' MUNIB AKHTAR, J.--- This revision application arises in the following circumstances. The respondent No,1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff') filed a suit, being F.C. Suit No,23 of 2009, in the court of IIIrd Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad, impleading therein the present applicant (hereinafter referred to as "the Contesting defendant") and the respondents Nos.2 and 3. Briefly stated, the case of the plaintiff as made out in the plaint was that he had lent a sum of Rs,20,00,000 to the contesting defendant who had promised to return the same within a period of one year. The amount lent was sent by the plaintiff to the contesting defendant's bank account in Islamabad.
According to the plaintiff, the contesting defendant thereafter, from time to time, returned certain amounts totalling 9,00,000, but the balance Rs,11,00,000 was not returned and remained payable upto the date of the filing of the suit. The plaintiff claimed that he had also suffered loss and injury on account of the failure of the contesting defendant to return the aforesaid balance amount, and claimed Rs,50,00,000 by way of damages in this regard. The aforesaid suit was filed for judgment and decree against the contesting defendant for Rs,61,00,000.
2. The contesting defendant filed an application under Order VI, Rule 10, C.P.C. Before the trial Court.
His case was that none of the defendants resided or work for gain within the territorial limits of the courts at Hyderabad, and that the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff (which of course was denied on the merits) arose entirely within the limits of the courts at Islamabad. Thus, according to the contesting, defendant, the civil courts at Hyderabad lacked territorial jurisdiction, and he prayed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for filing before a court of competent jurisdiction, which according to the contesting defendant was the appropriate civil court at Islamabad. By means of the order dated 9-7-2009, the learned trial Court was pleased to allow the application moved by the contesting defendant and returned the plaint.
3. Being aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal, which was disposed of by means of the impugned order dated 26-1-2010. The learned appellate court disagreed with the learned trial court, set aside its order returning the plaint and remanded the suit back to it for further proceedings, including consideration of the issue of territorial jurisdiction after framing a propel issue with regard thereto. Being aggrieved by impugned order, the contesting defendant has preferred the present revision application.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting defendant submitted that the learned appellate court had erred in setting aside the order of the learned trial Court. He submitted that the civil courts at Hyderabad clearly lacked territorial jurisdiction in the matter. According to him, even a bare perusal of the plaint itself showed that all the defendants impleaded therein resided or work for gain or were otherwise present within the territorial limits of the courts at Islamabad. Therefore, if at all the suit could competently be filed at Hyderabad, that could only be under section 20(c), C.P.C, i.e. On the basis that the cause of action had accrued wholly or partly at Hyderabad. Learned counsel submitted that the amount lent to the contesting defendant had been given to him at Islamabad and there was no connection or nexus of any aspect of the suit with Hyderabad. He pointed out that the mere fact that the plaintiff resided at Hyderabad was of no consequence.
Thus, according to him, the plaint had been rightly returned. Learned counsel placed reliance on Apollo Textile Mills Limited v. Mian Farhat Iqbal 2010 CLC 389, a single Bench decision of this court, and Muhammad Kashif and another v. Talat Mujeeb Ranjha 2008 YLR 56 and Muhammad Hassan and another v. Zubair Ahmed and another 1988 CLC 1914, both decisions of the Lahore High Court.
5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff defended the impugned order. His case was that the matter also came within the ambit of section 19, C.P.C. And that the loss and damage suffered by the plaintiff on account of the non-payment of the balance amount by the contesting defendant had occurred at Hyderabad. He placed reliance on Shahzad Humayoun v. Muhammad Akram 1991 MLD 530, a decision of the Lahore High Court.
6. In my view, section 19, C.P.C. Has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case, as set forth in the plaint. As regards section 20 all the defendants, including in particular the contesting defendant, reside or work for gain or otherwise have their presence at Islamabad. As pointed out by learned counsel for the contesting defendant, the amount lent was admittedly made available to the latter by the plaintiff at Islamabad. However, in my view these factors, though of course relevant, are not determinative of the matter. In the Lahore High Court decision relied on by learned counsel for the plaintiff, reference has been made to the well-known principle that the debtor must follow the creditor and that, in appropriate cases, the courts where the creditor resides or works for gain will also have territorial jurisdiction. In my view, the real question is whether, and if so how, this principle is attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The principle was explained as follows by the Lahore High Court in Nasim Saleem and Company v. M. Barkatullah PLD 1967 Lah 928:- "12. The rule of Common Law requires that in the absence of contract to the contrary a debtor is bound to seek his creditor and to pay him where he is. The fact that this rule is applicable to Pakistan also is borne out by more than one decision of superior Courts of this Sub-Continent including the Privy Council. It was applied by S.A. Rehman, J. (as he then was) in Mst. Fazlan Bibi v.
