' IJAZ AHMAD, J.---- The decree dated 22-11-1999, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, is impugned whereby in the suit for recovery of Rs,54,87,738.48, instituted by the appellants, the plaint was rejected.
2. There was a written contract, dated 15-6-1987, between the parties for supply of the Pulse. After elapse of the delivery period, a second purchase contract, dated 9-6-1988, was awarded to Messrs Naveed Industries, Lahore. The respondent is said to have partly failed to fulfil his contractual liability. The appellants had to incur an additional expenditure to purchase the remaining quantity from the open market. The appellants instituted a suit for recovery of Rs,54,87,738.48 against the respondent, as compensation for breach of the contract in question. The respondent made an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. For rejection of the plaint contending that the appellants' suit was barred by time. The application was contested by the appellants. The learned Civil Judge 1st Class Rawalpindi vide order dated 22-11-1999 rejected the plaint.
3. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the impugned order rejecting the plaint is illegal as the period of limitation for instituting the suit under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is sixty years, the suit was instituted within the period of limitation prescribed under law.
He places reliance on AIR 1958 Madhya Pradesh 425 titled Union of India. v. R.C. Jall of lndore and another and PLD 2005 Lah. 177 titled Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi through Station Commander (HQ) Sialkot v. Muhammad Bashir.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and also gone through the record.
5. The contract was entered on 15-6-1987. After cancellation of the contract by the appellants, a second contract dated 9-6-1988 for purchase of the pulse was awarded to Messrs Naveed Industries Lahore. The present suit was instituted on 21-12-1998. The cause of action arose to the appellants at the time of breach of the contract, which took place prior to the second contract. The suit was instituted after 11 years of the first contract and after 10 years of the second contract.
Articles 116 and 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908 are reproduced below:--- Article 116 1 2 3 For compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registeredSix years When the period of limitation would begin to run against a suit brought on a similar contract not registered.
Article 149 1 2 3 Any suit by or on behalf of the Central Government or any Provincial Government except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.Sixty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.
' A suit for compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered or unregistered has to be instituted within six yeaRs, The instant suit falls within the definition of a suit given under Article 116 (ibid). The Article 149 is a residual article, which will not apply in the instant case in presence of a specific Article applicable to the suit. The first judgment cited, only defines and explains the meaning and nature of "like nature" which is not the moot point in this case, therefore, is inapplicable. The ratio of the judgment cited as "PLD 2005 Lah. 177" encompasses the suits filed by the Federal Government or the Provincial Government relating to the recovery of loan. The said judgment also does not apply to the instant case which relates to the compensation for breach of a contract. In our view, the suit of the appellants-plaintiffs was hopelessly time-barred. The learned trial Court has rightly rejected the plaint in the suit instituted by the appellants by applying the provision of Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1908 to come to the conclusion that the suit had not been filed within the period of limitation prescribed by law. This appeal has no force. It is, hereby, dismissed.