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2011 PLC (C.S.) 174

Engineer SHAUKAT HUSSAIN vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary

Citation2011 PLC (C.S.) 174
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Writ Petition No,2863 of 2010
Date2010-07-30
Judge(s)Asad Munir
ResultPetition allowed

ASAD MUNIR, J.-- Facts relevant for the disposal of this writ petition are that vide notification dated 18-9-2008, issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology ("the Ministry"), the petitioner was appointed as Director-General (BS-21), Pakistan National Accreditation Council ("PNAC") "on contract basis for a period of 3 years and until further orders." Subsequently, the Establishment Division with the concurrence of the Finance Division through letter dated 22-11-2008 approved the terms, and conditions for the appointment of the petitioner as Director-General, PNAC which are reproduced below:--- "(1) Post. Director-General (BPS-21)

(2) Place of Posting Islamabad or anywhere within or outside Pakistan as the competent authority may decide.

(3) Period of Contract Three years tenure from the date of assumption of charge and can further he extended for another term with approval of the Competent Authority.

(4) Pay: Maximum of the relevant scale of pay. Annual increment shall be admissible as under the normal rules.

(5) Allowances: As admissible to corresponding civil servants.

(6) Traveling Allowance. As admissible to civil servants of the corresponding pay scale under the rules.

(7) Seniority: This contract appointment does not confer any right for being placed in the gradation/seniority list of the cadre/group to which the subject post belongs.

(8) Leave: As admissible under the Revised Leave Rules, 1980. However, provisions contained in Rules 5(c), 8, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 18-A, 19, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 39 of Rules ibid shall not apply. All leave at your credit will lapse on the termination of this contract.

(9) Medical Facilities: As admissible to officers of the Federation Government or PNAC employees under the rules.

(10) Pension: Service render under this contract shall not qualify for a pension or gratuity.

(11) General Provident Fund: No contribution towards GP Fund shall be required. However, if you are from a department where you already hold an account, then contribution must be paid on your own.

(12) Conduct and discipline: Rules made and instructions issued by the Government or a prescribe, authority as for civil servants under sections 15 and 16 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 as amended from time to time shall apply.

(13) Appeal: Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 with amendments if any shall apply.

(14) Termination of contract: The appointment during the period of contract shall be liable to termination on 30 days notice on either side or payment, of basic pay in lieu thereof.

(15) Whole Time employment posting and transfer: Your services will be on the basis of whole time employment during the contract and at the disposal of the Government during 24 hours. You may be employed in any manner required by competent authority without claim for additional remuneration.

(16) Other matters: In respect of other matters not specified in this contract the Rules/Regulations as applicable to Federal Civil Servants shall apply. You will at all times obey the rules prescribed for the time being in force for the regulation of the service or cadre to which the 'post in which you are being selected.

(17) Accommodation: House rent allowance/house hiring facility will be admissible as may be prescribed by the Federation Government from time to time."

2. The petitioner joined as Director-General, PNAC, on or around 18-9-2008 and till 8-4-2010 appears to have had a trouble-free relationship with his superiors in the Ministry who it is assumed were satisfied with his performance as head of the PNAC. According to the petitioner, he returned to work on 8-4-2010 after availing the approved causal leave of one week but could not enter his office as it was locked under the orders of the Minister for Science and Technology, respondent No,2. A few days later vide letter dated 15-4-2010, the Ministry entrusted the Deputy Director- General, PNAC, with the additional charge of Director-General, PNAC, without having passed any order to suspend or otherwise relieve the petitioner from his duties as Director-General, PNAC. Not being allowed to perform any duties and that too without any order having been passed, the petitioner is said to have agitated against order dated 15-4-2010 by submitting a representation to the Ministry followed by a departmental appeal dated 24-5-2010 addressed to the competent authority, the Prime Minister of Pakistan but appears to have received no response.

3. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No,2338 of 2010 which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 31-5-2010, the operative part whereof is quoted hereunder:--- "(3) In the circumstances, the respondents Nos.1, 2 and 3, are directed to decide the departmental appeal dated 24-5-2010, expeditiously, by means of a speaking order after hearing the petitioner.

The respondents are also directed not to take any adverse action against the petitioner till a decision is take on the said departmental appeal. Disposed of."

4. Once again the petitioner has approached this Court but this time he seeks the redressal of a grievance far more serious than before as vide notification dated 2-6-2010, his services have been terminated by the Ministry after approval of the competent authority.

5. The petitioner challenges his termination, inter alia, on the ground that the order terminating his services is unlawful as it has been passed in violation of this Court's order dated 31-5-2010 whereby the respondents were directed not to take any adverse action against the petitioner till a decision had been taken on the departmental appeal filed by him. Secondly, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Shoaib Shaheen, that the termination order is null and void as it could not have been passed without holding a regular inquiry in view of the dictum laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment reported in 2001 SCMR 1566. It is also contended that the impugned notification dated 2-6-2010 is the result of mala fide on the part of respondent No,2 who himself got executed and signed the MOU dated 4-1-2010 with an NGO, the Institute of Health Sciences, Islamabad, but now wants to victimize the petitioner as he is annoyed with the said NGO.

6. Respondents Nos.2 to 4 in their parawise comments as well as through their learned counsel, Mr. Munir Piracha, have denied having violated this Court's Order dated 31-5-2010 and have produced courier service record to show that the petitioner's departmental appeal dated 24-5-2010 was received by them on 31-5-2010 after the competent authority, the Prime Minister, had already approved the termination of the petitioner. In any case, it is pleaded this Court's order dated 31-5- 2010 was received by the Ministry only on 18-6-2010 as is evidenced by the letter sent by the office of this Court.

