' IJAZ UL AHSAN, J.--- A piece of land measuring 281 kanals and 19 marlas was acquired for the purpose of construction of the Lahore Bypass. The respondents were owners of 89 kanals and 2 marlas. For the purpose of this regular first appeal, the subject-matter land measures 10 kanals and 13 marlas.
2. A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 1st of September, 1993 and was published on 15-9-1993. Subsequently a composite notification under section 6 read with section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 12-6-1994 and published on 15-6-1994. For the purpose of calculating compensation under section 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, the relevant period was between 1-8-1992 to 1-9-1993. The Land Acquisition Collector made his award on 26-2- 1996. In the said award, compensation was allowed to the respondents at the rate of Rs,10,000 per marla together with 15% compulsory acquisition charges.
3. The respondents filed a reference for enhancement of compensation under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said reference was sent to the learned referee court. The respondents claimed compensation at the rate of Rs,40,000 per marla. The petitioners filed their reply on 26-1- 2006. Out of divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned referee court framed as many as 5 issues. Issues Nos.4 and 5 are relevant for the purpose of decision of this appeal. The said issues related to the quantum of compensation and the question of exact location of the land and whether or not the said land was situated in a commercial area.
4. It is pointed out that the land in question is situated at Mauza Babu Sabu, as is evident from order dated 10-10-2006. It appears that there was some confusion regarding the exact location of land and there were divergent claims to the effect that the land in question was situated either within the revenue estate of Shera Kot or Mauza Babu Sabu. It appears that the learned referee court vide order dated 10-10-2006 had given specific permission to the respondents to make an amendment in the reference to substitute the name of Babu Sabu instead of Shera Kot.
5. Vide judgment and decree dated 31-3-2009, the learned referee accepted the reference and awarded compensation to the respondents at the rate of Rs,30,000 per marla. Further, acquisition charges at the rate of 15% and compound interest @ 8% was also allowed.
6. The main issue agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned referee court. According to the learned counsel, the compensation awarded by the learned referee court is excessive and is not based upon any evidence. He points out that the only evidence available on record was by way of the estimate given by the Board of Revenue (RW-1/2) and the recommendations given by the price assessment committee (RW-1/3). He submits that the award in question dated 26-2-1996 is based upon the aforesaid documentary evidence.
7. It is pointed out that the respondents only produced three mutations which are discussed in paragraph-9 of the impugned judgment. The learned referee court did not rely on the documentary evidence produced by the respondents despite the fact that onus to establish the quantum and substantiate their claim of Rs,30,000 per marla was upon the respondents. The learned counsel submits that three mutations were relied upon by the respondents in which the sale price shown was Rs,40,000, Rs,25,000 and Rs,20,000 per marla. He, therefore, submits that it is not clear which of the three mutations was relied upon by the learned subordinate court.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant further points out that the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, while examining questions relating to compensation payable for land acquired for the same purpose by the same organization, decided that a sum of Rs,25,000 per marla for Mauza Shera Kot, which is an adjacent Mauza, was an adequate figure.
9. It has been argued that the position taken by the respondents before the learned referee court was that their land was situated at Mauza Babu Sabu, which was at a better location and was more valuable. Apparently, the witnesses produced by the respondents were not cross-examined on this point. Further, it has been pointed out that the best evidence rule was not followed insofar as the Land Acquisition Collector, who had undertaken exercise of acquisition was not produced as a witness. On the contrary, the Land Acquisition Collector, who was produced, did not have any direct knowledge of the acquisition proceedings in view of the fact that he had not undertaken the acquisition proceedings.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant further argues that the onus was on the respondents to adduce evidence to establish the exact location of their land. He points out that it was fundamentally important for the respondents to establish the exact location of the land in order to enable the learned referee court, to determine the exact value of the land. Failure on the part of the respondents to discharge such onus disentitled them from claiming compensation at an enhanced rate.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has taken the position that the respondents had established their case to the effect that the land owned by them was more valuable as compared to the adjacent land located in Kot Kamboh and Shera Kot. He has referred to the statements of AW-4 Haji Muhammad Razzaq and AW-5 Muhammad Ishaq; both of whom categorically stated in their examination-in-chief that the value of the land situated at Mauza Babu Sabu was much more than the land in Mauza Kamboh and Mauza Shera Kot, as the price of residential and commercial properties is higher in Mauza Babu, Sabu as compared to other the adjacent Mauzas. They further stated that the land which is the subject matter of this appeal is situated at the distance of 6/7 kilometers from the Town Hall and District Courts and was at the relevant time within the limits of the corporation. The said witnesses also identified a number of .Workshops and colonies, which existed near the land in question and went on to state that the land had the potential of becoming one of the most valuable residential and commercial areas of Lahore.
12. The learned counsel submits that the said witnesses were not specifically cross-examined either on the point whether the property in Mauza Babu Sabu was more valuable than that of Shera Kot and Mauza Kot Komboh, but also that it had the potential to become one of the most valuable commercial areas of Lahore. The learned counsel has also pointed out that although various workshops and colonies were named by the witnesses, which allegedly existed around the land acquired by the respondents, no effort was made to show that the said workshops and colonies did not exist around the said land. He, therefore, submits that the evidence of AW-4 and AW-5 relating to the value of the property, its location and its potentialities has to be accepted in toto and in fact constitutes an admission on the part of the appellant. In this regard, reliance is placed on the cases of "Mt. Sukhraji Bhuj v. Calcutta State Transport Corporation" (AIR 1966 Calcutta 620), "State v. Bhola Singh" (AIR 1969 Rajasthan 219), "Sachindranath Chatterjee v. Sm. Nilima Chatterjee"
(AIR 1970 Calcutta 38), "Mst. Noor-Nisa v. Abdus Salam and others "(PLD 1982 Pesh. 42) "Muhammad Yasin v. Shabbir Ahmad" (1985 CLC 2111), "Muhammad Sadiq v. Federation of Pakistan" (1991 MLD 1), "Abdul Mannan and others v. Sikandar Khan" (1992 CLC 505), "Arshad Mehmood Siddiqui v.
Muhammad Haroon" (1992 MLD 810) and "Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through Legal Representatives v.
Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi" (1991 SCMR 2300).
13. Referring to the statement of AW-3 Imran Mazhar, who was the Halqa Patwari at the relevant time, the learned counsel submits that the said witness categorically admitted in his cross- examination that the land in question, at the time of its acquisition, was residential in nature.
14. The learned counsel for the respondents has further pointed out that this Court while dealing with the matter relating to acquisition of land in Mauza Shera Kot had fixed the value of the land at the rate of Rs,20,000 per marla. The said judgment of this Court was upheld in appeal by the Hon'hle Supreme Court of Pakistan. Likewise, he points out that although the learned referee court had fixed a sum of Rs,50,000/- per marla for Kot Komboh, which is adjacent to Mauza Babu Sabu where the land in question is situated, this Court reduced it to Rs,30,000 per marla. The said Judgment of this Court was also upheld in appeal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. The learned counsel points out that admittedly land of the respondents is situated adjacent to Shera Kot and Kot Komboh but is more valuable because of better location being a residential area and being in close vicinity of commercial centres. Therefore, the value fixed by the learned referee court does not require any interference.
15. Our attention has also been drawn to the statement of RW-1 Mian Rauf Ahmad, Land Acquisition Collector NHA. He stated that he had no personal knowledge about the methodology adopted by the price assessm ent committee for recommending a price of Rs,10,000 per marla. In this regard, the learned counsel submits that the said witness also admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the area or the acquisition proceedings in view of the fact that he had been transferred to the said post at a subsequent point in time and all acquisition proceedings had been undertaken by his predecessor. The learned counsel, therefore, argues that the Land Acquisition Collector namely Agha Ahmad Raza, who had direct knowledge of the area and the acquisition proceedings undertaken by him, was not produced which runs contrary to the requirement of producing the best evidence. He adds that in view of the fact the best evidence was not produced an adverse inference can be drawn against the appellant and the court would be justified in inferring that in case the original Land Acquisition Collector had been produced, his evidence would have supported the case of the respondents. In this regard, reference has been made to the cases of "Mt. Shubratan v. Shabbir Ali and others" (AIR 1940 Oudh 268), "Bajranglaj Paddar v. Sitaram Kadia" [AIR (36)' 1949 Calcutta 467], "Kansi Ram v. Jai Ram" (AIR 1956 Him Para- 4), "Muhammad Rafique v. Muhammad" (1989 CLC 1318), "Mst. Kamina and another v. Al-Amin Goods Transport Agency through Legal Representatives and 2 others" (1992 SCMR 1715) and "AIR 1999 SC 1341".