Muhammad Azam PLD 1952 Lah. 227 which arose out of a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of non-maintenance. The suit had been filed by the wife at a place other than that where the defendant resided and where the marriage took place. It was held by his Lordship that the rule of English Law was attracted to the. Facts of the case and the Courts within the jurisdiction of which the plaintiff resided could entertain and dispose of a suit like the one out of which that appeal had arisen.
13. In still another case Sh. Imam Ali v. Ch. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1956 Lah. 341, B.Z. Kaikaus, J. (as he then was) observed:--- "This is how acceptance of the rule grants jurisdiction to the Civil Courts to entertain a suit at the place where the creditor resides. As regards the extent to which the rule is to be accepted. I may state that it is really a matter of inference as to intention of parties or as to the necessary implication of an agreement to pay. As their Lordship of the Privy Council have explained in Soniram Jeetmull v. Tata & Co. AIR 1927 PC 156 if a person says he will pay money to another, it will ordinarily mean that he would pay where the latter is. However, the circumstances of a particular case may negative any such intention or implication, and the rule is not one of universal application.---
7. Obviously, if there is a refusal or failure to repay any money lent, either in whole or in part, that constitutes part of the cause of action of any suit, and it would be regarded as having arisen at the place where the amount lent was to be repaid. The courts of that place would have territorial jurisdiction over the matter under section 20(c), C.P.C. If the agreement between the parties does not indicate where the money is to be repaid, and the relevant facts and circumstances also do not so indicate, then the principle that the debtor must seek his creditor would become applicable, and the courts of the place where the creditor resides or works for gain would have territorial jurisdiction. Now para 4 of the plaint provides as follows:--- "4. That the defendant No,1 since was obliged by the plaintiff therefore, as per commitment he returned the amount of Rs,5,00,000 only within the period of six months on 23-6-2007, again an amount of Rs,2,50,000 on 4-7-2007, again Rs,50,000 on 7-7-2007 and thereafter Rs,1,00,000 on 31-7- 2007 through online in the account of father of plaintiff namely Mr. Ghulam Nabi Mughal, the total amount returned during period of six months by the defendant No,1 become Rs,9,00,000 as he requested with further commitment that till the period of December, 2008 he will return the remaining amount of Rs,11,00,000."
' It is common ground between the parties that the account referred to in para 4 was an account at Hyderabad. Learned counsel for the contesting defendant submitted that the account was that of the plaintiff's father and not the plaintiff himself. However, in my view, that is of no moment since the amounts were received for and on behalf of the plaintiff, and constituted good discharge for the contesting defendant of the amounts being repaid.
8. In the present case, there is no written agreement nor does there appear to be any stipulation as to where the money lent by the plaintiff to the contesting defendant was to be returned. The amount (totalling Rs,9,00,000) actually repaid appears to have been repaid at Hyderabad. In my view therefore, the principle that the debtor must follow the creditor would be applicable and the place where the creditor resides or works for gain would be the place where part of the cause of action, i.e. Non-payment of the amount lent, would arise in the present case, it is the contesting defendant who is the debtor and the plaintiff who is the creditor, and accordingly since the contesting defendant must follow the plaintiff to return the loan amount and has allegedly not done so, the place where the plaintiff resides or works for gain would also be the place where part of the cause of action has arisen. Since that place is admittedly Hyderabad, it follows that the suit filed by the plaintiff was within the territorial jurisdiction of the civil courts at Hyderabad. Insofar as the cases relied upon by learned counsel for the contesting defendant are concerned, they are clearly distinguishable since the principle applicable in the present case did not apply there and hence the matter was decided in terms of the other principles applicable under section 20, C.P.C.
And on that basis the courts of the place where the suits were filed were found not to have territorial jurisdiction.
9. In view of what has been stated above, it follows that the learned appellate court arrived at the correct conclusion, namely that the civil courts at Hyderabad did have territorial jurisdiction in the matter. The order made by the learned appellate court does not therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, suffer from any illegality or irregularity as would require interference by this court. Accordingly, the operative part of the appellate order is upheld, and this revision application, along with listed miscellaneous application, are hereby dismissed.