7. On merits, Mr. Piracha has taken the stand that the petitioner was appointed as Director-General (BPS-21) on contract basis for a period of three years and until further orders and the words "until further orders" read with clause (14) of the contract of appointment mean that his appointment is liable to termination even before three years on 30 days notice on either side or payment of basic pay in lieu thereof. Mr. Piracha has also placed on record the summary moved by the Ministry and approved by the Prime Minister to show that the termination of the petitioner was ordered only because there were serious charges of misconduct committed by the petitioner.

8. After having given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel along with the record produced by them, I am not convinced that respondents Nos.2 to 4 have violated this Court's order dated 31-5-2010 when they terminated the services of the petitioner on 1-6-2010 as no evidence has been brought on record by the petitioner to show that order dated 31-5-2010 was served on respondents Nos.2 to 4 prior to the passing of the impugned order.

9. More importantly, there is need to address the merits of the impugned order of termination which according to the respondents is notification dated 1-6-2010, issued by the Establishment Division instead of notification dated 2-6-2010, issued by the Ministry. While defending the impugned order, Mr. Piracha has taken the stand that the termination of the services of the petitioner has been ordered under clause (14) of the Terms and Conditions and that it is a case of termination simpliciter as the termination order gives no reason and thus carries no stigma. One would agree with such a contention if one looks at the impugned order in isolation and shuts one's eyes to the circumstances which preceded the impugned order or the causes which led to it. A perusal of the summary, moved by the Ministry and approved by the competent authority, shows that the petitioner's services were terminated for the sole reason that there were allegations of misconduct against him. At page 2 of the summary, a list of irregularities committed by the petitioner is given whereafter it is stated as under:--- "Above indicated violations such as serious malpractices in issuing of illegal/unauthorized letters and certificates in connivance with the management of IHMC reflects on moral, intellectual and financial dishonesty in performing his duties as head of the Organization".

The above allegations are of a grave nature as they cast serious reflections rather aspersions on the personal character of the petitioner. Admittedly, no regular inquiry into these allegations has been held by the Ministry. A fact-finding inquiry is said to have been held by a Committee but such an inquiry cannot be equated with a regular inquiry where the person proceeded against is to be provided a fair opportunity to show cause against any charge or allegation of misconduct. In support, one can refer to 2001 SCMR 1566 wherein it was held that a fact-finding inquiry is no substitute for a regular inquiry. In the face of the reasons contained in the summary moved by the Ministry, there can be no doubt that the termination of the petitioner is not a case of termination simpliciter just because no reasons are mentioned in his letter or order of termination.

10. Obviously, the allegations, mentioned in the summary, stigmatize the petitioner as he is said to have committed acts reflecting on his moral, intellectual and financial dishonesty. In the circumstances, a regular inquiry should have been held to allow the petitioner to defend himself and attempt to clear his name.

11. It may be stated that according to the notification dated 18-9-2008 the contract of employment of the petitioner was for three years and until further orders". As such, the petitioner's tenure of service was at least three years and could be extended further. I do not agree with Mr. Piracha's interpretation that the services of the petitioner as per the notification were terminable even before the expiry of three years as it was not for "three years or until further orders". Thus, in terms of the notification, employment of the petitioner was for a three years-plus period and the period in addition to three years was dependant upon the order of the competent authority. As regards clause (14) of the Terms and Conditions of the appointment, it has to be said that the said clause was subject to three years tenure mentioned in clause (1) otherwise the period of three years guaranteed by clause (1) and the appointment notification becomes meaningless. However, taking into account the appointment notification and the terms and conditions of the appointment, it would not be reasonable to interpret that the petitioner was employed for a period of at least three years on contract but his contract could be terminated prior to three years if there were reasons for doing so. Such reasons would include his termination on disciplinary grounds. As per the Terms and Conditions, the petitioner is said to be governed by the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Rules, applicable to civil servants, in almost all matters including conduct and dispel. This should discipline the impression that he is subject to the law of Master and Servant and thus can be ousted from service at the pleasure of his superiors.

12. Reference may be made to WAPDA through Chairman v. Zulfiqar Ali 2002 PLC (C.S.) 128 wherein it was held that even if person has no right to be heard before he was pre-maturely retired, principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim "audi aletram partem" has to be observed.

Reference may also be made to the case of Abdul Hafeez Abbasi and others v. Managing Director, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi and others 2002 SCMR 1034 where the services of the employees of PIA were terminated under the directive issued by the Prime Minister but no show-cause notice was issued to the employees before terminating their services. The termination of the employees was declared by the honourable Supreme Court to be unlawful on account of the violation of principle of natural justice. I may also refer to Zahoor Ahmad v. WAPDA and others 2001 SCMR 1566, wherein it was held that when an employee has to be removed on the basis of misconduct allegedly committed by him he deserves fair opportunity to defend himself as he would carry for all time to come the stigma of misconduct with him.

13. I think the cases referred to above are aptly applicable to the facts of the present case and the principles of natural justice demanded that a regular inquiry was held into the charges against the petitioner before he was shown the door. In any case, the petitioner had at least a legitimate opportunity to defend himself. However, the petitioner has been summarily removed from service without facing any proper or regular inquiry to defend himself and clear his name from the stigma that the allegations of misconduct are bound to carry. It is futile to argue that the petitioner's termination is a simple termination which will not jeopardize his job prospects in future as no one particularly the Government would offer him any job given the circumstances in which his services have been dispensed with.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this writ petition is allowed and the order of termination of petitioner's services vide notification dated 1-6-2010 is declared to be unlawful and of no legal effect and as a result, the petitioner is reinstated in service with effect from 1-6-2010 with back benefits. There will be no order as to costs. However, the respondents are at liberty, if so advised, to proceed against the petitioner by initiating and holding a regular inquiry in accordance with law.

Cited by 5 cases

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