16. Our. Attention has also been drawn to Mutations Nos.3309, 3311 and 3261, which indicate that the value of the land in the area of Mauza Babu Sabu in the period between 1985 to 1989 ranged between Rs,20,000 to Rs,40,000 per marla. The learned counsel argues that the said mutations and the entries made therein have not been contested by the appellant. He further submits that the per marla rates mentioned in the said mutations also stand admitted for want of any documentary or oral evidence in rebuttal produced by the appellant. The learned counsel finally argues that in determining the compensation for compulsory acquisition of land, not only the market value of the land is to be seen but the courts have held that the future prospects and potential use of the land in future is also to be kept in mind. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has placed his reliance on the cases of "Muhammad Abdullah v. Yatim Khana Khalqia, Sargodha through its Manager and others" (2004 SCMR 471), "Province of Punjab through Collector Sheikhupura and others v. Akbar Ali and others" (1990 SCMR 899), "Province of Punjab through Collector, Attock v.
Engr. Jamil Ahmad Malik and others" (2000 SCMR 870) and "Muhammad Saeed and others v.
Collector, Land Acquisition and others" (2000 SCMR 470).
17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the record with their assistance.
18. Although the learned referee court framed as many as five issues including the maintainability of the reference and the same being barred by time, the learned counsel for the respondents has not pressed the question of maintainability or limitation. He has focused his arguments on the findings of, the learned subordinate courts relating to Issue No,5. It may be useful to reproduce Issue No,5 hereunder:--- "Whether the land of the petitioners is situated at main Multan Road within Lahore Municipality at a distance of about 6/7 km. From District Courts and is also surrounded by highly reputed industries, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs,40,000 per Marla along with 15% compulsorily acquisition charges and 8% compound interest till the date of final payment? OPP"
19. The position taken by the respondents before the learned referee court was that the Land Acquisition Collector, National Highway Authority had acquired their land to the extent of 10 kanals and 13 marlas for construction of Lahore Bypass, The award was announced on 26-2-1996, through which compensation at the rate of Rs,10,000 per marla was offered. The said amount has been found to be lower than the market value and actual price of the land. The respondents have submitted that their land, which was compulsorily acquired against their will, was more valuable than the compensation offered and had the potential of being developed into expensive real estate on account of its location, boundaries and market etc. Instead of giving an equitable compensation based upon market value of the land and its future potentialities as laid down by the Superior Courts, the appellant had acquired the land against a meagre sum of Rs,10,000 per marla, which was received under protest. The respondents filed a reference with the Land Acquisition Collector claiming compensation at the rate of Rs,40,000 per marla. The said matter was referred by the Collector to the referee court.
20. It is apparent from the record that Mauza Babu Sabu, Mauza Shera Kot and Mauza Kot Komboh are adjacent to each other and had become residential areas at the time when the acquisition proceedings were commenced. It is also on record that the value of the land in Mauza Babu Sabu was more than the adjacent Mauzas at the time of its acquisition in view of its location near workshops, cold storages, markets and residential areas. It is significant to note that the respondents produced oral as well as documentary evidence in the form of AW-4 and AW-5 in addition to production of mutations indicating that the value of the land at Mauza Babu Sabu ranged between Rs,20,000 to. Rs,40,000 per marla. There was no serious effort on the part of the appellant either to rebut the said claim, cross-examine the witnesses on the point of the value of land or to produce other documentary evidence in order to dislodge the claim of the respondents that the value of their land was at least Rs,30,000 per marla at the time of its acquisition. It is a settled principle of law that where specific factual assertions are made in the examination-in-chief and the witness is not cross-examined on the said point, the evidence of the witness is to be accepted to the extent that he has not been cross-examined. In this regard reference can usefully be made to the case of "A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian" (AIR 1961 Calcutta 359), where it was held as follows:--- "Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to present surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. It has been stated on high authority of the House of Lords that this much a counsel is bound to do, when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff's account in its entirety. Such failure leads to miscarriage of justice, first by springing surprise upon the party when he has finished the evidence of his witnesses and when he has no further chance to meet the new case made which was never put and secondly, because such subsequent testimony has no chance of being tested and corroborated."
' In the case of "State v. Bhola Singh" (AIR 1969 Rajasthan 219), it was held as under:- "A careful scrutiny of the statements of the above 3 witnesses shows that they have not been shaken in any material particulars in the course of their cross-examinations. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the system of administration of justice allows cross-examination of witnesses for the purpose of testing their veracity and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence has to be accepted unless, of course there are inherent improbabilities. In other words, when the opponent declines to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination it must follow that he believes that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. This is the rule of essential justice.
Here cross-examination conducted on behalf of the accused in respect of the examinations-in- chief of these 3 eyewitnesses does not indicate any material improbability and the statements of the witnesses remain unchallenged."
' In the case of "Mst. Noor-Nisa v. Abdus Salm and others PLD 1982 Pesh. 42 it was held as under:- "The petitioner-defendant in her statement recorded on Commission on 1-7-1975, has categorically stated that the disputed house was purchased by her for her occupation. She has also said that she does not own any house on vacant site for constructing a house thereon in Haripur where she is residing for the last 25 years and where who intends to reside in future. She has said that the area of the disputed house was about 5 or 6 marlas. She was cross-examined at length, but not regarding the fact which she had stated on solemn affirmation that the disputed house was purchased by her for her occupation. The legal position is well-settled that if a witness is not questioned on a particular point in cross-examination, then the presumption is that such point or the portion of the statement is accepted by the opposite party. On this point, 1 would refer to PLD 1967 Lahore 1138, PLD 1969 Peshawar 118, and PLD 1980 Peshawar 365. One of the ingredients of clause. (d) of section 5 of the N.-W.F.P., Pre-emption Act that the disputed house was purchased by the petitioner-defendant for her own occupation, therefore, stands proved."
' In "Muhammad Yasin v. Shabbir Ahmad" (1985 CLC 2111), it was held:--- "Absence of cross examination on this point clearly shows that assertion made by the landlord is not called in question by the tenant. In support of this view reliance is placed by the learned counsel on Qasim and others v. State, PLD 1967 Kar.
233. Although this was a criminal case but the principle laid down in the reported case is that under sections 137 and 138 of the Evidence Act if there is no cross-examination on the fact deposed in the Examination-in-Chief; the presumption is that evidence is deemed to have been accepted by the party against whom it was given. The reliance is also placed on another case Muhammad Mujibur Rehman Siddiqui v. Abdul Bari and 3 others PLD 1981 Kar. 537 in which the principle stated in the above-mentioned case is reiterated. This being the correct legal position. I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order of ejectment and in consequence the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs."
' In the case of "Kabool Khan v. Shamoon through Legal heirs and another" (2001 YLR 51), it was held as under:- "It is settled proposition of law that the documents produced by the respondent were received in evidence without any objection and no exception can be taken to the said documents merely for the reason that the author of the said document was not examined,"
' In the case of "Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Publix Industries Ltd." (1991 CLC 1907), it was held as follows:- "As in the instant case, so in the cited case, the counsel for the tenant contended that no details of personal requirement were given in the eviction application. In this .Respect it was held that it was not necessary for the landlord to give all the details in his eviction application. In my view the instant case is identical with the cited case. As in the cited case, so in the present case, nothing has been asked in the cross-examination of Ilasan Ali with regard to the tremendous increase in the business of bank and the personal requirement for its own use or for the use of its branches. It has held in the cited case that if some fact is deposed or stated in examination-in-chief; which is not questioned in the cross-examination, the presumption is that that part of the evidence is deemed to have been accepted by the party against whom that evidence has been given. In view of the observations made in the cited case and in view of the evidence that has been discussed, I am of the view that the appellant had made out a case for eviction of the respondents, on the ground of bona fide personal requirement."
' In "Messrs Kausar and Co. v. Messrs Universal Insurance Co. (Pvt.) Ltd." (1991 MLD 1774), it was held as follows:--- "Normally, on principles emerging from the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, failure to cross-examine a witness from the opposite side may and can have adverse implications on the claim or defence of the party unexplainable failing to make due cross-examination. Such could even constitute, in appropriate cases, an admission of what is stated. By the witness who has unaccountably been left without being duly cross-examined. The rule, however, is not always absolute and can never be divested from the overall considerations fairly and lawfully arising upon the record. The place of all procedure in the administration of justice should be and is none else but to secure and assure a just and fair determination of disputes. In the instant matter, apart from evidence from the side of the appellant-tenant, which alone, at the worst could have been negatived for want of necessary cross-examination of the opposite side, there still remained an uncontroverted Commissioner's report."
' In the case of "Muhammad Sadiq v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, Pakistan Railways Board" (1991 MLD 1):--- "These material facts deposed by A. W.1 in examination-in-chief having not been challenged in the cross-examination therefore, his evidence according to well established principle of law shall, be deemed to have been accepted as correct. The petitioner examined Jamshad Mohsin as R. W 1 who is son of Mr. S.M. Mohsin, Advocate to prove that his father died on 20-1-1983 and files of the cases were returned to the Railway Headquarter immediately after Chaleeswan when Railway officials took away all the files."
21. This Court has consistently followed the aforesaid principle. Reference in this regard may also be made to "Abdul Mannan and others v. Sikandar Khan" (1992 CLC 505), "Arshad Mehmood Siddiqui v.
Muhammad Haroon" (1992 MLD 810), "Muhammad Anwar v. Haji Muhammad Ismail and others"
(1992 MLD 860), "Ramzan and 2 others v. Lara through Legal Heirs and another" (2001 MLD 957. In this regard it may usefully be referred to "Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through .Legal Representatives v.
Syed Mujtaba All Naqyi" (1991 SCMR 2300) where it was held as follows:--- "The principle enunciated in the commentaries and rulings is that where on a material part of his evidence a witness is not cross-examined it may be inferred that the truth of such statement has been accepted. Statement of a witness which is material to the controversy of the case particularly when it stated his case and the same is not challenged by the other side, directly or indirectly, then, such unchallenged statement should be given full credit and usually accepted as true unless displaced by reliable, cogent and clear evidence."
22. The evidence of AW-4 and AW-5 is of material significance. They stated that the areas of Mauza Babu Sabu, Shera Kot and Mauza Kot Komboh are adjacent to each other and all these villages have turned into residential and commercial areas. The price of land situated in Mauza Babu Sabu was higher as compared to prices of land in Mauza Shera Kot and Mauza Kot Komboh at the time of acquisition. The difference continues to exist owing to better location and vicinity of Mauza Babu Sabu to commercial centers as well as the City of Lahore. There were workshops, cold storages and markets in and around the acquired area. Mauza Babu Sabu has the potential to become a valuable residential and commercial area of Lahore. According to their estimate, the market value of the land at the time of its acquisition was between Rs,50,000 to Rs,60,000 per marla.
23. It is significant to note that this Court had, in a matter involving acquisition of land in Mauza Shera Kot, fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs,20,000 per marla. In another, case, involving acquisition of adjacent land situated in Mauza Komboh, this Court fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs,30,000 per marla. Both the judgments of this Court were upheld by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan.
24. The appellants have not seriously contested that the three Mauzas are adjacent to each other and that the land acquired by the appellant is situated about 6/7 kilometers from the District Courts, Lahore and is better located as compared to Mauza Shera Kot and Kot Komboh. It has also not been seriously contested that the land is situated within the limits of corporation and the land within the limits of Mauza Babu Sabu is more valuable than the land situated in the adjacent Mauzas.
