IJAZ AHMAD, J. --- The respondent made an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, before the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. It was filed after 17 years of his termination. An application for condonation of delay accompanied. The petitioner submitted reply and raised some preliminary objections including the one regarding the inordinate and unexplained delay and the maintainability of the application as well. The authority vide order dated 15.11.2010, directed the full-fledge trial in the matter.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the matter has already been full and finally settled, the petitioner has been held entitled for Rs. 40,448/-as provident fund and the same has been paid through a cheque dated 22.1.1998, executed by the petitioner and encashed by the respondent and that nothing is due to the respondent: It is further contended that the order dated 15.11.2010, ordering the full-fledge trial is not a speaking order and is not sustainable in law. He further argues that an employee claiming towards the fund is either entitled for the receipt of the provident fund or the gratuity. Reliance is placed on PLJ 1986 Lahore 68 titled Mst. Shaheen Masood Vs. Malik Nasim Hassan, Judge Family Court, Lahore and another, NLR 2000 Labour 140 titled A & B Beverage Shama Labour Union Vs. Sindh Labour Court No. 3, etc. And 1993 SCM R 1533 titled Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. And another Vs. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal Fornewspaper Employees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and two others.
3. This petition is opposed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. It is contended that an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is provided, therefore, this Constitutional petition is not maintainable; that the dues have never been settled between the parties and have never been paid.; that a Constitutional petition does not lie against an interim order.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record.
5. The petitioner had raised some preliminary objections which needed to be addressed before passing the impugned order. Moreover, the impugned order is not a speaking order and is not in conformity with law. Impugned order dated 15.11.2010, is set aside. The authority may, however, after addressing all the preliminary legal objections taken by the respondents, pass a fresh order. This petition is accepted. .