' SHAUKAT UMAR PIRZADA, J.--- This revision petition has been directed against the order dated 21- 10-2010 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sahiwal, whereby the petitioner's application for impleading legal heirs of Jhon E. Mariner has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts giving rise to this revision petition are that petitioner along with respondent No,3 filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against respondents Nos.1 and 2 and one Mr. John E. Mariner. In this suit, an application for grant of interim injunction was also filed. This suit was contested by the defendants through filing written statement and reply to the application- for interim injunction. Mr. John E. Mariner has been shown as general attorney of Mission Hospital, Sahiwal and, -claimed himself to be the special attorney. However, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court accepted the application for interim injunction vide order dated 13-5-2010. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, respondent No,2 preferred appeal before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal. In the memorandum of appeal, respondent No,2/appellant pointed out that Mr. John E. Mariner has died in the month of February, 2010. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner filed application for impleading the legal heirs of the said deceased as party.
This application was contested by respondent No,2 and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Additional District Judge, Sahiwal dismissed the said application vide order dated 21-10-2010, hence, this revision petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Mr. John E. Mariner was a party as defendant No,2 in the main suit, therefore, upon his death impleading his legal heirs as party in the appeal is a legal requirement, for which the petitioner has moved the application, that has been illegally and unlawfully dismissed by the learned appellate court through the impugned order.
4. Learned counsel for respondent No,2 has controverted the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner and has contended that said John E.Mariner was a general attorney of an institution and the power of attorney stood revoked with the death of the attorney and that the authority given by principal to the deceased attorney was not an inheritable right, therefore, the application for impleading his legal heirs in the instant proceedings has been rightly dismissed by the learned appellate court. It is further contended that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law and be maintained.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the available record.
6. Admittedly, John E.Mariner was appointed as general attorney by the principal/institution, who has expired in February, 2010. The relationship between the institution and the said deceased was that of a principal and attorney which is governed by the provisions of the Attorney Act, 1882.
Through an instrument of power of attorney, principal confers certain powers on the attorney to be exercised by him on behalf and in the name of the principal. The authority or attorney comes to end with the revocation thereof by the principal or accomplishment of the assignment or by the death of either principal or the attorney. This view is supported by the judgment reported in 1999 CLC Page 501, the relevant portion thereof is reproduced below:--- "10. The objection of Mr. Muhammad Amin Lone, learned Asistant Advocate-General as regards the absence of authority of Rana Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate is equally valid and has to be upheld.
Dr. Muhammad Ismail attorney having died in the year 1987, the authority of Rana Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate under the signatures of br. Muhammad Ismail, as Special Attorney on the.
Wakalatnama also came to an end."
As the authority given by a principal to the attorney stands terminated/revoked by the death of the either party, therefore, the authority given to the attorney is not inheritable, hence upon the death of the attorney; the legal heirs/representatives of such attorney cannot be impleaded as party in the proceedings pursued by him as attorney. This view is supported in the judgment reported in 1985 M LD 549, the relevant portion whereof is reproduced below:--- ' With his demise his status as attorney on behalf of landlady/owner also terminated. Respondent Nos.2 to 8 being his legal heirs were, therefore, not competent to prosecute the ejectment petition against the petitioner unless they were authorized by the owner/landlady to act on her behalf ........ "
' In the instant case, the contention of the petitioner is that Mr. John E. Mariner being the general attorney of the institution, was impleaded as defendant No,3 in the main suit wherefrom an appeal has emerged and during its pendency before the learned appellate court, said John E.Mariner expired, therefore, his legal heirs should have been allowed to be impleaded as party in the appeal, is without substance. As pointed out above, the authority given to the said deceased came to end with his death and the authority given or delegated to the said attorney was not an inheritable right, therefore, his legal heirs have nothing to do with the instant proceedings. More-over, the learned appellate court has rightly observed that the necessary and actual parties, which were required to be heard in relation to the contentions of the appellant/ respondent No,2 are the petitioner and Wilson Masih/respondent No,3, who was plaintiff No,2 in the main suit, while the role of John Mariner if at all be considered was that of a pro forma respondent in c appeal, for which no compulsion can be placed on the appellant/ respondent No,2 to implead the legal heirs of the said deceased as party in the instant proceedings. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, error of jurisdiction or non- reading of the record in the impugned order, which otherwise is well reasoned and in accordance with law and record of the instant case, therefore, requires no interference by this court in revisional jurisdiction.
7.. In view of the above, this revision petition is without merit, hence, dismissed. No order as to costs.