25. We notice that in rebuttal the appellants produced Mian Rauf Ahmad, Land Acquisition Collector, NHA, who was the sole witness on behalf of the appellants. The record indicates that he assumed charge as the Land Acquisition Collector on 16-1-2007 while the land in question was acquired in 1996. He frankly admitted in cross-examination that he had no direct knowledge regarding any matter relating to acquisition of land, or the methodology adopted by the Price Assessm ent Committee in recommending the rate of Rs,10,000/- per marla as compensation. It is an admitted fact that the first notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 1-9-1993, which would be the relevant date for the purpose of determination of the value/price of the land in question. We have been informed that Agha Ahmad Raza was the Land Acquisition Collector at the relevant time. He was the most important witness to testify regarding the value of the land at the relevant time. Strangely enough, no effort was made to produce the said person as a witness. The evidence given by Mian Rauf Ahmad, Land Acquisition Collector, who was admittedly appointed as an LAC more than 10 years after the land had been acquired, is not helpful to the appellant in any manner. On the contrary, an adverse inference can be drawn against the appellant for failing to produce the best evidence. No explanation was offered as to why the best witness was not produced.
26. The evidence produced by the respondents was consistent, supported by documents and worthy of reliance. The documentary evidence produced included copies of mutations relating to the land situated in Mauza Babu Sabu and was consistent with the stand taken by the respondents.
As discussed above, this Court had examined the question of compensation awarded ,to the landowners whose land had been acquired for the purpose of construction of Lahore Bypass situated in Mauza Shera Kot and Mauza Kot Komboh and had fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs,20,000 per marla and Rs,30,000 per marla respectively. This rate of compensation was upheld by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. Copy of Mutation No,3621 relating to Mauza Babu Sabu has been placed on record as Exhibit A-6. In this mutation, the land was sold at the rate of Rs,40,000 per marla. Another copy of Mutation No,3311 of the same Mauza has been filed on record as Exhibit A-5. This mutation indicates that the land situated in Mauza Babu Sabu was sold at the rate of Rs,25,000 per marla. Finally Mutation No,3309 shows that the land was sold at the rate of Rs,20,000 per marla. All the sales took place before 15-9-1992 when notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Collector was issued.
27. The oral as well as the documentary evidence produced by the respondents and failure on the part of the appellant to rebut the stance of the respondents led to a finding by the learned referee court that the compensation granted to the respondents by the Land Acquisition Collector was neither just nor equitable. He was, therefore, in our opinion, quite justified in enhancing the compensation from Rs,10,000 to Rs,30,000. In arriving at the said figure, the learned subordinate court not only kept into consideration the judgments of this Court and the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in the cases involving the land situated in Mauza Komboh and Shera Kot but also considered the potentialities and use of the land in question in future in order to award just and reasonable compensation to the respondents. It is an admitted position that the land in question is located within the limits of corporation, is situated at a distance of 6/7 kilometers from the District Courts, Lahore and is surrounded by commercial as well as residential building projects etc. Therefore, the value of the property and its potential was rightly considered by the learned subordinate court in determining the quantum of compensation. It has been held by the superior courts that there is a distinction between "paying market price" and "awarding compensation". The sum of Rs,30,000 reflects and incorporates the market price as well as an element reasonable compensation to the respondents. This is clearly in line with the principles laid down by the honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in such matteRs,
28. In view of the fact that the respondents were deprived of their land against their will, they were not only entitled to be paid the market price of the land but were also required to be compensated for forcible taking of their property by the State for its own purposes. Therefore, the award of Rs,30,000 per marla by way of compensation is not, in our opinion, either excessive or exorbitant.
On the contrary, we are of the view that the value determined by the learned referee court is fully supported by the oral as well as documentary evidence, which has not, at any stage, even remotely been rebutted by the appellant. He award of compulsorily acquisition charges and 8% compound interest being statutory in nature has not been contested by the appellant.
29. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the judgment and decree of the learned referee court to the effect that compensation at the rate of Rs,30,000 per marla be given to the respondents together with compulsorily acquisition charges and compound interest at the rate of Rs,8% per annum is just, fair and duly supported by the record and oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties. It calls for no interference by this Court. We find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. .