. In the same application a settlement reached between the parties was also referred to.
4. ' The learned, counsel for the plaintiff Mr. Khursheed Javed, argued that since the suit was withdrawn at initial stage, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for the refund of court fees and in support of this arguments he relied upon a judgment reported in PLD 1993 SC 76 (Sh. Riazuddin v.
5. Aqil-ur-Rehman Siddiqui and 4 others). The facts of this case were that the plaintiff moved two applications one before trial court for certificate authorizing him to receive back from the Collector amount paid by him as court fees on the plaint and a similar prayer before the High Court in respect of court fees paid by him on memo of appeal, which applications were rejected. Leave to appeal was granted by Hon'ble Supreme Court to examine the conflict of opinion between the view of two High Courts whereby one High Court had expressed the view that High Court in its inherent jurisdiction could refund court fees on the withdrawal of appeal, while the other had found that High Court had no inherent jurisdiction to refund the court fees.
6. ' In the rebuttal Mr. Qazi Majid Ali, Assistant Advocate-General Sindh argued that the suit had reached at the stage of settlement of issues and after lapse of considerable time, there is no justification to ask for the refund of court fees.
7. ' After hearing arguments of learned counsel, in my humble view, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in fact in the aforesaid judgment reconciled the judgments of two High Courts, one judgment is reported in PLD 1975 Karachi 178 (Tradewell (Pakistan) Corporation v. Standard Bank Ltd.), in which the learned divisional bench of this Court has held that the levy of court fees if sanctioned by a statute cannot be ordered to be refunded unless the law, so expressly provides and the Court has no inherent power to refund the court fees paid as prescribed by law. The Courts have invoked their inherent jurisdiction only in such cases where the amount paid as court fees was in fact not payable in law and not otherwise, as for example when the Court came to the conclusion that the court fees has been paid by a litigant under his own mistake or when he was compelled to pay on account of mistake of a Court, for the Government should not profit by such mistakes. The Court has, however, no jurisdiction to exonerate the litigant from an obligation to pay court fees which is imposed by statute. The payment of court fees does not depend on the result of the proceedings whether or not such proceedings are heard on merits. Any attempt, therefore, on the part of the Courts to allow refund in circumstances other than specified above would in fact amount to allowing the litigant to circumvent the law and relieve him of his liability to pay court fees. In the other judgment reported in PLD 1976 Lahore 1268 (Bhola v. Sardar Muhammad). The learned Judge of Lahore High Court has held that High Court in its inherent jurisdiction can order refund of court fees on appeal being withdrawn. Provision of Constitution in Article 37(d) relating to "inexpensive" justice implies dispensation of justice at as less cost as possible. Three major conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the decided case: (i) The consensus of authority is that sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court Fees Act are not exhaustive on the question of the grounds for refund of court fees, (ii) that the Court has inherent powers to refund the court fees, and (iii) that it is only discretionary with the Court to issue a refund certificate in its inherent jurisdiction, while exercising the discretion. Some of the relevant factors which might be considered includes the length of proceedings vis-a-vis the proceeding and hearing of the matter; the fault if any committed by any party and the benefit, if any, derived by the party concerned through the filing of the proceedings.
8. These factors are by no means exhaustive, depending upon the circumstances of each case; there can be otheRs, The above discussion would show that in so far as the precedent is concerned there is no legal bar to the refund of court fees in this case and further that the High Court in its inherent jurisdiction can order refund of court fees on the withdrawal of the appeal. The judiciary is not debarred from interpreting the positive laws of Pakistan in the light and with the aid of principles of policy contained in the Constitution. Provision of "inexpensive" justice would imply the dispensation thereof at as less cost as possible. In the case reported in PLD 1988 Karachi 24 (Nabi Bux Khan Bhurgari v. National Bank of Pakistan), the learned Single Judge of this court has taken a view that there is no doubt that the court fees in cases which are not covered by the provisions of section 13 of the Court Fees Act, can grant declaration in the interest of justice in exercise of inherent powers in terms of MessRs, British India Engineering Works, Karachi v. Messrs Globe Navigation Ltd. And 2 others (PLD 1978 Kar. 375), but such inherent powers can be exercised in the interest of justice.
9. ' The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that under Article 2A of the Constitution of 1973, the State is obligated to further the ends of social justice which, inter alia, obligated "ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice". To require a party to pay court fees in a proceedings, where the parties have compromised their dispute outside the court and decided to withdraw his proceedings before the court, thereby not burdening it to expend its valuable time in examining the case, in hearing arguments in connection therewith, deliberating over the judgment thereon and then in formally taking time to write it, manifestly defeats the above mandate of the Constitution as it penalizes the party for approaching the Court, instead of assisting it to obtain inexpensive and speedy justice. It was incumbent upon the High Court to adopt the interpretation, which furthered the objectives of the Constitution rather than negated them. After this observation, the honourable Supreme Court allowed the appeal with the direction to issue necessary certificate authorizing the appellant to recover the amount by him on payment of court fees on the plaint and memo of appeal. The learned divisional bench judgment of this court is purely based on sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court Fees Act, in which it was strictly held that inherent jurisdiction under section 151 can be invoked only where the court fees not payable or has been paid or called upon by the court to be paid under mistake. The levy of court fees if sanctioned by a statute cannot be ordered to be refunded unless the law so expressly provides and the court has no inherent powers to refund the court fees as prescribed by law. While the view taken by this court, the learned Judge of the Lahore High Court has focused his view on Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan which provides that the State shall ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice, thereafter, the learned Judge of this court in the case of Nabi Bux Khan Bhurgari has held that courts even in cases not covered under the provisions of section 13 of the Court Fees Act have inherent powers to grant such certificate in the interest of justice. In the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, section 13 of the Court Fees Act has been considered in conjunction with objectives resolution and Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and keeping aside intricacies of section 13 of the Court Fees Act, it was held that State is obligated to further ends of social justice, which inter alia, obligated to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. To require a party to pay court fees in a proceedings where the parties had compromised their dispute outside the court thereby not burdening the court to expend its valuable time would defeat the mandate of the Constitution as it penalizes the party for approaching the court instead of assisting the court to obtain inexpensive and speedy justice. It is incumbent upon the court to adopt interpretation of section 13 of the Court Fees Act, which furthered the objectives of Constitution rather than negated them. In the present matter the suit was withdrawn on the basis of compromise which reached between the parties outside the court and neither the issues were settled nor any interlocutory application was filed, decided or pending in the suit. The suit was fixed first time for settlement of issues on 5-10-2009 and adjourned then on second date, it was withdrawn, thereby not burdening the court to expend its valuable time in examining the case, in hearing arguments in connection therewith, deliberating over the judgment thereon and then formally taking time to write it.
10. ' Keeping in view the criteria laid down in the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court supra, the application is allowed. Office is directed to issue necessary certificate for the refund of court fees to the plaintiff.