' The present appeal has been filed by Judo son of Muhammad Alam to challenge the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Tharparkar at Sanghar, in First Class Suit No, 27/1963, whereby the said suit was dismissed. I have heard Mr. Ramchand Rangwani for the appellant and Mr. All Murtaza Hussain who has appeared for respondents/ defendant. Namely, the Province of West Pakistan, Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Chief Conservator of Forest, Hyderabad, and the Range Forest Officer, Khipro.
2. The brief facts of the case, according to the plaint, are that Muhammad Alam, the father of appellant Jamo was granted an area of 16 acres of unsurveyed land bearing No. 1 in Deh Khambro Within Khipro Taluka. The grant was validated from Rabi 1963-64 under Colonization Officer's order dated 21-10-1963. This grant pertained to barrage lands and Muhammad Alam was found entitled to this land on account of a policy decision of the Government of West Pakistan known as "Hur Claim Policy". The land was subsequently demarcated and re-numbered as Survey Nos. 256 to 269.
It seems that this land, according to the Forest Department Authorities, was out of land which was a reserved forest. The Range Forest Officer therefore, issued a notice to appellant Jumo (Muhammad Alam having died in the meantime) asking him to refrain from cutting the trees in the forest and also to vacate the land. The appellant felt himself aggrieved by such order so that he filed a suit on 3-9-1955 claiming the following reliefs :- "(a) Permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them, their agents, attorneys, empolyees and subordinates from interfering in any manner or whatsoever with the possession and the enjoyment of the property of the plaintiff.
(b) The cost of the suit be borne by the defendants.
(c) Any other relief that this Honourable Court deems fit."
3. It was averred in the plaint that even the Colonization Officer of the Government of Sind was of the view that the land in question did not belong to Forest Department but was Government land disposable by the Barrage Authorities. It was even averred that legal procedures for evicting the appellant had not been complied with and it was further stated in the plaint that several other persons had also been granted land in the same area viz. Such area which the Forest Department claimed as a reserved forest. A joint written statement was filed by all the respondents/defendants in which was stated that the grant in favour of the predecessor of appellant was only a paper grant and was illegal, ineffective and ab initio void because the land belonged to Forest Department. It was admitted that the Forest Department wanted to eject the appellant. In the written statement a sort of accounting was resorted to for the purpose of showing that out of the total area of 382-34 acres of un-surveyed land No. 1 an area of 114-20 acres had been disposed of before 1941 and a further area of 35-1 acres had been disposed of after 1961 and an area of 232 acres had been reserved for the forest so that out of the total area only 3-13 acres was available and for such reason the grant of 16 acres was ineffective and void. On the pleadings of the parties the Court framed the following issues :- "(1) Whether the alleged grant of the suit land to the plaintiff is legal ?
(2) Whether the plaintiff was ever put in possession of the suit land ?
(3) Whether the notice of the Forest Department is illegal and inoperative ?
(4) Whether the suit is maintainable according to law ;
(5) Whether the suit is barred by the Revenue Courts Jurisdiction Act ?
(6) Whether the suit is in proper form ?
(7) Whether the suit is properly valued and adequately stamped ?
(8) What should the decree be ?
4. The first 3 issues were collectively discussed by the trial Court and it came to the conclusion that the land allotted to the predecessor of appellant was not available for grant at the time the grant was made. The documents on which the appellant mainly relied for the purpose of establishing his claim were `Yaksalo' lease in his favour and final entries in the record of rights. It was also established that the appellant had been in. Cultivating possession of the land in question. The appellant also produced documents to show that the Colonization Officer of the Government of West Pakistan had himself written a letter to the Forest Department stating that the land in question did not belong to the Forest Department. On the other hand, the evidence of the respondents was mainly grounded on the fact that 16 acres of land were not available for disposal at the time when the grant in favour of the appellant's father was made. The respondents also produced a document purporting to be the minutes of a meeting held by the Colonization Officer and the Forest Department Officers on 24-9-1965 when the question about the entitlement of the appellant to the land and of other grantees arose. In such document the relevant portion pertaining to the grant made in favour of the appellants reads as follows :- "Sketches brought by the D. F.
0. Working Plan Hyderabad showed that the portion of land granted to Muhammad Alam actually forms part of Reserved Forest area in accordance with the Government Orders bearing No, R- 10456-H(b) 44, dated 27-11-1947. Hence the grant of this area was illegal. It was, therefore, decided that this matter may be referred to the Commissioner, Hyderabad Division for cancellation of the grant. As however, this matter is sub judice in the Court of the Additional Judge, Sanghar, it was decided that it may be referred to the Commissioner after the case is decided by the Court.
Meanwhile A. G. P. Sanghar be apprised of the facts to enable him to place them before the Court."
5. All the above material coupled with Government notification dated 27-11-1947, placed on the record as Exh. 79 clearly shows that 230 acres of land, as stated by the respondents, was in fact reserved for a Reserved Forest and such land is in the same survey number within which the land granted to the appellant is situated. On the basis of such evidence the learned additional District Judge arrived at a correct conclusion of fact that this land was not available for allotment and the grant in favour of the appellant was ineffective and void. Nothing much can be said to controvert or challenge this finding.
6. The question in regard to maintainability of the suit was also raised before the learned Additional District Judge. I have examined the process of reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge and I am of the view that the suit was clearly maintainable.
7. The only point which has been firmly raised by Mr. Ramchand is that in the absence of a finding adverse to entitlement of the appellant, he should not be disturbed. In short, the submission is that even in the written statement or evidence as well as on the findings of the trial Court it is not even stated that the father of the appellant was not entitled to land account of Hur Policy. In such circumstances, Mr. Ramchand contends that if the appellant was entitled to land, his claim has to be satisfied. In that regard Mr. Ali Murtaza submitted that the question of providing alternate land to the appellant has to be considered by the Divisional Commissioner or any other relevant authority in such behalf. As it is, the suit was filed in 1965 and 15 years have already gone by but it seems the Commissioner has not been able to decide that. Mr. Ali Murtaza however, states that since the suit and the appeal was pending it was possible that the Commissioner had not found it fit to decide this question. Be that as it may, I am clear in my mind that the appellant was entitled to 16 ages of land on account of compensation awardable to the father of the appellant as a consequence of Hur Claim Policy. In these circumstances, while dismissing this appeal I only express a hope that the concerned authorities would take proper and timely steps to satisfy the claim of the appellant from out of the available land. There is no doubt, that such authorities would keep the convenience of the appellant in their mind while granting the land.
8. Subject to the observations contained in the immediately foregoing paragraph this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of this case I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs.