' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.--The respondent under the provisions of Order XXXVII, C.P.C. Initiated a suit for the recovery of an amount of Rs.5,700,000 against the petitioners on the basis of a dishonoured cheque issued by the former in his favour. After the grant of leave to the petitioners and framing of the issues, the parties were put to trial; the case was in the process of the evidence of the respondent/plaintiff, when on 27-9-2002 the statement of one of his witnesses was to be subjected to cross-examination by the petitioners' side that their counsel/they absented from the proceedings, resultantly, ex parte proceedings were initiated against them. The petitioners neither moved any application for setting aside of such proceedings nor made any attempt to join those, therefore, finally an ex parte decree dated 3-10-2002 was passed in favour of the respondent and against the petitioners.
' In order to seek the setting aside of the noted decree, an application under Order IX Rule 13, C.P.C.
Was moved by the petitioners on 4-12-2002, which was contested by the respondent and upon framing of the issues and recording of the evidence, it was dismissed by the trial court vide order dated 1-4-2004, holding the same to be barred by time and also that the petitioners have failed to make out a 'sufficient cause' within the purview of the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., justifying the reversal of the decree. This order was challenged by the petitioner in Civil Revision No.847 of 2009 before the Lahore High Court.
2. Another limb of the litigation is that the ex parte decree dated 3-10-2002 was assailed by the petitioner through filing a Regular First Appeal (R.F.A. No.203 of 2004) in the said High Court on 21-4- 2004 i.e after the dimissal of his application under Order IX, Rule 13. Both the cases were heard by the Division Bench of the High Court and through the impugned consolidated judgment, by upholding the order of the trial Court dated 1-4-2004 on facts and law the revision petition was dismissed; the High Court has shared the view of the trial court that no 'sufficient cause' was established by the petitioners for the purposes of the application for the setting aside and also for seeking condonation of delay in approaching the court within the prescribed period of limitation; the grounds in this behalf were considered flimsy, bald and unsubstantiated. On hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners we are not convinced if there is any error of fact or law in the two decisions arising out of the proceeding from the aforementioned applications, calling for interference. The courts on the basis of proper appraisal of evidence on the record have categorically concluded that 'sufficient cause' has not proved/established by the petitioners both for the setting aside of the ex parte decree and for the condonation of delay. The reasons given in this behalf are cogent and supported by the record.
3. As far as dismissal of the noted R.F.A. Of the petitioners is concerned, suffice it to say that this was filed on 21-4-2004 and undoubtedly, it was blatantly barred by time, thus in order to seek the condonation of delay an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was moved along with the memo of appeal, on the premise that as the petitioners have been pursuing the remedy under Order IX, Rule 13, therefore, the time consumed in those proceedings, which was a bona fide exercise on their part be condoned. The High Court has not considered such a ground as a 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of the section ibid. And has dismissed the noted R.F.A.
Simpliciter as being time barred. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to convince us and substantiate on the basis of any case-law that in the situation, when two simultaneous remedies against an ex parte decree were available and open to a party, and consciously, deliberately and overtly one is availed by abandoning the other, whereafter on account of the failure to achieve the desired result in such availed remedy on the merits, the time spent in pursuing that matter can be considered as a 'sufficient cause' for the condonation of delay in the other remedy, such as an appeal. Rather to the contrary there is plethora of judgments in which it has been held that the time spent in the proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. For the setting aside of the ex parte decree cannot be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 as this does not constitute 'sufficient cause' within the purview of the Section. Reference in this behalf can be made to Jotiba Limbaji Kanashenavar v. Ramappa Jotiba Kanashenavar (AIR 1938 Bombay 459), Rajendra Nath Kanrar v. Kamal Krishna Kundu Chowdhury (AIR 1932 Calcutta 558), and Kunwar Jaqdish Kumar Singh v. L. Harikishen Das (AIR (29)1942 Oudh 362). It has also been held by this Court in Shah Muhammad v. Ghulam and another (PLD 1970 SC 196) that two remedies against an ex parte decree are available to the aggrieved party, one under section 96 of C.P.C. And the other by application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. These are concurrent in nature, however time spent in prosecuting the proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. Can neither be excluded by application of section 14 nor under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. For the foregoing, we do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned judgment of the High Court, through which the R.F.A. Of the petitioners has been dismissed as being time barred. The petition arising out of the proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. As dilated earlier also has no merits and is hereby dismissed.
4. In the light of above, we find no merits in these petitions, which are hereby dismissed. Leave to appeal declined. C.M.As. Are dismissed accordingly. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.